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ABSTRACT 
The thesis explored the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were affected by 
the 2008 global economic crisis and the way they responded to the same. The Bank of 
Tanzania (BoT), Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd and Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) 
were taken as case studies. Secondary and primary data were used to inform the study. It 
was found that there are over twenty two (22) mechanisms through which banks can be 
affected by the crisis. The general mechanism through which the banks can be affected 
is through the impacts of the crisis on their customers. Mechanisms of impacts include 
defaults, debt re-scheduling, reduced lending and profits, stagnation in assets, more 
credit risk and reduced liquidity. Generally, BoT responded to the crisis in banking 
sector through various measures to ensure stability in the sector in the short and long 
term. Responses by individual banks included but are not limited to more carefull risk 
assessments, stress-testing, more adherence to regulations, provision of emergency 
liquidity, discussion with affected customers, capital injection in selected businesses and 
taking more long term and developmental view of customers. Conclusively, the 2008 
economic crisis affected the Tanzanian banking sector through second-round effects of 
the crisis. It is recommended that authorities and banks should be virgilant in times of 
economic crisis. They should respond accordingly so as to avoid the danger of such  
crises leading into collapse of individual banks and eventually the banking and financial 
system as a whole. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background Information 
The global economy has seen several economic crises. Among them is the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Duhigg, 2008, Robert and Ben, 2007 and Cochrane, 1958). 
The other crises include the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, (Kaufman et al 1999, Pettis, 
2001, Blustein, 2001 and Pempel,1999), crisis of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States of 1997 – 1998, Finnish Recession of 1990 – 1991 and the Euro Zone Sovereign 
Debt Crisis of 2010 (Matlock, 2010, Haidar, 2012).. Among the latest developments in 
the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis of 2010 by the last week of March 2013 was the 
bailing out of Cyprus due to the bad shape of its banking system. 
In the more recent times, the world economy underwent an economic crisis of more or 
less similar magnitude and impacts as the Great Depression of the 1930s. This is the 
2008 Global Financial and Economic Crisis (GFEC), which is the economic crisis of 
focus in this work. According to Adei (2010), Sikod (2010), Rwegasira (2010) and 
Ngowi (2010), the 2008 economic crisis started to manifest itself officially on 15th of 
September 2008 in the United States of America (USA). Since then, it spread not only 
to the financial sector of the global economy but also to its real sectors.  
Geographically, it spread to many parts of the world especially in Europe and Asia 
where the first-round effects were rapidly experienced. In Africa in general and 
Tanzania in particular, the contagious crisis was mainly seen and felt in the form of 
second-round effects (bounce-on effects) in the real sectors of the economy such as 
tourism, agriculture, mining and transport. Given the fact that these real sectors are  
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financed by the banking sector, the impacts of the crisis in the real sectors of the 
economy are assumed to affect the banking sector indirectly. The 2008 crisis is also 
termed the credit crunch, the economic turmoil, the economic downswing, the global 
downturn and financial meltdown (Adei, 2010). For the purpose of this work, the term 
economic crisis will be used. The crisis has been termed ‘the current’ (see for example, 
Ngowi, (2009a) to distinguish it from a similar crisis that was experienced in the 1930s 
that resulted into the Great Depression. According to IMF (2009), Adei (2010), 
Rwegasira (2010) and Ngowi (2010), the 2008 crisis manifested itself in form of severe 
credit, banking, currency, and trade crisis. 
According to Adei (2010), Rwegasira (2010), AfDB (2009), and Eghan (2010), among 
others, the 2008 crisis had many closely linked causes, impacts and responses. The 
causes include but are not limited to weaknesses in the financial regulations in the 
United States of America (USA). Within short time after the crisis, there had been 
many, far-reaching and closely linked and at times self-reinforcing impacts of the crisis. 
They include reduced aggregate demand, production, employment, incomes, liquidity 
and credit. These have been felt virtually in all sectors of the economy at individual, 
household, community, country, sub-region, region and global levels. There had also 
been many and far-reaching responses to the crisis. They include various policy 
responses. The responses have aimed at inter alia, halting the crisis, reducing its 
negative impacts, preventing a new crisis in the future and even exploiting 
opportunities that have unfolded from it.  
The crisis became among the leading current and contemporary global discourse issues 
since September 2008. This has been so in the academia, policy and decision making, 
among practitioners, captains and titans of the industry as well as the general public.  
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Among the key issues of discussion have included the meaning and causes of the crisis 
as documented in inter alia, Eghan (2010), Ngowi (2010, 2013), Rwegasira (2010), 
Norris (2008), Adei (2010), Moyo (2010), Sikod (2009), Minja (2009), Oke (2009) and 
Akbar (2008). 
Discussions on the 2008 economic crisis have also centred on its many and far-reaching 
impacts. Among the works on the impacts of the crisis include but are not limited to 
AfDB (2009a), Ikome (2008), IMF (2009), Ngowi (2013) and Kasekende (2008). 
Generally, the impacts outlined by the authors include reduced aggregate demand, 
reduced production, reduced employment, reduced incomes, reduced liquidity and 
creditt, reduced economic growth, reduced aid and weakened banks. 
Other discussions have revolved around various responses to the 2008 economic crisis. 
Among the works that have dwelt on responses to the crisis include those of the ILO 
(2008), Aryeetey (2009), IMF (2009), Krugman (2008), Ngowi (2010a), Ngowi 
(2009d), UN (2008), Fagbohun (2009), Barrell et al (2009) and Tumusiime-Mutebire 
(2009).. generally, responses outlined by the authors include various policy responses 
including economy-wide stimulus packages and sector-specific bailouts.  
In the research that informed this thesis, the focus has been on identifying and 
discussing the mechanisms through which the 2008 economic crisis potentially and 
actually affected banks in Tanzania. The focus has also been on various responses to 
the crisis in the banking sector with illustrations from three case studies. These are case 
studies on the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) which is the central bank and regulator of the 
banking sector. in Tanzania and Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited and Tanzania 
Investment Bank (TIB) which are among the 32 banks that were licensed by BoT when 
this study started in 2010. 
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1.2. Definitions of of Economic Crisis 
The research that forms the basis of this thesis was on the mechanisms through which 
banks were affected by and responded to the 2008 economic crisis in Tanzania. In order 
to place the study on the 2008 crisis in broader context, a brief description of economic 
crisis is given in what follows.  
According to Eghan (2010), economic crises usually refer to a long-term economic 
state characterised by slow growth or setback in economic activity; rising 
unemployment; low prices; and low levels of trade and investment. These are among 
the characteristics that have been seen in the 2008 global economic crisis. There has 
been a worldwide decline in economic activities of production, distribution and 
consumption in virtually all sectors of the economy. Unemployment increased across 
the globe and prices of most goods and services declined mainly due to reduced 
aggregate demand which in turn was a result of reduced incomes.  
Similar to Eghan  (ibid), the Business Dictionary (undated) describes economic crisis as 
a situation in which the economy of a country experiences a sudden downturn brought 
on by a financial crisis. An economy facing a crisis will most likely experience a falling 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a drying up of liquidity and rising or falling prices due 
to inflation or deflation, respectively. The sudden downturn in economic activities is 
correctly described as a depression in Pass et al (2000). 
Similar to Pass et al (ibid), the Business Dictionary (op cit), correctly state that  
economic crisis can take the form of a recession or a depression depending on its 
magnitude and intensity. Typically, economic crises are punctuated by periods of low, 
or even negative economic growth as a result of many and self-reinforcing factors such  
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as dwindling aggregate demand. Low and negative economic growth imply that 
production levels for goods and services in economies are lower than normal, resulting 
in increased unemployment and its many and far-reaching implications including 
negative impacts on banks that finance economic activities in the real sectors of the 
economy. 
According to Pass et al (2000), depression is a phase of the business cycle characterized 
by a severe decline in the level of economic activity. During depression, real output and 
investment are at very low levels and there is high level of unemployment. A 
depression is caused mainly by a fall in aggregate demand and can be reversed 
provided that the authorities evoke expansionary fiscal and monetary policy and their 
appropriate instruments. Whereas the crisis of the 1930s was of a depression level, the 
2008 one was of recession level. 
1.3 Banking Sector in Tanzania 
The research that informs this thesis focused on the Tanzanian banking sector. In order 
to place the study in the broader context, this part of the thesis is dedicated to 
documenting some key features of the banking sector in Tanzania in general and the 
banks that were studied in particular.  
The Tanzanian financial sector in general and its banking sub-sector in particular has 
evolved and developed relatively fast in the past 50 years or so. This is mainly the case 
since the major and far-reaching reforms in the management of the economy in the 
mid-1980s. Among other things, there has been an increase of the number of banks. 
The official March 2nd 2013 Bank of Tanzania (BoT) list of licenced banks has a total 
of 32 banks (online at http://www.bot-tz.org/Banking 
Supervision/RegisteredBanks.asp). Some of these are locally owned  
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while others are internationally owned.  
According to the Bank of Tanzania – BoT (2010), as at 31st December 2010 Tanzania 
had 42 banking institutions. Out of these, a total of 28 (about 66.7%) were fully-fledged 
commercial banks. The remaining 14 (about 33%) were financial institutions. The 
discussion on the overview of the banking sector in Tanzania below draws much from 
BoT (ibid). 
1.3.1 Network of Banking Institutions and Ownership Structure 
As at 31st December 2010, total number of operating branches/agencies was 473. This 
is an increase by 43 branches/agencies (1%) ) as compared to 430 reported in 2009. As 
at 31st December 2010, five (11.9%) institutions were majority state-owned and 37 
(88.9%) were majority privately owned. Therefore banks in Tanzania are largely 
private-sector owned. Twenty two (52.4%) of the banking institutions were locally 
owned and 20 (47.6%) were foreign owned. Theoretically, this relatively huge foreign 
onwership of banks can have many and far-reaching implications if economic crisis 
shakes parent banking companies in a way that would negatively affect the branches 
located in Tanzania. 
1.3.2 Market share 
The financial system in Tanzania is dominated by banking institutions which accounted 
for about 75 percent of the total assets. This partly justifies the focus of the study in the 
banking sub-sector of the financial institutions sector. As at 31st December 2010, the 
banking sector had total assets of Tshs 12,570 billion. The banking sector assets were 
equally shared between local and foreign banks. This verifies the view above that the 
47.6% foreign ownership, although minority compared to the 52.4% of local banks, 
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may have many and far-reaching implications if economic crisis affects negatively 
these entities.  
1.3.3 Employment in the Banking Sector 
According to BoT (ibid), as at 31st December 2010, the banking sector had 10,647 
employees as compared to 8,782 reported in 2009. This is an increase of 1865 (21.24%) 
staff and was mainly due to the increase in the number of licensed banks and financial 
institutions, branch expansion and newly introduced products and services provided by 
banks and financial institutions. The 10,647 employees are substantial number of labour 
force.  
If the banking sector is negatively affected by economic crisis in such a way that would 
lead to these staff loosing jobs, the direct and indirect impacts in the economy would be 
substantial. The study on the impacts of and responses to the 2008 crisis in the banking 
sector therefore is essential in identifying the possible labour market implications of the 
crisis via the effects on banking sector employees.  
1.3.4 Capital Structure 
Total capital of the banking sector as at 31st December 2010 reached TZS 1,516 billion 
compared to Tshs 1,266 billion recorded in year 2009. This is an increase of 19.75% 
from the 2009 figures. Major components of capital were paid up share capital (38.19% 
of the total capital), retained earnings and profits (54.78%), share premium (3.76%), 
and general reserves (1.75%). 
1.4 Introduction to the Studied Banks 
The thesis focused on three specific banks in Tanzania. These are the Bank of Tanzania 
(BoT), Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited and Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB). In order 
 8 
to understand and put the responses from these banks in correct contexts and 
perspectives, a brief description of these banks is documented in this part. 
1.4.1 Introduction to the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) 
Information about BoT was obtained from its website (www.bot-tz.org). What is 
presented here is a summary of what BoT is and its functions. Most importantly, there 
is the researcher’s description why it was important to include BoT in this study. The 
Bank of Tanzania (BoT) is the country’s central bank. It is the leading monetary 
authority and regulator in the financial sector and its banking sub-sector. BoT was 
established by the Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965 (ammended in 1995 and 2006) that was 
passed by the National Assembly in December 1965. The Bank was opened on June 
14th 1966. The Act empowered BoT to perform all the traditional central banking 
functions. 
BoT has several objectives and functions. Among its primary objective anf function is 
that of maintaining longer term price stability. Under this objective, BoT is required to 
formulate, define and implement monetary policy, directed to the economic objective of 
maintaining domestic price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of 
the national economy of Tanzania. 
Apart from the primary function, BoT has important subsidiary central banking 
functions. These include: the Bank of Issue in which it has the sole right to issue notes 
and coins in Tanzania. Other subsidiary functions include those of being the bankers' 
bank, the governments' bank, promotor of financial development, the advisor to the 
government on any matter relating to its functions, powers, and duties. It is also the 
guardian of the country's international reserves and a supervisor of banks and financial  
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institutions.  
It is mainly in the context of the BoT’s function of supervision of banks and financial 
institutions that the Bank was involved in this study. In this function, BoT has the role 
of ensuring that commercial banks and other financial institutions conduct their 
business on a sound prudential basis and according to the various laws and regulations 
in force. The function includes supervision of banking conduct and the licensing of 
financial institutions.  
According to the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1991, and the 2006 BoT 
Act, BoT has to implement prudential controls concerning capital adequacy, liquidity, 
concentration of credit and risk diversification, asset classification and provisioning, 
and prohibited activities. It also licenses banks and financial institutions; facilitates 
monitors  a Deposit Insurance Fund, and modifies and monitors the Minimum Reserve 
Requirements and foreign exchange exposure. 
In the context of mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were impacted by the 
2008 global economic crisis and responses to the same, it was assumed by the 
researcher that BoT would have adequate information given its role as the sector’s 
regulator. 
1.4.2 Introduction Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited 
Unless otherwise stated, the source of the information contained here is the bank’s 
website. Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited has a long history in Tanzania. The bank first 
entered the Tanzanian market well back in 1925. It continued to operate in the country 
until 1967 when its operations were nationalized to become National Bank of  
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Commerce. This was a result of the Arusha Declaration that embraced Ujamaa policy 
which among other things placed all major means of the economy under the state.  
Following the major and far-reaching reforms in Tanzania’s economic management in 
the mid 1980s and 1990s, Barclays Bank Plc made a decision to re-enter the Tanzania 
market. It re-opened its doors in the country in the year 2000. The bank has about 22 
branches, 41 Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs), over 400 employees and over 
110,000 customers.  
The bank serves a wide range of customers including large corporate. These consist of 
large local and multinationals, public sector and development organizations as well as 
supranational organizations. Products offered under the large corporates segments 
include corporate banking services, cash management services, treasury products, 
structured financing and trade financing.  
The bank offers a range of commercial lending products. These include overdraft 
facilities for periods of up to 12 months, lease finance for periods of up to 36 months 
either to acquire specific assets or as part of structured finance packages and short and 
medium-term loans. These are available for between one and five years for businesses 
seeking to borrowing funds for capital expenditure requirements.  
The bank is able to access funds through its contacts with the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the French Development 
Corporation (PROPARCO) and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). 
It is the researcher’s views that Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd can have been negatively 
affected if these institutions making borrowing of foreign currencies possible were 
affected by the 2008 crisis.  
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Apart from the large corporate customers, Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd also has 
products for Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs). It also offers trade finance 
products including imports trade financing/import letters of credit. The bank’s 
correspondent banks across the globe enable it to issue letters of credit to beneficiaries 
in virtually all countries worldwide and in all freely convertible currencies. It is the 
researcher’s views that if the correspondent banks that Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd 
transacts with were negatively affected by the crisis, this could affect the bank as well 
through contagious effects. Other trade finance products offered by the bank include 
standby letters of credit.  
1.4.3 Introduction to Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) 
Unless otherwise stated, the source of information about Tanzania Investment Bank  
(TIB) is the bank’s website (http://www.tib.co.tz). TIB was established in 1970 as a 
development finance institution (DFI). After about 25 years, the bank was transformed 
into an investment cum development bank. Similar to Barclays bank, TIB provides a 
comprehensive range of deposit services, in both Tanzania shillings and foreign 
currencies. 
1.4.3.1 TIB Business Areas 
TIB has various business areas. These include corporate banking services, complex 
trade finance arrangements in conjunction with its correspondent banks, others bank 
products such as Bonds and Guarantees and a wide range of treasury services to 
corporate clients. Other products offered by TIB include personal banking services, 
stock broking services through its subsidiary company, Rasilimali Ltd. It is also 
involved in trade inancing, agriculture financing and support to Small and Medium size  
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Enterprises (SMEs). 
1.5 Statement of the Research Problem 
Very little is known about the 2008 global economic crisis in general and whether it 
affected banks in Tanzania in particular. In case it affected banks in Tanzania, the 
mechanisms through which this took place and the way the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) as 
the leading monetary authority and regulator of banking sector as well as individual 
banks responded to the crisis are not known either.  
According to Kothari (2004) the statement of research probem consists of the issues 
that the researcher wants to adress and find answers to. The issues that this study 
wanted to find out were: what are the potential and actual mechanisms through which 
banks in  
Tanzania were affected by the 2008 economic crisis? How did the Central Bank and 
other banks respond to the crisis? Therefore the problem that the study set out to 
research included identification, documentation and discussion of the mechanisms 
through which banks in Tanzania were affected by and responded to the 2008 global 
economic crisis.  
If no systematic scientific study on these mechanisms and responses and their 
understanding becomes neglected, there can be many and far-reaching negative 
implications to the economy. These implications include lack of scientific knowledge 
on how banks can be affected by recurring or future similar crises and shocks as well as 
lack of scientific knowledge on how to respond to similar crises and shocks. Lack of 
such knowledge can lead to a collapse of the banking and even the whole financial 
system in case of similar future crises and shocks. 
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1.6 Research Objectives  
The study was guided by both general and specific objectives. These are outlined 
below. 
1.6.1 General Objective 
The general research objective of the study was to identify and have understanding of 
mechanisms through which banks could have been impacted by and responded to the 
2008 global economic crisis.  
1.6.2 Specific Objectives 
The study was guided by the following specific objectives: 
i) To identify mechanisms through which banks were potentially and actually 
impacted by the 2008 global economic crisis.  
ii) To identify the way the Bank of Tanzania and other banks responded to the 
2008 global financial and economic crisis. 
1.7 Research Questions 
The study that informs this report was guided by the following research questions: 
i) Through which mechanisms were banks in Tanzania impacted by the 2008 
global economic crisis? 
ii) What have been the responses by BoT and other banks in Tanzania to the 2008 
global economic crisis Tanzania? 
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1.8 Justifications of the Study 
The need for research on an economic global phenomenon that is as new, large, 
potentially dangerous, current and relevant as the 2008 economic crisis in general and 
its impacts on and responses in the banking sub-sector in particular cannot be 
overemphasized. When the research informing this thesis was conceptualized in 2009, 
it was still a new area of research. Even at the time of writing this thesis, the 2008 
economic crisis still remained a new, virgin and very relevant area of research. It was 
and still is a new research area with a lot of aspects not yet thoroughly researched on in 
a study of this magnitude if at all. The study therefore was and still is very important in 
creating new scientific knowledge in this area of study.  
1.9 Significance of the Study 
Systematic scientific knowledge of the mechanisms through which banks can be 
impacted by economic crisis and the way they can respond to the same is important for 
policy and decision makers as well as for practitioners and the general public. This is 
because of the centrality of the banking sector in the emerging modern economy like 
that of Tanzania.  
Scientific knowledge of the possible mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania 
were affected by and responded to the 2008 crisis has been missing. Yet, such 
knowledge is extremely important in designing interventions to reduce or even prevent 
impacts of a possible future similar crisis and shocks in the banking sector and even 
beyond. It is also important to scientifically establish how the BoT and other banks 
responded to the crisis with a view of, among other things, designing interventions by 
way of responses to deal with possible future similar crises and shocks. 
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The knowledge that has been created in this research in general and the field study part 
of it in particular is envisaged to have many and far-reaching implications to policy and 
decision makers, the academia, practitioners, captains and titans of the industry in 
general and its banking section in particular as well as the general public at local and 
international levels. The study findings and their wide disseminations have added and 
still will add new value in the existing body of knowledge.  
The findings from the study informing this thesis are of great value in understanding 
the crisis, its impacts, various responses to it and most importantly how to avoid 
possible future crises and/or their many and far-reaching negative impacts. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the findings of this study will stimulate academic and 
policy discussions and debates and become a source of further researches for many 
researchers including the author of this work. 
The significance is further strengthened by the 2010 Euro zone sovereign debt crisis 
that is arguably an extension of the 2008 global economic crisis and was still unfolding 
when the study informing this report was on-going and even at the time when this 
report was written.  
1.10 Scope of the Study 
The study limited itself in identifying, documenting and analyzing the mechanisms 
through which the 2008 global economic crisis actually and potentially impacted banks 
in Tanzania and the way kinds of responses that were given to the crisis. Apart from the 
general over view at global level, the study focused on the banking sector in Tanzania 
in particular. It is important to point out that this was not an impacts assessment study 
in which one would empirically measure the actual impacts of the crisis in the banks 
and establish clear causal-effect relationship. To the contrary, the scope of the study 
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was limited to exlporing the mechanisms through which banks were affected by the 
crisis and the way they responded to the same. 
1.11 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
A number of limitations were encountered in this study. These are various constraints 
and challenges that threatened successful accomplishment of the study. These 
limitations had to be circumnavigated by the researcher by way of delimitations so as to 
ensure a smooth and successful implementation of the study, the limitations 
notwithstanding. The key limitations that were encountered and the way each of these 
were solved in order to ensure success in the study are described below.  
Academic literature on the 2008 global financial and economic crisis in general and in 
the context of mechanisms of impacts and responses in the banking sub-sector in 
Tanzania in particular is limited. This is because the crisis was relatively new and 
therefore no many systematic scientific works had been written in this area. As a 
delimitation (solution to the limitation) some authoritative grey literature were also be 
used to inform the study 
Willingness and readiness for banks to give the needed data was foreseen due to 
possibility of some data being too sensitive to be given to the public domain. This 
limitation was partly reduced by ensuring confidentiality to the banks. 
Another limitation related to the respondents that was foreseen is their time to respond 
to the data collection instruments. This is partly because most bank staff with 
authoritative knowledge to respond to the data collection instrument are generally very 
busy. In order to reduce this limitation, the researcher prepared a rather short and direct 
questions that aimed at collecting the required information without unnecessarily  
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bothering the respondents. Time for the study was another limitation. This is because 
although the researcher had been granted a study leave on the second year of the study, 
the researcher was at times requested by the employer to support lecturing of Masters 
students as well as supervising their research works (this was the case in the whole first 
year of the study). The time limitation was solved by prioritizing the study as well 
foregoing leisure in order to concentrate on the study 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES BEHIND ECONOMIC CRISES 
2.1. Overview  
This chapter presents an overview of theories that describe economic crises. These are 
various schools of thoughts that partly describe why economic crises occur and how 
they can be responded to. There are various theories that attempt to explain reasons 
behind economic crisis. These theories include demand-driven theories, monetarist’s 
theories, break of international trade theories, debt deflation theories, Austrian school 
theories, heterodox theories and Marxist theories. These theories are briefly reviewed in 
the context of the 2008 global economic crisis 
2.2. Demand-driven Theories 
According to Klein (1947), the demand-driven theories of economic crisis are by and 
large Keynesian economics in nature. They attribute economic crisis to under 
consumption and over-investment. According to the theory, under consumption and 
over investments do cause economic bubbles. It also attributes economic crisis to 
malfunctioning of banks, industrialists or incompetence by government officials. 
Klein (ibid) informs that the consensus among demand-driven theories of economic 
crisis is that a large-scale loss of confidence in the market would lead to a sudden 
reduction in consumption and investment spending. When panic and deflation have set 
in, many economic agents will believed that they can avoid further losses by keeping 
clear of the markets.  
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According to Keynes (1936), lower aggregate expenditures in the economy contribute 
to a massive decline in income and to employment that was well below the average. In 
such a situation, the economy reaches equilibrium at low levels of economic activity 
and high unemployment.  
As a response to this economic situation, governments have to intervene in order to 
keep people fully employed. Such government interventions include running budget 
deficits when the economy is slowing. This is because the private sector would not 
invest enough to keep production at the normal level and bring the economy out of 
recession. According to the Keynesian school of thought, governments have to respond 
to economic crisis by increasing their spending and cutting taxes. (Keynes, 1936). 
All of the above were partly seen in various parts of the world in response to the 2008 
economic crisis. Governments across the world introduced massive stimulus packages 
and bail out plans. Central banks on the other hand reduced borrowing interest rates. 
All these aimed at rescuing and stimulating economies so that they could be back to the 
pre-crisis growth paths.  
In the 2008 crisis, some of these elements of the theory have been reported in among 
others, Adei (2010), Ngowi (2010, 2013), USA (2009) and IMF (2009). Therefore the 
above theoretical triggers of economic crisis can partly describe why the 2008 global 
economic crisis happened. 
2.3. Monetarists’ Theory  
According to the monetarists such as Bernanke (2000), economic crisis such as the 
Great Depression of the 1930s which was very similar to the 2008 economic crisis 
starts as an ordinary recession before becoming a depression. According to Pass et al 
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(2000), a recession is milder than a depression in terms of its size and impacts in the 
economy. Describing the 1930s depression, Bernanke (op cit), argues that significant 
policy mistakes by monetary authorities such as the Federal Reserve in the case of US 
and central banks in other countries caused a shrinking of the money supply. This 
shrinking, according to the monetarists, greatly exacerbated the economic situation, 
causing a recession to descend into a depression. (Bernanke, 2000). 
Subscribers of the monetarist theory of economic crisis argue that the Great Depression 
was mainly caused by monetary contraction. This was the consequence of poor policy-
making by the American Federal Reserve System. This continued the crisis in the 
banking system. Therefore, by not acting, the Federal Reserve allowed money supply to 
shrink. This transformed a normal recession into the Great Depression. According to 
Adei (2010), Ngowi (2010, 2013) and USA (2010) among the causes of the 2008 
economic crisis is weakness in the US monetary authority, the Federal Reserve. Partly 
therefore the monetarist theory explains the causes of the 2008 crisis. 
2.4. Debt Deflation Theory 
According Fisher (1933), the predominant factor leading to the Great Depression of the 
1930s which was very similar to the 2008 economic crisis, was over-indebtedness and 
deflation. According to Fisher (ibid) loose credit led to over-indebtedness. This in turn 
fueled speculation and asset bubbles. This seems to partly describe the 2008 crisis when 
considering sub-prime mortgage part of its cause in which prior to the crisis there was 
very easy access to credit and predatory behaviour of banks that resulted into among 
other things subprime mortgage problem.  
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According to the dept deflation theory, banks will begin to fail as debtors default on 
debt. This seems to be the case in the 2008 crisis in which the financial crisis graduated 
to the real sectors of the economy thereby making businesses struggle and at time 
default. The theory correctly states that depositors will attempt to withdraw their 
deposits en masse. This is what is termed run on bank. If it leads to multiple bank runs, 
the result would be a collapse of the banking system. For details, see among others, 
Bernanke, (1983). 
The danger of run on bank was observed in Cyprus in March 2013 following the Euro 
zone sovereign debt crisis which is arguably a result of the 2008 crisis. As a response to 
prevent this from happening, the authorities imposed maximum amount of money that 
could be withdrawn in Cyprus. Therefore the debt deflation theory partly describes not 
only the Great Depression of the 1930s but also the 2008 economic crisis and the 2010 
Euro zone sovereign debt crisis. 
The debt deflation theory suggests that bank failures can snow-ball when borrowers do 
not have time or money to repay due to the impacts of economic crisis including job 
losses. In times of economic crisis, there is generally poor future profits outlook.  
Therefore investors’ sentiments tend to be very low or cease completely. In the 
environment of Non Performing Loans (NPLs), and worsening future economic 
prospects, the surviving banks tend to respond by becoming more conservative in their 
lending. See among others, Fortune (2000) for details.  
Among other things, banks would be more cautious in their loans assessments. They are 
also likely to build up their capital reserves and end up with accumulation of excessive 
reserves. The implications include the fact that with conservative approach to lending,  
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banks are likely to end up making fewer loans. Since their profits are mainly a function 
of lending, they will end up with reduced profit levels in times of economic crisis. This 
phenomenon has been partly observed in the 2008 economic crisis in the studied banks. 
Therefore, the debt deflation theory too, as do the demand-driven and monetarist 
theories, partly describes the causes, impacts of and responses to the 2008 crisis. For 
details see Fisher (1933), Bernanke (1983) and Mishkin (1978).  
2.5 New Classical Theories of Economic Crises 
According to Kehoe and Edward (2007), neoclassical perspectives of economic crises 
focus on the decline in productivity. This causes initial decline in output and a 
prolonged recovery due to policies that affect the labour market. The authors 
decompose economic decline into a decline in the labor force, capital stock, and 
consequently the productivity with which these inputs are used. According to Kehoe 
and Edward (ibid), theories of the Great Depression have to explain an initial severe 
decline but rapid recovery in productivity, relatively little change in the capital stock, 
and a prolonged depression in the labor force. Given the nature of the 2008 economic 
crisis, this theory does not seem to explain it. Decline in productivity was more of a 
result rather than a cause of the 2008 global economic crisis. 
2.6 Austrian School of Economics Theory of Economic Crises 
Economic crises have also been theorized by the Austrian School of economics. In this 
theory and similar to the monetarists theory, the Federal Reserve, is held responsible for 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Contrary to the monetarists however, the Austrian 
School argues that the key cause of the Depression was expansion of the money supply 
in the 1920s that led to an unsustainable credit-driven boom. In the context of the 2008  
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crisis, this can partly be the case especially in some years preceding the crisis.The 
Austrian school correctly argues that excess money supply led to an unsustainable 
boom in both asset prices (stocks and bonds) and capital goods. By the time the Fed 
belatedly tightened in 1928, it was far too late. Therefore a significant economic 
contraction was inevitable. See Murray (2000) for details. Contrary to Keynesian 
Economics, the Austrian School argues that government efforts to prop up the economy 
after the crash of 1929 only made things worse. 
In the context of the 2008 crisis, this view of the Austrian School is opposed because 
largely the various interventions by various governments helped to reduce the intensity 
and spread of the crisis. These interventions include but are not limited to economy-
wide stimulus packages and sector specific bail outs. According to Diego (2009), the 
Austrian School partly believe that the Federal Reserve further contributed to the 
problems of the Depression by permitting the money supply to shrink during the 
earliest years of the Depression. 
In the context of the 2008 crisis and even the 2010 Euro zone sovereign debt crisis, this 
view is supported. This is because in times of economic crisis, there is a need for 
expansionary rather than contractionary monetary policy. Austerity economic measures 
that were partly applied as a response to the 2008 crisis and largely as a response to the 
Euro zone sovereign debt crisis have been described as bad economics in Ngowi 
(2013). This is because they contribute to deepening of rather than to the recovery from 
economic crisis.  
2.7 Marxist Theories of Economic Crisis 
According to Harman (2009), the Marxist theory of economic crisis sees recession and  
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depression as unavoidable under free-market capitalism. This is because, according to 
Marxists, there are no restrictions on accumulations of capital other than the market 
itself. In the Marxist view, capitalism tends to create unbalanced accumulations of 
wealth, leading to over-accumulations of capital which inevitably lead to a crisis. 
Marxists urge that economic crisis like the Great Depression of the 1930s is a regular 
feature of the boom and bust pattern of chaotic capitalist development. According to 
this school of thought, economic crises are inevitable. They will be increasingly severe 
until the contradictions inherent in the mismatch between capitalist mode of production 
and the development of productive forces reach the final point of failure.  
Marx’s theory of economic crisis has also been described by Easterling (2003). The 
author points out that capitalism is an economic system that is inherently crisis-prone. It 
is driven by forces which cause it to be unstable, anarchic and self-destructive. 
According to Easterling (ibid), understanding the drive toward economic crisis is 
central to Marx’s analysis of capitalism and to his arguments for the possibility and 
necessity of revolutionary change.  
The lack of profit and accumulation as a describing factor behind economic crisis as 
captured in Easterling (ibid) does not seem to be appropriate in the context of the 2008 
global economic crisis. Lack of profit and accumulation was more of results than 
causes of the 2008 crisis. These have been well captured in Ngowi (2010, 2013), Adei 
(2010) and Rwegasira (2010), among others.  
Where Marx’s theory in solving economic crisis seems to be relevant is on government 
intervention in forms of Keynessian economics in which governments intervene to 
correct market failures of the capitalist system. This has been seen in forms of various 
stimulus packages and bail out plans. The challenge in this, especially in poor 
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developing countries like Tanzania include the ability of governments to sustain such 
interventions for a long time if crises continue for substantially prolonged period of 
time. According to the Marx’s theory therefore, economic crisis is a problem that is 
confined to capitalist system. This is not the case with the 2008 global economic crisis 
that affected all countries both socialist and capitalist. 
Marx’s theory of economic crisis is not sufficient and relevant in explaining the 2008 
global economic crisis. It focus much on exploitation of labour by capital and creation 
of surplus as a result of exploitation. Marx’s theory assumes that economic crisis is 
essentially a problem of capitalism. By implication, only capitalist countries would 
experience the 2008 global economic crisis. Based on the literature that has been 
reviewed it is clear that the crisis was not confined in capitalis countries only. It 
affected virtually all countries across the globe.  
2.8 Business Cycle Theory of Economic Crisis 
The concept of business cycle is described by Pass, Lowes and Davies (2000: 50 – 51) 
as fluctuations in the level of economic activity alternating between periods of 
depression and boom conditions. Business cycle is characterized by four phases. The 
first one is depression which is a period of rapidly falling aggregate demand 
accompanied by very low levels of output and heavy unemployment. This eventually 
reaches the bottom of the trough.  
The second phase of business cycle is recovery which is an upturn in aggregate demand 
accompanied by rising output and a reduction in unemployment. The third phase is 
boom in which aggregate demand reaches and then exceeds sustainable output levels 
(potential Gross National Product – GNP) as the peak of the cycle is reached. Full 
employment is reached and the emergence of excess demand causes the general price  
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level to increase. The fourth phase of a business cycle is recession in which the boom 
comes to an end. In this stage, aggregate demand falls, bringing with it, initially, 
modest falls in output and employment but then, as demand continues to contract, there 
is an onset of depression. The 2008 GFEC is seen as the recession stage of the business 
cycle. 
Pass et al (ibid), correctly point out that there are several causes of economic 
fluctuation as described in the business cycle theory. According to the authors, one 
prominent factor behind business cycle is the volatility of fixed investment and 
inventory investment expenditures (the investment cycle), which are themselves a 
function of business’ expectations about future demand. At the top of the cycle, argues 
Pass et al (ibid), income begins to level off and investment in new supply capacity 
finally catches up with demand. This causes a reduction in induced investment and, via 
contracting multiplier effects, leads to a fall in national income, which reduces 
investment even further. As described by Pass et al (ibid), at the bottom of the 
depression, investment may rise exogenously or through the revival of replacement 
investment. In this case, the increase in investment spending will, via, expansionary 
multiplier effects, lead to a greater volume of induced investment. The figure below 
depicts a typical business cycle. 
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Figure 2.1: Business Cycle 
 
Source: Adopted from Pass et al (2000) 
There are a number of scholarly works on the business cycle theory. These include but 
are not limited to the works of Alvarez et al (1999) on Labor Market Policies in an 
Equilibrium Search Model; Abel (1990) on Asset Prices under Habit Formation and 
Catching up with the Joneses; Altig et al (2004) on Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal 
Rigidities and the Business Cycle; Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmermann (2004) on 
International Business Cycles: What are the Facts?; and Andolfatto (1996) on Business 
Cycles and Labor-Market Search. 
Other scholarly works on business cycle theory include those of Baxter (1995) on 
International Trade and Business Cycles; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist on The 
Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework; Lawrence and 
Eichenbaum on Current Real Business Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor Market 
Fluctuations; and Prescott (1986) on Theory Ahead of Business-Cycle Measurement. 
Some of these works are reviewed as a point of departure in applying the business cycle  
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theory as the theoretical framework guiding the study that informs this work.  
Rebelo (2005) reviews the contribution of real business cycle models to the 
understanding of economic fluctuations. In the context of this work, such economic 
fluctuations include the ones observed in the 2008 global financial and economic crisis 
and those associated with the 2010 Euro zone sovereign debt crisis. The author also 
discusses open issues in business cycle research. Citing Lucas and Prescott (1971), 
Rebelo (op cit) correctly argues that business cycles can be studied using dynamic 
general equilibrium models.  
He also argues that is possible to unify business cycle and growth theory by insisting 
that business cycle models must be consistent with the empirical regularities of long-
run growth. Rebelo (ibid: 1) informs that the wave of models that first followed 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) work were referred to as real business cycle (RBC) 
models. This is because of their emphasis on the role of real shocks, particularly 
technology shocks, in driving business fluctuations.  
In the context of this work however, the role of technology shocks is not the major 
focus as is the role of financial shock that is seen to be behind the 2008 global financial 
and economic crisis. According to Chari and Kehoe (1999), RBC-based models have 
been used in analyzing policies especially in studies related to optimal fiscal and 
monetary policies. This work on the 2008 GFEC has elements of responses to the crisis 
including fiscal and monetary policy responses through various fiscal and monetary 
policy instruments. That is partly why the business cycle theory forms the theoretical 
framework and foundation of this work. 
Rebelo (ibid: 2) correctly discusses the Great Depression of the 1929 to 1933 in the 
context of business cycle theory. Now that the 2008 GFEC is very similar to the Great  
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Depression, business cycle theoretical framework is used in this study. The Depression 
was characterize by, inter alia, large output decline, stock market crash and financial 
crisis that occurred between 1929 and 1933. These characteristics are seen as part and 
parcel of massive market failures. These could be prevented if governments played 
larger roles in the economy. Similar views do emerge in the context of the 2008 GFEC. 
Rebelo outlines an observation on responses to the Great Depression of the 1930 that is 
very similar to what we have witnessed with the 2008 GFEC. This is the dramatic  
increase in government spending as a fraction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This 
happened seen since the 1930s as part of policy response to the Great Depression. As 
for the 2008 GFEC, policy responses include generous expenditure by governments 
through massive economy-wide stimulus packages and sector as well as industry-
specific bail outs. 
The causes and results of shocks from the Great Depression are outlined in the context 
of business cycle theory by Rebelo (ibid:3). The shocks include huge drops in the 
global agricultural products prices and financial system instability. These are very 
similar with the impacts of the 2008 GFEC. That is why therefore the 2008 GFEC is 
studied in the context of business cycle theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2008 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS 
3.1. Introduction 
This thesis is on the 2008 economic crisis. More specifically it is about the mechanisms 
through which the crisis impacted banks in Tanzania and the way they responded to it. 
The research that forms the basis for this thesis identified the mechanisms through 
which banks were potentially and actually affected by and respond to the 2008 
economic crisis in Tanzania. In order to place the study in broader context of the 2008 
economic crisis an overview of the crisis is documented in this chapter. However, the 
theories that explain the 2008 crisis are outlines here first. These are sythesized from 
the theoretical underpinnings of economic crisis presented in chapter two. 
3.2. Theories Behind the 2008 Global Economic Crisis 
Given the theoretical underppining of economic crisis reviewed in chapter two, the 
2008 crisis can be interpreted and explained in light of several theories. The theories 
that are more relevant to the 2008 crisis include the demand-driven theory, the 
monetarists theory, the debt-deflation theory, new clasical economics theory, the 
Austrian School theory and the business cycle theory. These theories can be used to 
describe and understand various aspects of the 2008 economic crisis in general and its 
causes, impacts and responses in particular. The Marxists theory however does not 
seem to be relevant in interpreting and describing the 2008 crisis. 
The theory that best explains the 2008 economic crisis however, is the business cycle 
theory. Therefore the business cycle theoretical framework has been used to guide the 
study. Therefore the business cycle theoretical framework is the general theoretical  
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framework that formed the foundation and guidance of the study. More particularly it is 
the recession stage or phase of the business cycle theory that informed the part of the 
study on the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis in general and in the banking sub-
sector in Tanzania in particular. Interventions by way of responses to the 2008 crisis, 
have aimed at attaining recovery and eventually reaching the boom stage or phase of 
the business cycle theory. 
3.3. Meaning and Nature of the 2008 Economic Crisis 
IMF (2009), Adei (2010), Ngowi (2010) and Akbar (2008) among others correctly 
inform that, the 2008 economic crisis started officially in United States of America 
(USA) on September 2008. This crisis is also termed the credit crunch, economic 
turmoil, economic downswing, global downturn, and financial meltdown. The crisis has 
been termed ‘the current crisis’ to distinguish it from a similar crisis that was 
experienced in the 1930s that resulted into the Great Depression. The crisis manifested 
itself in many forms. These forms include but are not limited to severe credit, banking, 
currency and trade crisis which emerged in September 2008.  
The crisis became prominently visible in September 2008 with the failure, merger or 
conservatorship of several large United States-based financial firms. These firms 
include Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Merrill 
Lynch, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York Mellon and State Street.  
3.4. Causes of the Crisis 
There are many and at times closely interlinked and self-reinforcing causes of the 2008 
economic crisis. According to Akbar (ibid), -Pritchard (2007), Adei (2010), Ngowi 
(2013) and Norris (2008)  and others, the failures of large financial institutions in the  
 32 
United States rapidly evolved into a global crisis resulting in a number of European 
banks failures and declines in various stock indices and large reductions in the market 
value of stocks and commodities worldwide. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 when it filed for bankruptcy was a 
symbol of the global financial crisis. Broadly, it is seen that lack of adequate 
regulations (laisser-faire) of the financial markets by the appropriate authorities in the 
US (The Federal Reserve Bank) is among the major explanations behind this crisis. 
Adei (2010) identifies many causes of the crisis. These include prolonged economic 
boom for two decades preceding the crisis accompanied by surging house prices at a 
rate which was unsustainable especially in United States of America. These were also 
rapid expansion of credit (similar to the Finnish crisis). The expansion of credit led to 
accumulation of debt that was several times the size of GDP. This partly explains why 
there was a credit crunch. Significant proportion of this debt according to Adei (ibid) 
was owed by marginal, doubtful and barely credit-worthy clients (sub-prime borrowers) 
in the U.S. 
Another key cause of the crisis, according to Adei (ibid) is the emergence of new, 
complex and innovative types of financial instruments due to financial engineering.  
This arguably made it difficult for regulators to follow up these very rapid, innovative 
and dynamic developments in the financial sector in general and its banking sub-sector 
in the context of this work in particular. The 2008 crisis was also caused by over-
expansion of predatory lending practices by financial houses – both banking and none-
banking. These lending practices include but are not limited to adjustable rate mortgage 
that tended to obscure the true position of lenders and capacity of borrowers (mainly 
sub-prime borrowers) to service their liabilities. 
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Many other authors have documented findings that are similar to those of Adei (ibid) 
on the causes of the 2008 global economic crisis. These authors include but are not 
limited to Akbar (ibid), Pritchard (ibid), Moyo (2010), Pianim (2009), Sikod (2009), 
Minja (2009), Rwegasira (2010) and Oke (2009). Mutahi (2009) argues that the crisis 
began in July 2007 when a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitized 
mortgages and banks in the United States started. However, this is not exactly the case. 
This was just among the signs of the crisis and not the beginning of the crisis itself. 
Akbar (2008) on his side argues that the crisis has been a major financial crisis. 
The 2008 economic crisis became prominently visible in September 2008 with the 
failure, merger or conservatorship of several large United States-based financial firms 
including but not limited to Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Bank of 
America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York Mellon and State 
Street. The views of Muthai (ibid) are also shared by Pritchard (2007), Norris (2008), 
Salmon (2009) and and Baily et al (2009). 
3.5. General Impacts of the 2008 Economic Crisis  
Many and far-reaching impacts have emanated from the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis. These have been felt at global, national, corporate/organization, 
household and individual levels across the world. These impacts include but are not 
limited to liquidity problems in financial institutions and others, reduced production of 
goods and services as a result of reduced aggregate demand and increasing 
unemployment as a result of reduced production. 
Other impacts include declining gross domestic product (GDP), reduced economic 
growth rates, reduced foreign currency earnings due to reduced export volumes and  
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prices, reduced domestic revenue collections due to decline in economic activities, 
reduced Official Development Assistance (ODA) for most donor-dependent countries 
due to the impacts of the crisis on the donor countries and many other direct and 
indirect, positive and negative, short-term and long-term impacts.  
A number of works have documented some impacts of the 2008 crisis. These works 
include but are not limited to the AfDB (2009a) on the impact of the crisis on Africa; 
Ikome. (2008) on social and economic consequences of the crisis on developing 
countries and emerging economies; the IMF (2009) on impacts of the crisis on Sub-
Saharan Africa; IDS (2009) which gives accounts of the crisis on poor people’s 
experience of food and fuel in five countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya 
and Zambia). 
Kasekende’s (2008) work is on the impacts of the financial crisis on Africa while 
Rahman et al (2009) dealt with impact of the global economic crisis on employment 
and labour markets of Bangladesh; AfDB) (2009b) made an update on the impact of the 
crisis on African economies. Naudé (2009) conducted a study on the crisis and the 
developing countries. Biekpe (2009) documented impact of credit crunch on foreign aid 
in Africa while Kiptoo (2009) documented potential impacts of the crisis on African 
economies.  
Mtango (2008) worked on the African growth, financial crisis and implications for 
TICAD IV. Ngowi (2009a) dwelled on the impact of the crisis on employment and 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) while Ngowi (2010) looked at the current 
crisis and its impacts and solutions in Tanzania. Ngowi (2009b) dwelled on the impacts 
of the crisis on the environment both positively and negatively. Ngowi (2009c) focused  
on the crisis and its impacts on investment in human capital and Ngowi (2009c) dealt  
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with the impacts of the crisis on the construction industry. Mwamanga (2010) studied 
the impacts of the crisis on employment while Kamugisha (2010) researched on the 
impacts of the crisis on airlines in East Africa as Rang’a (2009) studied the impacts of 
the downturn at household level in Tanzania. 
Osakwe (2008) worked on the Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis while 
Stiglitz (2008) worked on a crisis of confidence as Akbar (2008) looked at the global 
financial meltdown and the demise of neo-liberalism. Ringer (2008) focused on the 
financial crisis and severe impact on humanitarian funding while the IMF (2009a) 
looked at the impact of the crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa. Pianim (2009) worked on the 
current economic meltdown in the West and its implications for corporate entities in 
Ghana.  
3.6. Impacts of the 2008 Crisis in Tanzania 
As is the case for other countries, the literature indicates that Tanzania too was affected 
by the 2008 economic crisis. Most of the literature however do not show causal-effect 
relationship (causality) between the stated impacts on one hand and the 2008 economic 
crisis on the other. However, given the circumstance of the economy during and just 
after the crisis, it is easy to see the correlation between the impacts on one side and the 
crisis on the other even if a counter-factual situation is not established. 
IMF (2010), correctly points out that the 2008 global recession has had a significant 
impact on economic performance and outlook in Tanzania. For example, export sectors 
led a decline in real GDP growth to about 5.5% in 2009, from some 7½ percent in 
2008. FDI and syndicated loans from abroad contracted. IMF (ibid) argues that better 
performance in some sectors such as construction, telecommunications, and food crops 
as well as fiscal stimulus of 5% of GDP helped to moderate the slowdown with GDP  
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growth. 
According to Velde and Lunogelo (2009), the crisis affected economic growth 
projections in Tanzania negatively. Due to the crisis, the growth was projected 
downward to less than 5% in 2009 compared with historical levels of above 7% per 
annum. Without giving figures, it is further reported in Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) that 
Tanzanian exporters experienced reduced demand for goods and services through 
reduced demand for tourist attractions and education facilities. This is a typical second-
round effect of economic crisis. 
Other impacts were through import trade from the rest of the world in which there was 
erratic and escalating importation costs of goods and services. This finding from Velde 
and Lunogelo (ibid) is contrary to expectations because in times of economic crisis one 
expects prices to decline due to reduced demand. This is what happened with prices of 
most agricultural commodities and minerals – except gold that were exported from 
Tanzania as documented in URT (2009) and Ngowi (2009, 2013). 
Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) have various findings on the impacts of the crisis in 
Tanzania that are very similar to those of URT (ibid) and Ngowi (ibid). These include 
reduced capital inflows due to dwindling foreign direct investment (FDI)and declining 
diaspora remittances. They also document that there were both reduced demand and 
declining markets for traditional agricultural commodities such as cotton (more than 
130,000 bales of cotton lacked a market early this year). Also companies and 
cooperatives were affected as well as the manufacturing sector which recorded a drop 
in export revenue of about 50%, mostly due to cancelled apparel orders from the US. 
Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) inform that traders of traditional export commodities like 
cotton had severe loan repayment problems. In the context of this study, this implies  
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increase in Non Performing Loans (NPLs), reduced profits as well as asset quality in 
the affected banks. Naturally these banks had to respond to these impacts to avoid or 
reduce loss and possibilities of eventual collapse.  
According to Velde and Lunogelo (ibid), exporters of non-traditional crops like cashew 
nuts and simsim managed to repay 74% and 68% of their loans, respectively. The 
decline in horticultural products export orders by 30% threatened the jobs of about 
50,000 Tanzanians already employed and earning Tanzania about $130,000 annually. 
This implies that the banks that were exposed to these sectors stood a big risk of being 
negatively affected by the crisis. Minja (2009) has also reported similar impacts of the 
crisis. 
Alcorta and Nixson (2011) point out that in general, the impact of the 2008 crisis has 
been highly uneven. The more integrated into the global economy is an individual 
economy, the more vulnerable is the economy to external shocks such as those of the 
2008 crisis. Tanzania, as are most other parts of Africa exceopt South Africa is not very 
much integrated into the global economy in general and its financial sector in 
particular. This is partly due to the relatively infancy nature of its financial and banking 
sectors. 
URT (ibid) also documents without establishing attribution and causality that over 
48,000 people had lost jobs directly in Tanzania by April 2009 due to the crisis. This is 
assumed to have impacts on the personal loan portfolio of some banks where some of 
these employees were actual and/or potential customers. 
According to Ngowi (2009f), benefits of FDI inflows include employment creation, 
increased sources of capital, technology transfer and creation of inter-sectoral linkages 
within the economy. Similar benefits have been identified by Dunning (1994),  
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Blomstrøm and Kokko (1997), Røvik and Frøyen (1997), Ayiku (1995) and Ngowi 
(2001a, 2001c). Such FDI benefits can potentially benefit banks too through various 
transactions. Therefore when FDIs shy away from Tanzania due to the crisis then it 
implies that these and other potential benefits that the country could benefit will not be 
forthcoming. 
Citing and borrowing much from URT (2009), Ngowi (2010, 2013) documents several 
impacts of the 2008 economic crisis in Tanzania’s various areas of the economy. These 
include negative impacts on economic growth in which growth forecast was reversed 
dowwards from about 7% to 5%. Balance of payment (BoP) and national reserves were 
also negatively affected as did employment. There were about 48,000 direct 
unemplyment in Tanzania due to the crisis. It was estimated that FDI inflows to 
Tanzania would decline by about 10% in 2009 due to the crisis. The crisis also affected 
negatively various sectors of the economy such as tourism where there have been 
cancellation of hotel booking by 60% in 2009 and reduced tourists arrivals by 10% as 
well as reduced revenues by about 18% in 2008 and 30% in 2009. The crisis affected 
the agricultural sector through reduced export demand and lower prices of agricultural 
products like coffee and cotton. In the context of inter-sectoral linkages, the banks that 
transact with these sectors would naturally be affected by the crisis partly due to bad 
performance of their clients in these sectors. 
Whereas the views on limited integration into the global economy are similar to those 
of Minja (2009) and supported in this work, the other views are contested. For example  
there have been report (see URT, 2009) of reduced reserves due to the crisis and even 
until 2010 the country was still suffering from various direct and indirect impacts of the 
crisis. 
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Generally, the impacts of the crisis in Tanzania, as is the case in many other developing 
countries with no highly developed, sophisticate and globally intergrated financial 
system was through second round effects which are bounce-on effects. These mainly 
emanated from reduced aggregate demand both at global and local levels. The crisis 
resulted into liquidity problems and all-times low consumers’ and investors’ sentiments 
in the world market. Foreigners’ appetite for goods and services from Tanzania 
declined on account of the crisis, inter alia. All these are assumed to affect banks that 
finance these transaction negatively. It is assumed further that banks responded in 
various ways to the crisis. 
3.7. Responses to the 2008 Economic Crisis 
The impacts of the crisis necessarily called for a number of responses at the individual, 
household, community, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels. In the context 
of this work, the term ‘responses to the crisis’ is used to mean reactions that were 
undertaken to deal with the crisis and its impacts. Whereas some responses have aimed 
at stopping the spread of the crisis and its many negative impacts, others have aimed at 
reducing possibilities of a future crisis and at best prevent one all together. Other 
responses have taken the form of exploiting the opportunities that unfolded from the 
crisis. 
Works that have dwelled on responses to the crisis include those of the ILO (2008) on a 
global policy package to address the global crisis; ILO (2009a) on tackling the global  
job crisis and recovery through descent work policies; ILO (2009b) on the financial and 
economic crisis: a descent work response; AfDB (2009) on response to the economic 
impact of the financial crisis; and Aryeetey (2009) on the global financial crisis and 
domestic resource mobilization in Africa. 
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Other works on responses to the crisis include IMF (2009) on world economic outlook: 
crisis and recovery; Krugman (2008) on bad anti-stimulus arguments; Ngowi (2010b) 
on the current global financial crisis: its impacts and solutions in Tanzania; Ngowi 
(2009d) on whether the 2009/10 Tanzanian budget could offer recovery from the crisis; 
UN (2008) on calling for decisive action to lessen impacts of the global economic 
crisis; and -Eze (2009) on six measures identified by the ILO to address the crisis. 
The work of Fagbohun (2009) dwelt on global financial crisis and corporate 
environmental governance with a focus on rethinking rationalizations. Barrell et al 
(2009) worked on fiscal stimulus to address the effects of the global financial crisis on 
Sub-Sahara Africa while Tumusiime-Mutebire (2009) looked at the global financial 
crisis and its impact on Uganda and policy response. Walsh (2008) worked on 
responses to the crisis through going green and asks whether the environment will lose 
out to the economy or not. 
According to Ngowi (2010a, 2013), generally the responses to the crisis would include 
finding solutions for the same. This should be done by addressing its specific causes in 
general and reverse its impacts in particular. Among the key to solving the crisis is to 
address the demand side of the economy. This can be done by various measures to 
stimulate aggregate demand at national, sub-regions and global level. Ngowi (ibid) 
points out that among the strategies to stimulate aggregate demand include the use of 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in general and their appropriate policy 
instruments in particular. 
3.8. Implications of the Responses to the Banking Sector 
The responses outlined above, especially those at firm, household and individual levels 
are assumed to have many and far-reaching implications to the banking sector which is  
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a focus of this work. The responses in the above levels mainly imply reduced demand 
for goods and services, the result of which would be reduced production and reduced 
investments.  
By extension, this implies reduced willingness and ability of firms, individuals and 
households to borrow from financial institutions including banks. This implies reduced 
sales volumes, sales revenues, profits and asset quality of these banks. When such 
responses are prolonged, they could lead to collapse of individual banks and eventually 
of the whole banking system. To avoid this from happening, it is assumed in this study 
that the regularors of banking sector (Central Banks) and individual banks would 
respond in various ways. Part of the study that informs this work researched on the way 
the central bank in Tanzania – BoT – , Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited and Tanzania 
Investment Bank (TIB) responded to the 2008 economic crisis. 
3.9. Empirical Literature Review 
This part of the thesis covers most recent studies done on the impacts of and responses 
to the 2008 economic crisis in the banking sector locally and globally. As noted earlier 
there is a general inadequacy in the availability of academic literature on the 2008 
economic crisis in general and on its impacts on and responses to the same in the 
banking sector in general and in Tanzania in particular. This is due to the infancy nature 
of this study area. However, an attempt has been done to review the limited available 
literature both locally and globally.  
3.9.1. International Literature 
Among the leading global authority in the banking sector is the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. Partly in response to the 2008 economic crisis impacts in the  
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banking sector, Basel Committee issue a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. The regulatory framework is contained in Basel (2010). 
Among its contents include strengthening of the global capital framework; raising the 
quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base;enhancing risk coverage; 
supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a leverage ratio; reducing 
procyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers; and addressing systemic risk and 
interconnectedness. The framework also covers global liquidity standard; minimum 
capital requirements and buffers. 
 
Basel III framework aims at among other things, to strengthen global capital and 
liquidity rules. The goal is to promote a more resilient banking sector. The objective of 
the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s bility to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress, such as the 2008 crisis. According to Basel (2010), the 
ability of the banking sector to absorb the shocks would reduce the risk of spillover 
from the financial sector to the real economy. 
 
The Committee also aims to improve risk management and governance and strengthen 
banks’ transparency and disclosures. The Basel III reform package includes the 
Committee’s efforts to strengthen the resolution of systemically significant cross-border  
banks. The reforms were necessary in order to have stronger and more resilient banks. 
This is important because strong and resilient banking system is the foundation for 
sustainable economic growth, as banks are at the centre of the credit intermediation 
process between savers and investors. Most central banks, including BoT are expected 
to adhere to the Basel III regulations, among others. This will take place by the central 
banks’ overseeing that the banks they regulate, such as commercial and investment  
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banks do adhere to the Basel III regulations accordingly. 
 
Choudhry et al (2010) found that the 2008 economic crisis caused disruptions in the 
working of banks and credit systems in across the world general. It also caused 
systemic banking crises in some countries in which case corporate and financial sectors 
experienced large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face 
great difficulties repaying contracts on time. The authors note that if non-performing 
loans increase sharply, all or most of the aggregate banking system capital can be 
exhausted. According to the authors, responses to the crisis in the banking sector 
include but are not limited to easy monetary policies, rescue plans for banks and 
financial institutions, as well as attempts to reform the international financial systems. 
 
According to Reavis (2012), European financial institutions have pushed the global 
financial system to the brink of systemic meltdown. In May 2009, the results of the 
stress tests conducted on the 19 largest banks in the United States to test their capacity 
to withstand a further economic downturn were less negative than feared. A total of 10 
out of the 19 banks subjected to the test were ordered to raise $75 billion in new capital.  
 
As part of the impacs of the crisis in the banking sector, the auhor infprms tha smaller 
banks were left saddled with loans that they had borrowed. Banks started defaulting on 
their loans and many banks were facing insolvency. Their assets were too small to 
cover their liabilities. As a result, credit markets started to freeze up, and individuals 
and businesses could not get loans. There was liquidity runs on financial institutions 
including banks and there were posssibilities of run on banks. Banks were afraid pf 
lending to each other partly on fear of run on banks.  
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According to Reavis (2012), as part of responses to the crisis, starting in the fall of 
2008 the U.S. government stepped in with financial assistance in form of hundreds of 
billions of dollars in bailout. The responses by the government are in line with the 
recommendations from Austrian schhool of though and from Marxists school of though 
as well who propose government intervention in form of Keynesian economics to 
adress economic crisis. 
 
In a study on the 2008 crisis imoact and response by the European Union (EU), Jackson 
(2009) informs that throughout the crisis, the European Central Bank and other central 
banks have assumed a critical role as the primary institutions with the necessary 
political and economic clout to respond effectively. The author further informs that 
within the United States, the Congress appropriated funds to help recapitalize financial 
institutions including banks. European governments on the other hand adopted fiscal 
measures to stimulate their economies and wrestle with failing banks. The crisis, 
according to Jackson (ibid),  has shown that financial markets are highly 
interdependent. Whereas this is true for more developed parts of the world such as 
Europe and America, it is not the case for Africa, except South Africa. 
 
In their study on the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis on emerging Asia, Goldstein 
and Xie (2009) point out that the crisis was assumed to affect credit flow. Credit 
growth, including bank lending to the private sector stands to dry up and adversely 
affect real economic activities. They found however that neither bank lending growth 
nor private credit growth indicated much of a decline in emerging Asia during this 
crisis. For example, bank lending growth in China has surged at an annual rate of over 
30 percent in 2009. The authors attribute this to the fact that banking systems in most  
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Asian economies had benefitted from a strong rise in bank deposits in the run-up to the 
crisis; hence, their balance sheets were very liquid and (with the notable exception of 
Korea) they were not highly dependent on international wholesale funding.Among the 
responses to economic crisis in the banking sector, according to Goldstein and Xiel 
(ibid) is bank restructuring. 
 
In a study on evaluation of the implications of the 2008 global economic crisis on the 
performance of Nigerian banks, Ruth (undated), points out that the crisis had the 
potential to escalateinto unmanageable proportions for the Nigeria financial system 
which is dominated by banking sector. 
According to the author, incessant bank failurecalls for appropriate measures capable of 
stemming the tickle. This is because eventual bank failures have many and far-reaching 
implications. Bank failures woud affect bankers, customers, government and the 
general public. Using secondary data, the study found that the crisis impacted Nigerian  
banks through the mechanisms of of profitability and liquidity. Using multiple 
regression analysis, Ehiruth (ibid) found that the crisis had a negative impact on the 
performance of banks in term of liquidity. The author recommended that the federal 
government should put up proactive measures to conserve the foreign reserves and 
timely injection of liquidity into the banking system. Whereas the recommendation on 
icreasing liquidity into the banking system seems to be in line with the author’s 
findings, the one on conserving foreign reserves does not. What is recommended by the 
author in as far as increasing liquidity is concerned is in line with the monetarists and 
Austrian schools of thoughts of economic crisis. 
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In another study by on the impacts of the 2008 crisis on the Nigerian banking system, 
Ashamu and Abiola (2012), found that because the global economy is inter-related, the 
Nigeria banking system was vulnerable to the 2008 economic crisis. The authors inform 
that the crisis could snowball into worse scenario for the Nigeria banking system and 
the entire economy. It was also found that the crisis caused a drop in the quality of part 
of the credit extended by banks for trading in the capital market, tightening of liquidity, 
greater loan-loss provisioning, slower growth rate of banks' balance sheet in response to 
the crisis and higher provisioning leading to lower profitability among others. As a 
response to the crisis, the authors recommended that the federal government should, 
among other things, put up proactive measures to conserve the foreign reserves and 
timely injection of liquidity into the banking system. These recommendations are 
similar to those of Ehiruth (undated). 
 
Drawing experience from Kenya, the study by Were and Tiriongo (2012) focused on 
the central bank’s response to the 2008 economic crises from a developing African 
economy perspective. The authors found that the policy interventions were initially 
effective in restoring confidence, lowering the short term interest rates and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. However, the loose monetary policy stance, which was alao 
applied in Tanzania, could not be sustained. This is because of increased inflationary 
pressures and unprecedented depreciation of the exchange rate.  
 
The abrupt shift to a tight monetary policy stance on the other hand, led to a sudden rise 
in both short term and long term interest rates. This, according to the authors partly 
counteracted the gains that had been achieved. In their assessment of the effectiveness 
of monetary policy using simple Vector Autoregression(VAR) analysis, the authors  
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found that there was weak monetary policy transmission mechanism. The authors 
recommended that in responding to economic crises, there is a need for a clear exit 
strategy. There is also a need for  a wholistic approach to addressing structural 
weaknesses and vulnerability of most African economies to shocks such as the 2008 
economic crisis. This is partly because monetary policy on its own is not adequate in 
addressing such shocks. 
What has emerged from the global literature such as Ssonko (2009), indicates that due 
to the 2008 economic crisis, foreign parent banks investing in Africa could withdraw 
funds from subsidiaries and local banks. This can negatively affect the sector in the 
continent. Besides the possible withdrawals, there can be stopping of investing local 
profits in local subsidiaries and economies. This calls for among other things,  
monitoring of the sector vigilantly in order to minimize vulnerabilities from such 
withdrawals and mitigate risks. 
According to Ssonko (ibid), the 2008 crisis affected among other sector, the financial 
one in Uganda. Ssewanyana et al (2009), without establishing causality argue that as a 
result of the crisis, Uganda’s financial sector was affected by the drop in demand for 
government securities. This is because investors retreated to safer destinations. For 
example the Bank of Uganda (BoU) had to suspend a number of Treasury bill auctions 
in the first quarter of 2009 due to the crisis. Citing BoU (2009), Ssonko (op cit) informs 
that in order to encourage lending, the BoU had to cut its lending rate to the commercial 
banks by 3.4 percentage points, from 19.3% to 15.8%. This in line with some banks in 
such developed countries like Japan as documented in Ngowi (2013). 
Ssonko points out that the structure of Uganda’s banking sector raises concern. This is 
because about 80% of the banking business is foreign owned (mainly by banks from  
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South Africa, the UK, Nigeria and Kenya). This is seen as posing potential risks to the 
Ugandan economy since local banks could face difficulties if due to the crisis their 
parent companies abroad withdrew funds to support their operations at home as 
documented in IMF (2009). In Tanzanian context however, this should not be a concern 
because according to BoT regulations foreign banks in Tanzania are licensed as 
independent banks with own capital base, not as branches of their parent banks abroad.  
According to the BoU (2009) however, the banking sector in Uganda was sound and 
stable depite the crisis. This is similar to the situation in Tanzania as documented by 
BoT (2008) among others. BoU (op cit) informs that its capital adequacy ratios were 
well above the regulatory requirements. BoU admitted that Uganda is a home to many 
subsidiaries of international banks. However, the local subsidiaries have no exposures 
to the subprime products of other toxic debts. While some banks such as Citi Bank 
International and Barclays Bank (Uganda) Ltd have their own capital base and no 
exposure to toxic assets, the two subsidiaries have a stand-alone capital requirements 
and are decoupled from the parents. 
Ssoko (ibid) citing BoU (ibid) informs further that the abrupt decline in capital inflows 
has contributed to the reduction of liquidity in the banking system in Uganda. There is 
also some anecdotal evidence that some large local companies access to credit abroad 
was curtailed causing an increase in domestic demand for credit. This is further 
reflected by the nominal average interest rates which peaked at 23.2% in August 2008, 
but declined subsequently to 18.9% in January 2009 before increasing to 20.9%. in 
March 2009. 
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3.9.2. Literature on Impacts of the 2008 Economic Crisis in Banking Sector in 
Tanzania 
There is a general lack of academic literature that give general objectives of research 
works; methodologies used including but not limited to research design, sampling, data 
collection and data analysis; and general conclusions on the impacts of and responses to 
the 2008 economic crisis in Tanzanian banking sector. This shows the need for and 
value added by the research informing this dissertation that is likely to be a pioneering 
and ground-breaking work in this area of research. 
However the available limited literature on the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis in 
the banking sector in Tanzania is reviewed here. In an article without the author’s name 
titled ‘Tanzania Banking not Deterred by Global Financial Crisis (Online at 
http://www.tanzaniainvest.com/banking-finance/news/97-tanzania-banking-not-
deterred-by-global-financial-crisis), the Bank of Tanzania informed that the country’s 
banking system was still secure, safe, stable and sound. 
This is contrary to what banks in more developed part of the world such as US and 
Europe had experienced. Due to the crisis, such banks as Merril Lynch, Bank of New 
York Mellon, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J. P. Morgan, Wells Fargo and Citi 
Group were arguably no longer secure, safe, stable and sound. (See Ngowi, 2013). 
The BoT report informed further that the banking sector was adequately capitalized. On 
the basis of such financial indicators as capital adequacy ratio, the sector was 
considered resilient to the 2008 crisis shocks and liquidity in Tanzanian banking sector 
remained high. Therefore banks were able to meet any maturing obligations. This is 
contrary to what some banks in the US and Europe experienced. They experienced 
liquidity problems leading to credit crunch. Without establishing clear causality, Velde  
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and Lunogeno (2009) informs that by March 2009, CRDB Bank had suffered defaulted 
repayment worth Tshs 168 billion due to the 2008 economic crisis. This is just six (6) 
months after the crisis started officially in September 2008. The amount of default 
(Tshs 168 billion) is a relatively substantial amount of money and should be a reason 
for concern for the bank and its shareholders. This is because default of payments 
implies reduced profit margins and can even lead into loss. 
The impacts of the crisis in Tanzania (compared to more developed countries), 
according to Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) were somehow shielded by some factors. These 
factors include, among others, Tanzania’s low level of integration with the international 
capital and financial markets. It is understood that Tanzania’s capital and financial 
markets are still in their relative infancy stage of development. They are yet to be 
sophisticated and fully integrated into the global markets in the likes of those in more 
developed parts of the world such as America and Europe.  
Another factor that shielded Tanzania’s banking sector from the 2008 crisis according 
to the authors is the relatively small component of foreign assets in the country’s 
commercial banks. Velde and Lunogelo (ibid)  argue that the foreign asset component 
in the commercial bank system is less than 11% of total commercial bank assets in 
Tanzania. Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) partly attribute the low exposure to volatilities of 
foreign-owned banks in Tanzania to their not operating as branches of parent banks 
abroad but as independent subsidiaries. They document further that most businesses 
and banks had limited amounts of foreign borrowing while none held securities in the 
international banks that were affected by the crisis. This position is similar to that of 
Minja (2009). 
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In discussing the impacts of the 2008 crisis in Tanzanian banks, Minja (ibid) points out 
that foreign banks operating in Tanzania (about 47% of the total banks) are governed 
by laws that treat them as independent banks rather than as branches of parent foreign 
banks. The implication is that these banks will not automatically be exposed to 
volatilities caused by the crisis inter alia, of their parent companies. 
Some multinational banks such as Citi Bank, Bank of Baroda, Barclays, Standard 
Chartered Bank and Federal Bank of the Middle East with branches in Tanzania might 
have been affected by the crisis. However, their operations in Tanzania might not have 
been necessarily affected as a result of the effects of the crisis in the parent banks. 
Minja (ibid) argues that, the strength of bank regulation and supervision based on the 
Bank and Financial Institutions Act (2006) has led to limited number of foreign 
resources in the Tanzanian banks. These, according to Minja (ibid), are to the tunes of 
11% only and do not constitute toxic assets. 
The views of Velde and Lunogelo (ibid) and Minja (ibid) above can be contested and 
interrogated. In BoT (2010) for example, it is documented that about 47% of banks in 
Tanzania are foreign-owned and have a 50% share of capital in the sector. This may 
imply that the sector is not all that shielded as claimed by Velde and Lonogelo. From 
foreign direct investment (FDI) point of view, a foreign investor may flag out and 
invest in another economy if investment conditions in the original location are no 
longer favourable. Therefore if economic crisis reduces profitability of the foreign-
owned banks in Tanzania, they can flag out even if they are not operating as branches 
of their parent companies and with their own capital base. 
Minja (ibid) argues that Tanzania’s financial supervision and regulatory system 
managed to limit damages of the crisis in the country’s banks. This is contrary to the  
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situation in the US where weak and too liberal supervision and regulations of the 
banking sector by the Federal Reserve Bank (the Fed) has been cited as among the 
causes of the 2008 economic crisis. Among others, see USA (2009) and Adei (2010) 
for details on how weak supervision and regulation by the Fed contributed to the 
emerging of the 2008 crisis. 
Economic crisis can lead to a flight to currencies perceived as safe or even a run on 
banks. This, according to Minja (ibid) can be caused by information asymmetry which 
may throw firms and individuals into a panic mode. Possibilities of run on banks where 
customers would draw as much of their deposits as possible is not far-fetched. It was 
observed in Cyprus in March 2013 when the banking sector in the country was highly 
troubled. Banks had to be closed for about a week and opened on the 28th March 2013. 
Limits had to be put on how much customers could draw from their deposits. This 
implies that economic crisis can have very serious and far-reaching impacts on banks 
and their customers. 
As noted in Ngowi (2010, 2013), Minja (2009) and Rwegasira (2010) among others, 
IMF (2010) correctly informs that Tanzanian banks were not directly affected by the 
global financial crisis. However they were affected by second-round effects through the 
real sector of the economy. These second round effects of the crisis intensified risks to 
the financial sector. The IMF (ibid) informs that Tanzanian banks were well-capitalized 
and not exposed to the asset classes (toxic assets) that led to large losses in major 
financial centers.  
Exposure to distressed real sectors of the economy such as agriculture including cash 
crops and horticulture; tourism; construction; hotel; and transportation however, 
affected loan quality in a number of banks. Due to the crisis the sectors were distressed  
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for various reasons. In the agricultural sector for example, there was reduced exports 
due to reduced demand abroad. In the tourism sector there was reduced tourist inflows 
which affected all various nodes in the tourism commodity chain. All this implies that 
the distressed sectors could not repay their loans as per pre-crisis agreements. 
Without giving details, IMF (2010) informs that part of impacts of the crisis in 
Tanzania include considerable domestic liquidity tightening. It is argued that there was 
tightening of liquidity by way of restriction of issuing credit. As a response to liquidity 
tightening, according to IMF (ibid) there was a significant loosening of monetary policy 
to help mitigate the downturn. From Ngowi (2013) it is understood that liquidity 
tightening implies contractionary monetary policy which is bad economics in the 
context of mitigating economic crisis and its impacts. This is because it takes 
expansionary rather than contractionary monetary and fiscal policies and their 
instruments to mitigate against economic crisis and attain recovery. 
The 2008 economic crisis has affected Tanzanian banks by way of inter alia, increasing 
Non Performing Loans (NPLs). According to IMF (2010), NPL rates in Tanzanian 
banks peaked in mid-2009 due to the 2008 crisis. NPLs exhibited large variation among 
banks, partly reflecting different exposures to distressed sectors. The sectors that are 
more distressed and exposed to the crisis would logically report higher rates of NPLs. 
According to IMF (ibid), system-wide NPLs rose to 7.8% in June 2009 from 6.2% 
(increase by 1.6%) in December 2008 due to the 2008 crisis. However, NPLs declined 
by 0.5% to reach the 6.7% mark partly as a result of the government rescue package for 
distressed borrowers.  
According to IMF (ibid), NPL rates varied not only across sectors but also across 
banks. The IMF informed that NPLs for systemically important banks at the end of  
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June 2009, ranged from 1.8% to 14.2% which is a range of 12.4%. Although the Fund 
did not mention these systemically important banks, it is assumed that they include 
some of the biggest banks in the country in terms of, inter alia, assets, customer base, 
deposits and number of branches. These banks include CRBD Bank Ltd, the National  
 
Microfinance Bank (NMB) and the National Bank of Commerce (NBC). 
As documented in Ngowi (2010 and 2013), banks that had advanced loans to various 
investors suffered from borrowers’ inability to repay. Some cooperative unions and 
about 24 companies borrowed from CRDB Bank Ltd and were unable to repay. 
Shinyanga Regional Cooperative Union (SHIRECU) and Nyanza Cooperative Union  
(NCU) borrowed some 6.6 billion Tshs to purchase cotton. They were unable to pay 4.6 
billion out of the sum. This is a failure to pay a total of 69.7% of the total loan. Out of 
the 24 companies that borrowed from CRDB a total of 20 or 83.3% were made none-
credit worth by the crisis. 
According to Lunogelo et al, (2010), the banking sector in Tanzania started worrying 
that trade finance was increasingly becoming more risky due to the 2008 economic 
crisis. This is because the country’s export commodity prices continued to decline in 
the global market. This is a result of reduced demand for the export commodities which 
in turn is a result of the economic crisis.  
Lunogelo et al, (ibid) informs that export orders were reduced and at times cancelled 
while revenues from the tourist sector dwindled. Using various indicators such as 
profitability and liquidity criterial, the authors argue that by the third quarter of 2009,  
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the financial sector in Tanzania was still sound. However, similar to the views of the 
IMF  
(2010) the authors noted that some banks in Tanzania experienced an increase in their 
NPLs. 
Without establishing causality, the literature informs that the 2008 crisis also affected 
Tanzanian banks through reduced bank businesses. Velde and Lunogelo (2009)  
identifie reduced bank lending and other bank transactions owing to reduced business, 
exchange rate and interest rate changes as among the impacts of the 2008 economic 
crisis. Reduced bank lending in times of economic crisis can be a result of banks extra 
risk assessments that reduces the number of none credit worth clients. It can also be a 
result of borrowers reduced inability and/or willingness to borrow for various reasons 
including bad business prospects due to the crisis.  
3.9.3. Literature on Responses to the 2008 Crisis in the Banking Sector in 
Tanzania 
There have been various responses following the various potential and actual impacts 
of the 2008 economic crisis in general and in the banking sector in Tanzania in the 
context of this work in particular. Generally the responses aimed at mitigating the many 
and far-reaching negative impacts of the crisis. In the banking sector these are arguably 
the responses that were taken by individual banks Some responses also arguably aimed 
at preventing a similar crisis and its severe impacts in the future. These are arguably the 
responses that were undertaken by the Central Bank. 
Minja (2009) states that due to the economic crisis,  some financial institutions might 
have taken a more cautious stance when advancing credit. According to the author, this  
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kind of response to the crisis is caused by reflecton by the financial instritutions on the 
consequences of irresponsible lending and financial engineering. This is logical because 
the the main cause of the crisis as partly documented in Adei (2010), Ngowi (2010, 
2013) and USA (2009) is irresponsible lending and financial engineering. Cautious 
stance towards lending would include being more risk averse by inter alia having more 
stringent risk assessments prior to advancing credit to a particular borrower. As detailed 
in the chapter on field findings, some banks responded to the crisis in this way. 
IMF (2010) correctly notes that the policy response of the Tanzanian authorities to the 
2008 crisis included a rescue package that was designed to support sectors affected by 
the crisis and by extension bail out banks. As mentioned in Ngowi (2013) these sectors 
include the agricultural sector especially cash crop such as cotton. The rescuse package 
was to the tunes of 1.7 trillion Tanzania Shillings that were injected in the 2009/10 
national budget.  
The funds were channeled through banks to ensure that they were used for resolving 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) rather than for other purposes. In the context of this wor, 
this was a response to bail out banks against the many negative impacts of NPLs. It is 
worth noting that there have been controversies and questions – for example in the  
Parliament - on how this rescue package was used. It is beyond the scope of this work 
to dwell on the controveries.  
According to IMF (ibid) stress tests were carried out as part of responses to the crisis in 
the banking sector.It was found that the main vulnerability for banks in Tanzania stems 
from credit risk, particularly from large exposures. The stress tests, according to IMF 
(ibid) found that substantial concentration in the loan portfolio leaves banks exposed to 
the failure of large borrowers. 
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In the context of this study, banks can be affected by economic crisis due to failures in 
the real sectors of the economy they fund.  Partly this can be among the reasons for the 
response to the crisis by injecting the 1.7 trillion Tshs rescue package in the 2009/10 
national budget. The tests also found that a sharp increase in short-term rates would 
hurt a number of banks in Tanzania.  
3.10. Knowledge Gap Bridged by the Study 
The reviewed literature has shown that there are some works that have been done on the  
2008 global financial and economic crisis. These include Adei (2010) on Africa and the 
global economic downturn – causes, responses and future options; AfDB (2009a) on 
impacts of the global financial crisis on Africa; AfDB (2009b) on response to the 
economic impact of the financial crisis; Biekpe (2009) on impact of credit crunch on 
foreign aid in Africa; Brambila et al (2009) on the global financial crisis effects of 
slowing private capital inflows on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and Ikome (2008) on 
the social and economic consequences of the crisis on developing countries and 
emerging economies. 
Other works include those of IMF (2009) on impact of the global financial crisis on Sub 
Saharan Africa; Massimilano and Salvatore (2009) on the global financial crisis and 
remittances; Ngowi (2009a) on the impact of the crisis on employment and official 
development assistance; Tumusiime-Mutebire (2009) on the global financial crisis and 
access to finance and Velde et al (2009) on the global financial crisis and developing 
countries. 
Despite the various literature above, there was still a knowledge gap on the impacsts of 
and responses to the 2008 economic crisis in Tanzanian banks. The little literature that 
exists such as Minja (2009), Lunogelo et al (2009), URT (2009), IMF (2009) and 
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Ngowi (2010, 2013) is inadequate in bridging the knowledge gap on the general and 
very specific mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were affected by and 
responded to the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
Understanding the mechanisms through which banks were affected is important in 
order to, among other things, design national level and bank-specific interventions to 
address the impacts shoul another crisis emerge. The knowledge on the nature of 
responses too is very important in establishing possible ways in which banks should be 
responding to similar crises and shocks. All these are very important in safeguading the 
banking sector and its clients, knowing that economic crises and similar shocks can 
lead into collapse of banks and the real sectors of the economy that transact with these 
banks. This study therefore has been a humble attempt to bridge the hitherto existing 
knowledge gap on the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were affected by 
and responded to the 2008 economic crisis. However, some areas for further research 
still exist as this thesis could not exhaust all the existing knowledge gap in this very 
new research area. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the methodology that was used in the research that informs this 
thesis. The contents of the chapter are partly guided by the works of Kothari (2004, 
2011), Ndunguru (2007), Adam and Kamuzora (2008), inter alia. 
4.2  Type of the Research 
The research that informs this report was an exploratory type of research. As outlined in 
Ndunguru (2007: 17) exploratory types of research are for new study areas that are little 
known about. This view of exploratory research is also shared by Kothari (2011: 4) and 
Adam and Kamuzora (2008:7). The authors correctly point out that exploratory 
researches are for unfamiliar research problems or a new research area or topic. The 
study aimed at exploring the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were 
impacted by the 2008 economic crisis and the way they responded to the same.  
There are several rationale and justifications for adopting exploratory type of research 
on the mechanisms through which banks were impacted by the 2008 global economic 
crisis and their response to the same. As a new study area, there was a need to explore 
so as to discover and unearth as many of these mechanisms and responses as possible. 
This is because they were unknown. Research on impacts of and responses to the 2008 
economic crisis in general and in the Tanzanian banking sector in particular falls in a 
new and virgin research area. This is because the 2008 economic crisis was (when this 
study began in 2010) and still is rather new and much is yet to be known and 
scientifically established. The crisis that started officially in September 2008 was about  
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two years old in 2010 when the proposal for this study was developed. Therefore, there 
was and still there are many issues that were and still are not yet known and need to be 
explored.  
Among these issues that were unknown include mechanisms through which banks were 
impacted by the crisis and responses to the same in Tanzania. As discussed under 
justification for the research, and consistent with Kothari (2004: 35 – 36), these 
unknown issues are better unearthed using exploratory type of research, hence a 
justification for exploratory research. 
There are several possible approches in undertaking exploratory type of research. 
According to Kothari (ibid: 36 -37), these approaches include but are not necessarily 
limited to the survey of the literature and experience survey in which people with 
practical experience would give insight to the issues being explored. Another approach 
in exploratory type of research is analysis of insight-stimulating examples which 
involves intensive study of selected instances – impacts of and responses to the 2008 
crisis in banks in Tanzania in the context of this study. 
For this study, various approaches of exploratory type of research were used. These 
approaches included very intensive and extensive reviewing the literature. Both 
academic and non academic (grey) literature were widely reviewed. Books, journals, 
dissertations, various reports, newspaper and magazine articles as well as various other 
documentations were reviewed with the view of exploring the various mechanisms 
through which banks were potentially and actually impacted by the 2008 economic 
crisis. 
It is a fact that the 2008 global economic crisis is still a relatively new phenomenon.  
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There are a number of insights, knowledge, facts and opinions about the mechanisms 
through which banks were impacted by and responded to the 2008 crisis that are not yet 
documented. It was necessary therefore to explore beyond the literature. This was done 
through carrying out field studies in efforts to explore the nature of impacts and 
responses to the same in the banking sector in Tanzania in particular.  
4.3  Research Design 
This study adopted a case study research design. The justification of this choice is 
based on the objectives of the study. The study aimed at exploring detailed and case-
specific mechanisms through which selected banks were impacted by the 2008 crisis 
and the way specific banks responded to the crisis. In line with what Kothari (2004, 
2011), Ndunguru (2007) and Adam and Kamuzora (2008) describe about case study 
design, specific banks were chosen for the purpose of exploring their detailed and very 
specific inputs on the impacts mechanisms of and responses to the crisis. 
The choice of a case study design is justified on various grounds. Firstly, the study 
aimed at exploring detailed and bank-specific views on impacts mechanisms and 
responses to the same. The aim was to study very specific study units, in this case 
banks. The choice of case study design is also justified by the fact that the study aimed 
at exploring the mechanisms of impacts and responses to the same in-depth rather than 
breadth. It aimed at full exploration of limited number of study units and intensive 
investigation of each particular bank. 
Apart from Kothari (2004, 2011), Ndunguru (2007), Adam and Kamuzora (2008), the 
choice of case study design is also guided by Odum and Katharine (1929) who 
correctly informs that case study design is for a fairly exhaustive studying of individual  
 
 62 
unit or units. It is also justified by descriptions of Burgess (1949) who correctly points 
out that case study designs are social microscopes in that they give very close and in-
depth investigation of a study unit. Case studies allow for carefull and almost complete 
study of a unit. 
The aim of the case studies was to have few in-depth and specific cases to illustrate 
how banks in Tanzanian context can be affected by economic crisis and respond to the 
same. The general views from the literature are that findings from case studies should 
not be generalized to the rest of the population. However, it is argued in this thesis that 
the way the chosen banks have been affected by the 2008 economic crisis and 
responded to the same reflects how other similar banks in Tanzania and banks in 
similar environment elsewhere can be affected and respond in times of economic crisis. 
However, the findings from the Barclays and TIB case studies cannot be generalized to 
other banks especially those in different environment. The findings from BoT case 
study however, can be generalized to other banks in Tanzania since it gives an over 
view of all banks under its jurisdiction. 
4.4  Case Study Units 
The study units for the case studies were three banks in Tanzania. These are the BoT, 
Baclays Bank Tanzania Limited and Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB). In the 
population of central banks in Tanzania, BoT is the only available study unit since there 
is only one central bank in the country. On the other hand, Barclays and TIB are just 
units out of a population of 32 banks that were licensed by BoT at the start of this 
study. This is just 6.3% of the total population of banks. By all standards this is not a 
representative sample. Neither does it need to be because the study was not a survey but 
a case study design. 
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The limitation of the case studies to these two non central bank units was based mainly 
on time and financial resources constraints as well as on the volume limitations 
imposed on the thesis. If it was a survey research design a total of at least ten (10) 
banks would be sampled in which the sample would be about 31.3% of the total 
population. 
A summary description of each of the study unit has been presented in chapter two of 
this thesis. The executives of each of the study units were contacted with official 
request to provide responses for the study. Introduction letters and interview guides 
were mailed to these executives (Governor’s office for th case of BoT and Managing 
Directors for Barclays and TIB).  
Senior officials of various departments of the three banks were the main sources of the 
information in the study. For BoT, the researcher was directed to the Department of 
Research which provided the information that was requested. For Barclays Bank  
Tanzania, the researcher was directed to the Department of Treasury which provided 
the requested infomation while for TIB the point of contact was the Strategic Planning 
Department. Raw responses from all the three banks and follow up questions that were 
asked by the researcher as well as the documents that were availed to the researcher by 
the banks for further review to complement the interviews are attached as appendices in 
this thesis. 
4.5  Sampling Procedure 
The three study units were sampled using purposefull sampling technique. The BoT is 
naturally the only central bank in Tanzania. Since there was a great need to explore the 
mechanisms through which banks were affected by the crisis and responses to the same  
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from the central bank, the BoT was purposefully sampled as one of the case study 
banks. This is because as the financial sector regulator, it was only BoT that constitutes 
the total population of such regulators in Tanzania. Therefore it is the only one that 
would have the kind of information needed from a financial sector regulator for this 
study. 
Barclays and TIB were also sampled purposefully. The researcher aimed at exloring 
inputs from at least one investment bank in Tanzania on the mechanisms through which 
that specific bank was affected by the crisis and its response to it. The aim was to 
explore investment-bank-specific detailed elaborations of the impacts mechanisms and 
responses that would otherwise be missing in the general BoT inputs. By the time of the 
study, TIB was the only known and large investment bank in Tanzania. It was therefore 
natural to have it as a case study. 
The researcher was also interested in having one international bank case study. This 
would help to explore whether the mechanisms through which local banks were 
affected by the crisis and responded to the same are the same or different from the 
international one. Barclays bank was purposefully selected as a case study due to the 
researcher’s earlier professional engagement with the bank as a guest speaker to its 
management team, hence relative easier support and access to information. 
4.6  Types of Data and Their Sources 
The study was informed by two types of data. These are secondary and primary data. 
As stated in Kothari (ibid), Adam and Kamuzora (ibid) and Ndunguru (ibid), secondary 
data are those data which already exist. They are data that have been collected by others 
for various purposes. The main source of the secondary data are various  
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documentations including academic and non-academic (grey) literature . Primary data 
on the other hand are fresh and new data collected for the purpose of a specific 
research. The main source of primary data for this study are various departments of the 
three study units (BoT, Barclays and TIB) as outlined under the description of study 
units of this thesis. 
4.7  Data Collection Techniques 
Each of the two types of data (secondary and primary) were collected using various 
techniques.  
4.7.1  Secondary Data Collection Techniques 
Secondary data from various sources including libraries, documentation centres, the 
study units as well as online were used to inform this thesis. Secondary data collection 
was an on-gong activity throughout the study. This is because new literature kept on 
emerging in the whole due course of the study. Relevant documents were collected by 
the researcher over time. These were both hard and soft copies. They were 
systematically sorted according to the type of information they would provide in the 
various parts of the study. Then, the collected information was systematically and 
scholarly reviewed in the context of this study. 
Several challenges were encountered in getting and accessing secondary data. The main 
challenge is associated with the newness of the theme and topic of the study. Academic 
literature including books, book chapters, journal articles, theses and dissertations on 
the 2008 economic crisis in general and its impacts on and responses in the banking 
sector in Tanzania is particular is highly limited. 
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 This has made it necessary for the researcher to make use of both the limited academic 
literature and some authoritative and informative none acad. 
4.7.2  Primary Data Collection Techniques 
It was very necessary to collect primary data in order to explore and bring new insights 
and perspectives of the study units (the three banks) on the mechanisms through which 
banks were impacted by and responded to the 2008 crisis. The primary data 
supplemented and complimented secondary data and vice versa.. Primary data  were 
also important in updating and cross-checking some of the secondary data as well as 
identifying, documenting and analyzing new information/data on the ground.  
Primary data collection techniques were determined by the respondents. Understanding 
how busy the respondents in the banking sector (senior staff) are, the researcher gave 
each of them  an option to choose the best way to respond to the research questions that 
were availed to them in advance. The primary data were collected through various 
techniques as outined below. 
4.7.2.1  Face to Face Interviews 
Barclays Bank opted for a face to face discussion with the researcher. Interview guide 
were mailed to the senior treasury officer at the Treasury Department about one week 
before the appointment day for the interview. The contact person shared the interview 
guide with two other senior staff from the same department. The respondents requested 
for some elaborations and clarifications for some questions. The elaborations and 
clarifications were given accordingly well in advance of the scheduled interview day. 
On the interview day, the respondents had prepared some of their responses and were  
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discussed with the researcher. Responses from Barclays were followed up by follow up 
questions from the researcher and these are attached as appendices in this report. The 
researcher requested for documents from the bank that were reviewed to suppliment the 
responses from interview.  
4.7.2.2  Mailed Questions 
As opposed to Barclays, BoT and TIB opted for mailed questions as their preferred 
technique of responding to the researcher’s questions. As was the case for Barclays, the 
questions were mailed to the contact persons in these two banks. These were the BoT  
Governor’s secretary for BoT who forwarded them to a senior researcher at the research 
department of the bank. Responses were mailed back to the researcher with a 
substantial list of specific documents including page numbers that were reviewed by the 
reseacher to complement the mailed responses. 
For TIB, the contact person was a senior economic researcher at the Strategic Plan 
department. The detailed research questions were answered and mailed back to the 
researcher. These are attached as appendix in this report. Similar to Barclays and BoT, 
a number of key documents (annual reports from 1998 to 2010 inclussive) were availed 
to the researcher in hard copy. Both data collection techniques proved usefull in getting 
responses. However, the face to face interviews and discussions with Barclays gave the 
researcher an opportunity to instantly probe in some questions so as to understand 
better the issues under discussion. In all the three banks therefore, the start point in 
collecting information was through written questions that led to interview (for 
Barclays) and written responses (for TIB and BoT). Then all the three resulted into 
substantial documentary review. 
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4.8  Data Processing and Analysis 
4.8.1  Data Processing 
Data processing was mainly done by editing the raw data and classifying the same 
according to the major aspects of the study. Data on mechanisms of impacts were 
separated from those on responses. For the BoT data the researcher classified data on 
responses by BoT to the crisis separate from the BoT data on responses by banks on the 
crisis. As part of data processing, some data had to be tabulated, some had to be 
processed into charts, graphs and histograms. 
4.8.2  Data Analysis 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. Each of these category of data 
was analyzed differently using different approaches and techniques best suited to the 
kind of data and objectives of the study. 
4.8.2.1  Qualitative Data Analysis 
Since qualitative data mainly contains words rather than numbers, it was natural to use 
qualitative data analysis techniques for such data. The main qualitative data analysis 
technique that was used in this study is content analysis technique. Content analysis or 
textual analysis is a methodology in the social sciences for studying the content of 
communication. According to Babbie (2010), it is the study of recorded human 
communications. For Joubish and Muhammad (2011) content analysis is considered a scholarly 
methodology in the humanities by which texts are studied as to authorship, authenticity, or 
meaning. For Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003), content analysis enables analysis and 
interpretation of qualitative data so as to bring meaning and understanding. It is a science and 
art that requires creativity and systematic approach. 
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This study adopted the content analysis process and steps proposed in Taylor-Powell 
and Renner (2003). This choice is justified by the relevance of the process in the 
context of this study. Taylor-Powell and Renner  (ibid), recommend five steps to be 
followed in  
analysing qualitative data using content analysis techniques. These steps are 
understanding the data, focusing the analysis, identifying patterns and connections 
within and between categories and lastly categorizing information and interpretation. 
In line with Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003) model, in the first step of content 
analysis, the various and massive data that was collected was put into context so as to 
undersstand it within the realm of the study. Data were read and re-read several times. 
Impressions and meanings in the context of the study were noted down. This enabled 
clear understanding of the mechanisms through which banks were impacted by the 
crisis and responses to the same. This step of analysis also made it possible to identify 
similarities and differences in the various impacts and responses within and between 
the study units.  
In the second stage of content analysis in the adopted model, the study objectives were 
reviewed with the view of identifying the extent to which the qualitative data are likely 
to answer the research questions thereby atatining the research objectives. A review of 
how each respondent responded to each reseach question was done. Relations between 
each question and responses were examined. This was followed by categorization of 
narrative data. 
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Although Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003) propose categorization of data into preset 
and emergent categories in the second step of content analysis, this study departed from 
this advise and adopted the latter. The responses were read and re-read with the view of 
identifying the mechanisms and responses instead of making preset categories. The 
latter would imply using preconceived themes or categories (interpreted as impacts 
mechanisms and responses in this study). Since this is an exploratory research, the 
impacts and responses were not preconceived. Therefore it was more logical to make 
emergent categories by reading the responses – including the secondary data – and then 
identify impacts and responses. 
Categorization of the narrative data into emergent categories allowed the mechanisms 
of the impacts of and responses to the 2008 crisis to emerge from the data. The impacts 
and responses were therefore known after as a result of working with the qualitative 
data. This step of content analysis made t possible for the researcher to develop initial 
list of impacts and responses. This was expanded from time to time as new texts were 
read and old ones re-read. 
The third step of the content analysis model that was employed in this study is 
categorization of information. This is similar to coding and indexing in quantitative 
research. In content analysis technique of quality data analysis however, no number are 
used. Impacts and responses were identified and organized into coherent categories. 
Categories were built until when no new ones were identified. 
In the fourth step of the content analysis technique used in this study, patterns of 
mechanisms of impacts and responses were identified. Also connections within and 
between the mechanisms through which banks were impacted by and responded to the 
2008 economic crisis were identified as can be seen in the findings of the study. 
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The step of content analysis in this study was interpretation of the qualitative data in the 
context of the study before writing up the report. All the analyzed qualitative data were 
brought together and connected to present the study findings in the context of the 
research objectives. Findings were synthesized in order to make sense out of them in 
the context of the study and its objectives.  
4.8.2.2  Quantitative Data Analysis 
Although this was basically a qualitative research, some quantitative data were 
collected and therefore had to be analyzed. These data were analyzed in various ways 
depending on their nature and objective of analysis. Some descriptive statistical 
analytical tools were employed to make sense out of the collected data in the context of 
the study. For example, some totals, percentages and averages were computed 
accordingly. 
This was an exploratory research that aimed at identifying as many mechanisms 
through which banks were affected by and responded to the 2008 economic crisis as 
possible. The objective was not to quantify the magnitude of the impacts, but to 
understand their mechanisms and the way banks responded to the same. Most of the 
data collected therefore are qualitative although there are some quantitative data to 
support them. Therefore quantitative analysis such as multivariate analysis which 
would analyse more than two variables on a sample of observations was not used as it 
was not appropriate for this kind of study and its objectives. 
Following Kothari’s (ibid: 130) advise, if multivariate analysis was appropriate, among 
the analysis that could be done include but are not limited to multiplr regression 
analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, multivariate analysis of variance and canonical  
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analysis. Since this was not impact assessment study but identification of the 
mechanisms of impacts, the before- and after analytical procedure that would involve 
establishing causality between the crisis on one hand and impacts on the other was not 
used either.  
After identification of the mechanisms of impacts (22 different mechanisms have been 
identified in this exploratory research), the next research frontier by way of areas for 
further research include emperical study and analysis of these mechanisms of impacts 
with the view of establishing causal-effect relationship with the crisis. Among the 
challenges that are foreseen however are adequate time series and panel data. This is 
because the 2008 crisis was a shock that lasted for relatively short period of time before 
recovery sat in sometimes in 2010. 
Therefore the after -the crisis data would be only for some two years. To complicate the 
matter, the data for 2010 are likely to be polluted by the 2010 Euro zone sovereign debt 
crisis that emerged in 2010. Therefore this would create causality problem as some of 
the data could be attributed to the 2008 crisis while others would be attributed to the 
2010 Euro zone crisis. Filtering which impacts are emanating from the 2008 crisis and 
which are emanating from the 2010 Euro zone crisis would pose substantial 
methodological challenges that would most most likely lead to interrogations of results 
of data analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS FROM THE BANK OF TANZANIA (BoT) AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter the findings on the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania in 
general  have been affected by the 2008 economic crisis and the way they have 
responded to the same from the perspectives of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) are 
presented together with discussion of the same.  
As pointed out earlier, the objectives of the research included identifying the 
mechanisms through banks in Tanzania were affected by the 2008 economic crisis from 
the point of view of these banks. It was beyond the scope of this study to measure and 
quantify the actual impacts of the crisis in each mechanism through which the banks 
were affected. The focus of the research was on identifying the conduits/mechanisms 
through which the banks were affected by the crisis. Measuring and quantifying the 
actual and potential impacts through which each bank was affected by each mechanism 
remains among the major areas for further research once the mechanism are 
understood. 
5.2  Findings From the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) 
The Bank of Tanzania (BoT) is the leading monetary authority in the country. It is the 
regulator of the banking sector. Therefore it was assumed by the researcher that the 
bank will have an overview of the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis in the banking 
sector in Tanzania and responses to the same. This is why it was important to get the 
views of BoT on the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were impacted by 
and responded to the 2008 economic crisis in general.  
 74 
5.2.1  Mechanisms of Impact of the 2008 Economic Crisis in the Banking Sector 
in Tanzania 
According to responses from the BoT, the banking sector in Tanzania was affected by 
the 2008 economic crisis through various mechanisms. These mechanisms include the 
following. 
5.2.1.1 Second Round Effects 
Unless otherwise stated, the findings on the second round effects are from the BoT’s 
written response to the researcher’s questions. According to responses from BoT, the 
banking sector in Tanzania was not affected directly by first round of the impact of the 
crisis. The impact was more felt in the advanced economies such as in the USA and 
Europe. The rather little impacts of the crisis in Tanzanian banks, according to the BoT 
responses was partly due to the fact that banks in Tanzania were not holding the ‘toxic’ 
securities and debt instruments that had spread the crisis across the international 
financial system. This response is similar to the literature by such authors as Adei 
(2010) and Ngowi (2013, 2010) who have pointed out that it was the second round 
impacts of the crisis not the first one that was felt in most part of the developing world 
including Tanzania.  
This second round or bounce-on effect is the result of collapse in the demand for 
exports which in turn affected cash flows of export-based activities. This caused banks 
to be more cautious to lending to the establishments involved in such activities, leading 
to a substantial slow down in credit growth from 44.6%t in 2008 to 9.6% in 2009. This 
is a decline by a whole 35%. Table 5.1 and chart 5.1 below show the share of 
Tanzania’s exports in the period 2004 to 2008. 
 
 75 
Table 5.1: Tanzania’s exports by destinations, 2004 – 2008 
Region Share 
Europe 47% 
Asia 20% 
SADC 20% 
EAC 10% 
North America 3% 
Source: Adapted by the researcher from BoT (2010d) 
 
Figure 5.1: Tanzania’s exports by destinations, 2004 – 2008 
 
 
Source: BoT (2010d) 
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The table and chart above show that Tanzania’s exports destinations in the period 2004 
– 2008, which are four years leading the 2008 crisis, were skewed to Europe (47%). 
This is among the continents that were much affected by the crisis. When one adds the 
exports to Asia (20%) and North America (3%), it becomes clear that about 70% of 
Tanzania’s exports were destined to parts of the world that were substantially affected 
by the crisis. The implications of this include second-round impacts of the crisis 
through decline in exports. By extension, this affected banks whose clients were in 
businesses exporting to these markets. 
Second round effects of the crisis were also caused by decline in tourism. This is partly 
because the countries hat are sources of tourists to Tanzania were also affected by the 
crisis thereby reducing the ability and willingness of the would-be tourists to visit 
Tanzania. In the table below, the top ten countries that are sources of tourists in 
Tanzania are listed. 
 
BoT (2010d) correctly points out that the first round effects of the 2008 crisis were 
rather limited. This is largely due to two major reasons. The first is the low level of 
integration of domestic financial markets with the international financial markets. The 
second one are the remaining restrictions on capital account, which lowered exposure to 
the toxic financial assets. BoT (ibid) points out that at the time of the crisis, foreign 
assets component in Tanzania’s banking sector was about 11% of total assets of the 
banking system. This implies minimal exposure to direct effects of the crisis. 
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5.2.1.2  Increase in Non-performing loans (NPLs) 
As a result of the crisis, there was also a deterioration of the overall quality of the 
banking sector’s loan portfolio. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased during the 
height of the crisis (mid 2009) and return on assets declined as interest rates fell. 
According to BoT (2011: 66), in 2010, NPL ratio increased to 9.3% compared to 6.6% 
recorded in the previous year. This is an increase by 2.7%. BoT (ibid) attributes the 
increase in NPLs mainly to poor performance of loan portfolio of some big banks 
which had suffered from the second round effects of the global financial crisis. The 
bank informs further that the 2.7% increased in NPLs did not pose a systemic risk due 
to a strong capital position in the banking system. For the affected individual banks 
however, the increase in NPLs is bad to their operations especially in their profit 
targets. The chart below shows NPLs in selected sectors. 
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Figure 5.2: Quarterly NPLs of the selected economic activities 
 
Source: BoT (2010d) 
5.2.1.3  Decline in Personal Loans 
As part of mechanisms through which banks were impacted by the 2008 crisis, BoT 
(2010b) states that personal loans registered slowdown in annual growth but maintained 
their dominant share in total credit.  
 
It accounted for 20.4% of the total stock of outstanding loans in December 2009, down 
from 21.2% recorded in December 2008. This decline by 0.8% does not seem to be big 
but it lead to reduced bank sales revenues and profits associated to this particular 
product. Therefore, this does not seem to be an important mechanism through which 
banks were impacted. 
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5.2.1.4  Banking Sector Soundness 
BoT (ibid) informs that Tanzania’s financial sector remained sound despite the global 
financial turmoil. By December 2009, all major financial soundness indicators of the 
banking sector were strong. These include capital adequacy ratio (CAR) - measured as 
a ratio of core capital to total risk weighted assets, asset quality, liquidity ratio and 
profitability level. It informs further that the banking system was adequately capitalized 
against any potential financial risk. The CAR was at 18.0% compared to the legal 
minimum requirements of 10%. This implies 8% above the minimum regulatory 
threshold. Therefore, banks were not impacted through the mechanism of reduced bank 
soundness. 
 
5.2.1.5  Banks’ Assets Quality 
With regard to asset quality of the banking system (measured by level of NPLs), BoT 
(ibid) informs that during the year ending December 2009, the ratio of NPLs to total 
loans remained relatively stable and below the prudential limit of 10%. It moved from 
6.3% in November 2008 to 6.4% (an increase by 0.1%). The rather slow decline is 
attributed to the rescue plan which, inter alia dampened the impact of the second round 
effects of the global financial crisis on the banking system.  
 
According to BoT (2011b), in order to manage the asset quality within prudential 
levels, BoT directed banks with high NPLs to submit Action Plans for improving their 
portfolio performance. By December 2010, the quality of assets of the banking system 
was satisfactory. This is reflected by the declining ratio of NPLs to total capital. It 
eclined from 30.5% in December 2009 to 28.5% in December 2009. The ratio of NPLs 
to total loans declined to 6.7% from 7.0% in the same period. 
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 Generally, this is an important mechanism through which banks were impacted. 
5.2.1.6  Resilience of Banks 
The stress tests conducted by BoT in 2010 showed that the Tanzanian banking system 
was resilient to adverse changes in interest rates, exchange rate and credit quality. 
Liquidity levels were sufficient to cushion the system against extreme liquidity risk. 
 
5.2.1.7  Banks’ Liquidity 
According to BoT (ibid), throughout 2009, the banking system in Tanzania had enough 
liquidity to operate smoothly and cover their liabilities without much recourse to 
liquidity windows at the Bank. The overall liquidity of the banking sector continued to 
be high. The ratio of liquid assets to demand liabilities rose to 46.6% in December 2009 
from 41.7% at the end of December 2008. This is much above the regulatory minimum 
limit of 20.0% by 26.6% and 21.7% respectively. Gross loans to total deposits ratio 
declined to 61.8% from 68.4%. This is a decline by 6.6%. The 61.8% deposit ratio is 
within the maximum regulatory limit of 80% required for each individual institution. 
 
5.2.1.8  Banks’ Profitability 
On the impacts of the crisis on banks’ through the mecahnism of profitability, BoT 
informs that the banking business continued to be profitable, although profitability level 
declined slightly during 2009. During the year ending December 2009, the Return on 
Equity was recorded at 20.1% compared with 22.7% (decline by 1.6%) recorded in the 
previous year. Return on Assets declined to 2.85% in the first half of 2009/2010 from 
3.45% (decline by 0.6%) in the same period of 2008/2009.  
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5.2.1.9  Financial Soundness 
According to BoT (2011), indicators of the financial soundness of the banking system 
by the end of December 2010 show that the system continued to be sound and stable in 
aggregate terms. Most banks were well capitalized with liquidity levels above the  
regulatory requirements. The ratio of core capital to total risk weighted assets was at 
18.8% compared to the minimum requirement of 10%. Therefore this was 8.8% above 
the minimum threshold. 
 
5.2.1.10  Accumulation of Excess Reserves 
According to BoT (2010d), since the on-set of the 2008 economic crisis, banks have 
been accumulating excess reserves on account of lack of demand from their main  
 
borrowers and a cautious lending attitude on their part. Excess reserves of banks 
increased from Tshs 100.7 billion in December 2008 to a peak of Tshs 440.6 billion in 
February 2010. This is an increase by Tshs 339.9 billion or by a whole 337.5%. This 
excess reserve is equivalent to idle cash that should have instead been lent out to 
increase banks’ sales volume and profits. The chart below shows the excess reserves in 
Tanzanian banks. 
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Figure 5.3: Excess Reserves of the Banking System 
 
Source: BoT (2010d) 
 
5.3  Responses by BoT and Banks to the 2008 Economic Crisis 
As with the impacts, there are various ways in which the 2008 economic crisis was 
responded to in the Tanzanian banking sector. Responses in this category inlude those 
by BoT which is the country’s leading monetary authority and regulator as well as 
responses by individual banks. The responses to the crisis based on the findings from 
BoT are presented below. 
5.3.1  An Overview of BoT Responses 
From the responses from the BoT, it was made clear that the bank responded to the 
2008 crisis in various ways. These include introduction of daily surveillance meetings 
and reports reports, more closer monitoring and supervsion of banks to know the state 
of banks including lending and deposits trend in each bank on daily basis, stress-testing, 
increase of reserve requirements on government deposits held in commercial banks to 
cushion the financial system against eventual liquidity dry up; formation of crisis 
committee, formation of Financial Sector Regulatory Authority, establishment of an  
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early warning system to intensify oversight of the banking system, establishment of a 
financial stability department to produce regular financial stability reports. The general 
responses above are followed by specific responses that are mainly based on the review 
of documents that were availed to the researcher by the bank. 
The general analysis of the responses to the 2008 economic crisis by the BoT indicates 
that they are in line with the theoretical underpinnings of the monetarists and Austrian 
schools of thoughts as presented in chapter two of this work. More specifically, they are 
in line with the views of the theories that attribute economic crisis to weaknesses of 
monetary authorities such as central banks. The theoretical underpinnings call for 
monetary authorities (central banks) to intervene in various ways as necessary 
responses to adress economic crisis in the banking sector. The various BoT responses 
documented below are in line with the theoretical underpinnings. 
5.3.2  Enhanced Monitoring of the Sector 
According to responses from BoT, the bank enhanced monitoring of the activities of the 
financial sector through introduction of daily surveillance of selected performance 
indicators of banks. These indicators have ever since been presented and discussed in 
the surveillance meeting on daily basis. This response is natural given some of the 
causes of the crisis including in adequate surveillance by the Federal Reserve Bank as 
outlined in Adei (2010), among others. Increased surveillance by BoT is a necessary 
response to ensure that necesary corrective measures are applied in the sector before it 
is too late. This is also in line with the monetarists ans Autrian schools of thought on 
what monetary authorities ought to do in response to economic crises. 
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5.3.3  Easy Monetary Policy 
In its response to the research questions, the BoT informs that as a measure to respond 
to the 2008 economic crisis, it pursued a relaxed monetary policy in 2009. This 
monetary policy stance was a countercyclical measure to mitigate the impact of the 
2008 economic crisis. Inter alia, it aimed at warding-off the downside effects of the 
crisis. It also aimed at sustaining a low interest rate environment in order to enhance 
credit flow to the private sector. Monetary policy targets were revised upwards to 
accommodate monetary expansion. This response is in line with the views of the 
monetarists and Austrian schools of thought on expected response from monetary 
authorities in times of economic crisis. 
 
According to BoT (2010b), the bank reduced the volume of most monetary instruments 
sold. In the first half of 2009/2010 the Bank supplied a total of Tshs 1,518.3 billion 
worth of Treasury bills against a demand of Tshs 2,557.3 billion which is an 
oversubscription of 68.4%. In a similar period of 2008/2009, the Bank supplied Tshs 
1,445.9 billion worth of Treasury bills against a demand of Tshs 1,662.2 billion which 
is an oversubscription of only 15.0%. This response is in line with the fact that the 
crisis reduced liquidity in the financial system across the world as documented in inter 
alia, Ngowi (2013, 2010).  
5.3.4 Increase in Banks’ Capital Requirements 
According to BoT (2010b), in order to improve the resilience of the financial sector to 
shocks in the medium to long-term, BoT raised the minimum capital requirements of 
commercial banks from Tshs 5.0 billion to Tshs 15.0 billion in 2010. This is an increase 
by a whole Tshs 10 billion or by 200%.  
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Whereas this was an important response to the crisis, it has negative implications to 
small banks that were unable to raise the new capital requirement. This may have 
negative implications to most Tanzanians who are not banked and it may have negative 
implications for financial inclusion efforts. The new capital requirement was to be 
attained within three years by the existing banks. New banks had to start with this 
amount of capital. 
 
5.3.5 Establishment of Financial Sector Stability Department 
According to BoT (2010d), in order for the Bank to carry out its financial stability 
mandate, it established a Financial Sector Stability Department in 2009. Its main 
responsibility is to undertake overall surveillance and assessment of the financial 
system, in order to identify any financial imbalances/risks and their implications to 
financial stability. BoT will be publishing semi annual Financial Stability Reports to 
inform stakeholders about the health of the financial sector and its ability to mitigate 
risks and absorb shocks. This is important in building public confidence on the 
Tanzanian financial system.  
 
Among other things, it is likely to help in reducing possibilities of a run on banks in 
case of a crisis similar to the 2008 one. The inagural volume of BoT’s financial stability 
report was released in September 2010. Among the key issues covered in this inagural 
volume include macroeconomic and financial environment globally and in Tanzania; 
financial sector development in Tanzania including the structure of the financial 
system, financial system resilience, financial system infrastructure and regulation, 
national payment and settlement systems as well as safeguarding payment systems  
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stability through risk reduction measures. In September 2011, BoT released another 
financial stability report. 
5.3.6 Enhancement of Financial System Stability and Efficiency  
BoT (2010d) informs that as part of responses to the crisis, the bank will seek to 
enhance the stability and efficiency of the financial system which is mainly composed 
of banks (75%). This will be mainly done through the following priority areas: 
Sustenance of daily surveillance of the financial transactions in the banking sector and 
through the payment and settlement systems. This intensive approach enables the Bank 
to identify early warning signals of systemic risks to the financial system, and hence 
take appropriate measures. 
i) Sustenance of prudential surveillance and supervision over banks in order to 
strengthen the resilience of the banking system.  
ii) Ensuring compliance by banks to the new increased capital requirements within 
the agreed grace period.  
iii) Speeding up of the establishment and operationalization of Credit Reference 
Bureau to facilitate the sharing of information on creditworthiness of customers 
in the banking system – as one of the measures of managing credit risk. This is 
important especially when one takes into account that the 2008 economic crisis 
was caused by, inter alia sub prime morgages 
iv) Enhancement of crisis response mechanism through development of an effective 
and coordinated national financial crisis management and resolution framework. 
v) Coordination in harmonizing the East African Community (EAC) member 
states’ financial stability frameworks in a bid to develop a regional framework 
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for financial stability analysis and reporting. This is in line with the growing 
exposure to cross-border risks as banks increase their regional operations. 
5.3.7  Prudential Oversight  
According to BoT (2011b), the bank responded to the crisis by maintaining confidence 
in the banking system thereby promoting financial stability. This was done in various 
ways including maintaining adequate liquidity level, ensuring that banks are solvent by 
all times having sufficient capital and requiring banks to continuously improve risk 
management of their operations. 
5.3.8  Establishment of Financial Regulators Forum 
As part of safeguarding financial stability, BoT formed financial sector regulators 
forum as stated in BoT (2010a: 42). The aim of he forum is to take joint responsibility 
in safeguarding the sector and coordinating crisis management and resolution. 
5.3.9  Strengthening Crisis Preparedness 
BoT also responded to the 2008 economic crisis by strengthening crisis preparedness in 
case another crisis emerges. The measures taken include raising commercial banks’ 
minimum capital from Tshs 5 billion to Tshs 15 billion and from Tshs 2.5 billion to 
Tshs 7.5 billion (200%) for non banking financial institutions. 
Another measure in strengthening crisis preparedness was the increase of insurance 
coverage per depositor from Tshs 500,000 to Tshs 1,500,000. This is an increase by 
Tshs 1,000,000 or 200%. This increased insurance cover is interpreted by the reseacher 
as a way of letting banks write their living wills so that if they are troubled by a future 
crisis, they can bail out themselves instead of relying on tax payers’ money for bail out. 
 
 88 
5.3.10  Liquidity Management 
According to BoT (2010b), it responded to the 2008 crisis through liquidity 
management. It strived to balance the instrument mix so as to ensure that they reflect 
the economic fundamentals. It also continued to promote transparency in monetary 
policy. This was done in various ways including but not limited to various regular 
publications, meetings with the media and through its monthly meetings with chief 
executive officers of commercial banks. These kinds of liquidity management in times 
of economic crisis such as the 2008 one are important because among the possible 
severe impacts of the crisis is liquidity dry up. 
 
5.3.11  Review of Rates 
As part of responses to the crisis, BoT reviewed the Lombard and discount rates 
downward with a view to making them more active instruments of monetary policy and 
to enhance flexibility in provision of liquidity to the economy. According to BoT 
(2010d), Lombard Facility is an overnight facility established to enable commercial 
banks to borrow at their own discretion, bypledging eligible government securities as 
collateral. Lombard rate on the other hand is the rate payable for the use of the 
Lombard Facility. The rate is based on the prevailing 35-days Treasury bill yield, 
REPO rate and overnight inter-bank rate, whichever is higher. 
 
According to BoT (2009), there was a decline of the Lombard rate from 7.35% in June 
to 4.13% in July 2009. This is a reduction of 3.22% points. There was also a drop in the 
discount rate from 10.31% to 6.95% in the same period. This is a reduction of 3.36% 
points. According to BoT (ibid), both rates remained low, at an average of 3.7% for 
Lombard and 4.6% for discount rate, in the first half of 2009/2010.  
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5.3.12  New Capital Requirement 
According to BoT (2011), the Bank responded to the crisis by raising the required 
minimum core capital for banks from Tshs 5.0 billion to Tshs 15.0 billion (200% 
increase) with a view to enhance the capability of the banking sector to absorb losses 
caused by inter alia, economic crisis similar to the 2008 one. Three years grace period 
was provided for the existing banks to comply with the new capital requirement. Newly 
established banks are required to comply with the new regulation on licensing.  
 
It can be seen that some of the responses by BoT above are reactive in nature. These are 
those responses that aimed to reduce impacts and spread of the crisis. Some responses 
however are proactive in that they aim at preventing future crisis in the banking sector 
and reducing impacts of the same in the sector if it happens. 
 
Generally, the responses by the BoT to the 2008 economic crisis are in line with 
various theoretical underpinnings on what monetary authorities ought to do in response 
to economic crisis. For example, the responses are in line with the monetarists’ theory 
on hat monetary authorities ought to do in times of economic crisis. According to 
Benanke (2000) for example, monetary authorities need to prevent shrinking in money 
supply in times of economic crisis. This is partly seen in BoT’s response to the crisis by 
ways of, inter alia, embracing easy monetary policy stance in 2009, establishing 
financial sector stability department, prudential oversight, strengthening crisis 
preparedness as well as reviewing the Lombard and discount rates downward. 
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5.4  Responses by Banks 
The responses above are those that were undertaken by BoT. Besides the responses to 
the crisis by the central bank, the research at BoT found out that there were some 
general responses to the crisis by banks in general. These responses are outlined in this 
part.  
 
5.4.1  More Cautious Lending 
According to the findings from BoT, banks in Tanzania became more cautious to 
lending to businesses in risky sectors such as agriculture, tourism and exports. The  
 
cautious lending stance taken by banks, which was triggered by the effects of the global 
financial crisis, caused the annual expansion of credit to the private sector to decelerate. 
According to BoT (2010c), the rate of growth of credit to the private sector was 9.6% in 
January 2010 compared with 12.2% recorded in December 2009 and 44.6% recorded in 
the year ending December 2008.  
 
The sustained slower growth rate of credit to the private sector, according to BoT was 
mainly driven by continued cautious stance taken by banks in extending credit to the 
private sector, following the 2008 economic crisis. The views that banks became more 
cautious in lending are consistent with Velde and Lunogelo (2009) who inform that 
there was tightening of lending rates in the banking sector due to the crisis. They are 
also consistent with Minja (2009) who reports that banks in Tanzania adopted a more 
cautious stance when advancing credit. 
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5.4.2  Preference for Safer Money Market Instruments 
With the pace of expansion of credit to the private sector declining, accordong to BoT 
(2010b) banks increased their preference for safer money market instruments. These 
include Treasury securities, repurchase agreements and foreign currency. The stock of 
government securities held by banks rose by Tshs 202.7 billion in the year ending 
December 2009 compared to a decline of Tshs 137.5 billion in the year to December 
2008. There was also a sharper increase of Tshs 599.9 million registered in foreign 
assets of banks in 2009, compared to a decline of Tshs 138.8 million in 2008. 
 
5.4.3  Resumed Lending 
According to BoT (2010d), banks resumed lending in the second half of 2010. This is 
in response to signs of recovery from the 2008 economic crisis. In the first quarter of 
2010 assessment of the economy shows that excess reserves declined from peak at Tshs 
440 billion recorded in February 2010 to Tshs 377.6 billion by end June 2010. This is a 
reduction by Tshs 62.4 billion or by 14.2%  According to BoT (ibid), lending across 
most economic activities recorded positive growth rates in the quarter ending March 
2010 as shown in the chart 5.4 below. 
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Figure 5.4: Quarterly annual growth rate of credit to selected sectors 
 
Source: BoT (2010d) 
According to BoT (2011), in the year ending December 2010, credit grew by 20%. This 
is far above the 9.6% growth recorded in the corresponding period a year earlier. It is 
slightly higher than the target of 19.2% for December 2010.  
 
Generally, the theoretical underpinning of the Debt-deflation theory do explain the 
general responses to the 2009 economic crisis by banks in Tanzania. The theory, 
according to Fisher (1933), indicates that banks will avoid collapsing due to economic 
crisis. They will therefore undertake various response measures. As documented above, 
it is seen that according to BoT responses, that banks in Tanzania responded to the 
2008 economic crisis as predicted in the Debt-deflation theory. To avoid collapsing, as 
predicted in Fisher (ibid), banks in Tanzania practised more cautious lending. They also 
had preference for safer money market instruments. When recovery had started setting 
in and dangers of collapsing reduced from the second half of 2010 however, they 
resumed lending. Therefore the responses by banks can be undersood by the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Debt-deflation theory. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS FROM BARCLAYS BANK TANZANIA  
6.1  Introduction  
In this chapter the findings on the mechanism through which Barclays Bank Tanzania 
has been affected by the 2008 economic crisis and the way it has responded to the same 
are presented together with discussion of the same. Barclays Bank Tanzania is among 
the banks that were studied with the aim of understanding the mechanisms through 
which it was affected by the 2008 economic crisis and the way it responded to the 
same. Information on the impacts of the crisis and responses to the same in the bank 
were mainly collected through face to face interviews with three staff of the bank. The 
researcher mailed the research questions and interview guide to the bank’s 
management. 
6.2 Mechanisms of Impacts of the 2008 Economic Crisis on Barclays Bank 
In the discussions with Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, it was stated by the respondents 
that the bank was affected by the 2008 economic crisis through various mechanisms as 
documented below. 
6.2.1  Impacts Through Defaults by Borrowers 
According to the bank, the 2008 economic crisis led to defaults by borrowers. Among 
the borrowers that defaulted on loans are those in the tourism sector. This is because the 
sector was negatively affected by the 2008 crisis. Tourist hotels operators experienced 
cancelled bookings and therefore their sales revenues and profits declined substantially 
amidst a number of fixed costs. The result was inability of the borrowers to honour 
their debt obligations to the bank and had to default.  
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The impacts of defaults on banks include not reaching revenue and profits targets as 
well as being in danger of making losses and even going bankrupt. If this becomes the 
situation for pivotal banks in the country, it could lead to collapse of the banking and 
financial sector. This in turn would have many and far-reaching negative implications 
in the economy. 
The bank’s views that it was affected by the 2008 crisis through defaults in the tourism 
sector can be partly supported and understood in the light of the available literature 
although establishing clear causality is challenging. As documented in the literature 
review part of this report, acording to URT (2009), the tourism sector experienced a 
decline in revenue by about 18% in 2008 and by some 30% in 2009. URT (ibid) reports 
further that there was a 60% cancellation of bookings in the tourism sector due to the 
crisis in 2009.  
The sector experienced reduced tourist visits of about 10% in Tanzania mainland and 
10.4% in Zanzibar. Tourism income in the mainland was reduced in the first quarter of 
2009 (USD 241.7 million) compared to USD 283.3 million in the same period in 2008. 
This is a reduction of some USD 41.6 million or 14.7% of the initial income. Tourist 
number was expected to drop by between 15% and 50% in Zanzibar in the 2009/10 
season. It was beyond the scope of this study to establish how many of the tourism 
sector players that were affected by the crisis were actual or potential customers of 
Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited. Looking at the figures however, it makes sense that 
the bank was affected by such shocks in the sector. 
According to the bank, the manufacturing sector was not affected by the crisis in the 
same way as the tourism sector. Whereas tourism sector clients were and still are 
mainly foreign and very much affected by the crisis, those of the manufacturing sector  
 95 
are mainly local and not as severely affected by the crisis as foreigners. It is the 
author’s interpretation that the bank’s manufacturing customers were not exporters or if 
they were then were not exporting to the countries that were severely affected by the 
crisis. This is because the literature has documented that the crisis affected the 
exporting manufacturing sector. By implications, this would also affect the bank in 
similar way to that of the tourism sector. 
According to URT (ibid) for example, various industries in Tanzania were affected by 
the 2008 economic crisis. Among these include textile industries that depend on export 
markets. The textile industries that were affected include Sun Flag, 21st Century, 
Tabora Textile, Mbeya Textile and Kilitex. Tannery industries too were affected by 
decline in skin and hides export price from USD 1,500 to USD 500 per ton for salt-
dried skin. This is a decline by 1000 USD per ton or 66.7% of the pre-crisis price. The 
decline was from USD 1,100 to USD 350 per ton for raw skin. This is a decline by 
USD 750 per ton or 68.2% of the original pre-crisis price. If the manufacturing sector 
was so much affected by the crisis but the bank reports not to have been affected then 
the explanatory factors include the possibilities that the specific firms that were affected 
were not customers of the bank.  
The argument that the bank was more affected by the impacts of the crisis in tourism 
sector that depends much on foreign market implies that strong domestic market 
including domestic tourism could be among the strategies of reducing the impacts of 
the crisis. However, when taking into consideration the relatively low purchasing power 
of domestic tourists one doubts on whether this strategy could could offer recovery in 
the sector in particular and economy in general. Without giving evidence, the bank 
argues that the manufacturing sector was mainly affected through raw materials price 
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hikes. This is not likely to be the case because during the crisis prices of many goods 
and services declined. 
The implications of defaults include increase in Non Performing Loans (NPLs) in the 
bank. Without reference to a particular bank, IMF (2010) informs that the crisis 
increased the rate of NPLs in Tanzanian banks. It informs that the rate peaked in mid-
2009 due to the 2008 crisis. According to the Fund, NPLs exhibited large variation 
among banks, partly reflecting different exposures to distressed sectors. According to 
IMF (ibid), system-wide NPLs rose to 7.8% in June 2009 from 6.2%  in December 
2008 due to the 2008 crisis. This is an increase by 1.6%. A 1.6% increase in NPL may 
look small, but may have many and far-reaching negative implications in monetary 
terms. 
The Fund informs further that NPLs declined by 0.5% to reach the 6.7% mark partly as 
a result of the government rescue package for distressed borrowers. According to IMF 
(ibid), NPL rates varied not only across sectors but also across banks. It informed 
further that NPLs for systemically important banks at the end of June 2009, ranged 
from 1.8% to 14.2% which is an average of 8% and a range of 12.4%. Although these 
figures are not specifically for Barclays, they send some signals on the possible rate of 
NPL in the bank due to the crisis. 
6.2.2  Impacts Through Debt re-Scheduling  
The bank was affected by the crisis as it had to reschedule debts of its troubled and 
struggling customers. Payment time, frequencies and amounts to be paid had to re-
negotiated and re-cheduled on case by case basis depending on the position of each 
client. For some borrowers, repayments had to be negotiated and rescheduled by the  
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bank’s NPLs unit. For example, some five-years loans had to be extended to six years 
and re-amortized.  
The bank had to renegotiate loan portifoli in the tourism sector that were worth about 
10 million Sterling Pounds. This is about 10% of the bank’s corporate book. Customers 
in this category had to be put in special unit care of the bank. However, some customers 
still had hopes for more business and did not have to renegotiate and reschedule 
payments. The results of renegotiating and rescheduling payments include delayed 
revenue and profits for the bank. It also implies bank’s longer exposure of expected 
revenues and profits to risks.   
6.2.3  Impacts Through Reduced Issuance of Loans 
Due to the uncertainties caused by the crisis, the bank was obliged to reduce issuance of 
loans to its customers. This was done in two major ways. Firstly, headroom was 
cancelled in order to limit exposures to some risky sectors. Secondly, the bank 
evaluated high risk sectors like tourism, whole sale and trade (buying commodities 
abroad). Loans in these sectors were frozen considerably. This was especially so for 
new businesses than known ones.  
The bank also froze personal lending as a cautious strategy to reduce possible losses. 
This affected the bank negatively because it reduced some of its customers who  
arguably went to less risk-avers lenders. Reducing a bank’s customer base amidst cut-
throat competition in a competitive banking market structure with over 40 banks 
implies reduced potential bank revenues and profits. 
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From the 2006 to 2012 Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd’s Annual Reports and Financial 
Statements, it is reported that loans and advances to customers have been declining 
from 2009 to 2012 as shown in the table below. A clear causality between the 2008 
economic crisis on one hand and decline in loans and advances to customers on the 
other hand can not be established. This is because such a decline is a function of many 
variables not only economic crisis.  
However, there is possibility that the crisis triggered the decline. There was an increase 
in loans and advances from 192.2 billion Shillings in 2006 to 221.2 billion Shillings in 
2007. This is an increase by 29 billion Shillings or 15.1%. However, just after the crisis 
in 2008, there has been a decline in loans and advances to customers. This can imply 
that the bank has been more strict than before in issueing loans and advances. It can 
also imply that customers have been affected by the crisis to the extent that they are no 
longer willing or able to access loans and advances. 
However, after the recovery from the crisis that started to set-in from around 2010, one 
would not expect decline in loans and advances that continued up to 2012. Therefore, 
although the figures show decline in loans and advances just after the crisis, this cannot 
be clearly attributed to the crisis. 
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Table 6.1. Loans and Advances to Customers, 2006 to 2012 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Loans 
and 
advances 
192.2b 221.2b No data Decline 
by 62b 
Decline 
by 11b 
Decline 
by 25b 
Decline 
40.4b 
Source: Compiled by the author from Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements For the Years Ended 31st December 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
6.2.4  Impacts Through Reduced Sale of Bank Products  
Due to the 2008 economic crisis, the bank was obliged to stop saling some of its 
products. These products include mainly longer-maturing obligations. Long term 
maturing obligations for Barclays include term loans above two years. These were seen 
as a problem during the crisis and therefore had to be reduced. The aim was to reduce 
the bank’s exposure to risks associated to long-term maturing obligations.  When a 
bank reduced types and amounts of the products it sells, the implications include 
reduced sales revenues and profits from these specific products. 
Figures from Barclays indicate that there have been losses (negative profits) for all but 
one year after the crisis as shown in the table below. Partly, the losses can be attributed 
to the reduced sales of Barclays’ products as a result of the crisis.  
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Table 6.2: Profit Before Tax, 2006 to 2012 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Profit 
before 
tax 
3,950m 14,904m 239m (39b) (4.8b) 1.6b (5.1b) 
Source: Compiled by the author from Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements For the Years Ended 31st December 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
6.2.5  Impacts on the Bank’s Soundness 
The bank’s soundness was not significantly affected by the 2008 economic crisis. This 
is because its buffer capital was still good. Despite the crisis, the bank’s ability to do 
business had not been affected. According to the Barclays Bank’s Annual Reports for 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, the bank was sound in all these years. This finding is 
in line with the BoT (2008) statement that the banking sector in general was still sound 
as the capital requirements of most banks were good and arguably above the BoT and 
Basell requirements. 
6.2.6  Impacts Through Exposure to Complex Financial Products  
Barclays was not affected by the crisis through exposure to complex financial products. 
This is because the bank did not deal with complex products like derivatives. This was 
the case despite Barckays having a number of corresponding banks and international 
financial institutions that it transacts with. These institutions include the European  
 
 101 
Investment Bank (EIB), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the French 
Development Corporation (PROPARCO) and the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (CDC). The institutions do facilitate international trade and access to 
borrowing in foreign currency by Barclays’ clients with medium and long-term 
projects.  
Being based in the developed countries, one would expect that these institutions would 
be affected by the crisis in various ways including through complex financial products. 
If this was the case then Barclays too would be affected indirectly. The response that 
Barclays was not affected through this mechanism implies that these foreign institutions 
did not trade with Barclays in complex financial products that could have impacted the 
bank negatively. 
6.2.7  Impacts Through Credit Risks 
The bank was affected by the crisis through increased credit risks. According to 
Barclays, credit risk increased by almost 100% during the crisis. Interest rate went up 
substantially by 5%.  This is a disincetive to customers because higher interest rates 
imply higher cost of borrowing.  
According to the bank, some of its corporate customers shied away from borrowing 
partly due to higher interest rates. This implies reduction of potential and actual 
customers and related revenues and profits.  
As for the case of reduced sales of the bank’s products, figures on losses (negative 
profit) for all but one year after the crisis may imply that credit risk resulted into 
reduced customers and associated interest incomes as shown in the Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.3: Profit Before Tax, 2006 to 2012 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Profit 
before 
tax 
3,950m 14,904m 239m (39b) (4.8b) 1.6b (5.1b) 
Source: Compiled by the author from Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements For the Years Ended 31st December 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
It is important to note that establishing the number of actual and potential customers 
that Barclays lost due to increased credit risk and therefore increase in interest rate was 
beyond the scope of this study. Also the actual and potential revenues and profits lost 
for this reason was beyond the scope of this study. All these form part of areas for 
further research. Establishing such lost customers, revenues and profits would require 
establishing a clear causality between the crisis on one hand and the lost customers, 
revenues and profits on the other. It would also imply filtering out other possible 
contributory factors to loss of customers, revenues and profits by the bank. 
6.2.8  Impacts Through Losses of Deposits With Troubled Correspondent Banks 
Barclays was not affected by the 2008 economic crisis via the route of deposits with 
correspondent banks. It did not loose its deposits in correspondent banks. Its main bank  
is Barclays Plc and therefore there were no exposures. Barclays vetted across the world 
with financial institutions with which it has correspondence in order to make sure that it 
was not loosing its deposits through troubled correspondent banks. 
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6.2.9 Impacts Through Exposure to Crops and Other Commodities Financing 
Barclays bank was not affected by the 2008 economic crisis through the mechanism of 
financing crops and other commodities. This is because, contrary to such banks as 
CRBD Bank Ltd and TIB, the bank does not deal with financing of the agricultural 
sector. Therefore it was not exposed to the risks associated with crops financing. As 
noted in the introduction to the bank, Barclays is more active in the manufacturing, 
tourism, industrial and trade sectors but not in agriculture.  
6.2.10 Impacts Through Parent Bank Withdrawing Funds  
Barclays Tanzania’s parent bank is Barclays PLC of United Kingdom (UK). The bank 
was not affected by the crisis by the way of the parent bank withdrawing funds from it 
for various purposes including but not limited to supporting operations at home. 
Nothing  
was withdrawn from Barclay Tanzania. According to Barclays Bank Tanzania, the 
parent company itself had adequate buffer and would not need to withdraw from  
Barclays Tanzania. Besides this, the Qatari Group which is a shareholder of Barclays 
PLC in UK bought preferential shares in the bank thereby increasing its liquidity and 
removing any need of the bank to withdraw funds from Tanzania. 
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6.2.11 Impacts Through Parent Company Stopping Re-investing Profits Locally 
Barclays Bank Tanzania was not affected by the 2008 economic crisis through the 
mechanism of parent company stopping re-investing its profits locally. As noted earlier, 
Barclays Tanzania operates as an independent bank in Tanzania with its own capital 
base. It does not depend on Barclays PLC capital for its investment in Tanzania. 
6.2.12  Impacts Through Parent Company Repatriating Funds  
Tanzanian Investment Act 1997 allows for unconditional repatriation of profits, 
incomes, dividends and interest by multinational companies investing in Tanzania. 
However, in the context of this study, this did not happen to Barclays Bank Tanzania 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the bank operates in Tanzania as an independent 
entity and not a subsidiary of the parent company. Even if the above was not the case, 
the parent company – Barclays Plc, would not have the need to repatriate funds in 
forms of profits, dividends, incomes and the like. This is because according to Barclays 
Tanzania, it had adequate capital. Therefore, it would not need to repatriate funds from 
Barclay Tanzania. 
6.2.13 Impacts Through Parent Company Curtailing Local Operations 
Barclays bank Tanzania was not affected by the 2008 economic crisis through the 
mechanism of its parent company to curtail its operations in Tanzania. This did not  
happen firstly because Barclays Bank Tanzania operates in the country as an 
independent company. The parent company could therefore not curtail its operations in 
the country. Even if Barclays Tanzania was not operating as an independent company 
the parent company would not need to curtail its operations in the country due to the  
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crisis. This is because the parent company was arguably liquid enough and would not 
need to curtail its operations in Tanzania. 
6.2.14  Impacts Through Run on the Bank 
The 2008 economic crisis could have caused a run on the bank. This would happen if 
there was a rapid withdrawal of deposits by customers due to fears of the collapse of 
the bank in particular or the financial system in general. According to Barclays, there 
was no run on the bank. If run on a bank takes place, the implications include 
possibilities of liquidity dry up in a particular bank. If this becomes the general case in 
the country, it would imply a possible collapse of the banking and financial sector. By 
extention, this implies a possible collapse of the economy that increasingly depends on 
the banking system for its smooth operation.  
A possible response to potential and actual run on the bank would include rationing of 
cash. In this case, there would be a maximum amount of cash that each individual could 
draw from a given bank. This would lead to reduced withdraw-related profits of the 
banks and reduced liquidity in the economy. In March 2013, there was observed a 
possible run on banks in Cyprus due to the impacts of the Euro zone sovereign debt 
crisis in the banking sector in Cyprus. Among the banks in Cyprus that were on the 
verge of collapse due to the crisis include Laiki Bank.  
A proper measure of run on banks would be comparing figures on daily, weekly or 
monthly withdrawals before, during and after the crisis. This would help in assessing 
whether during the crisis there was extraordinary withdraws that can be translated as a 
run on banks. In absence of such figures for Barckays Bank Tanzania, figures on 
customers deposits are used here to discuss the response that Barclays Bank Tanzania 
did not experience a run on banks.  
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As shown in the Table 6.5, there was an increase in deposits from 198.9 billion 
Shillings in 2006 to 249.9 billion Shillings in 2007. This is an increase by 51 billion 
Shillings or 25.6%. However, in 2009 which is just a year after the crisis, there was a 
decline in customers deposits by 99 billion Shillings. This can be partly due to the crisis 
and an indication of fears similar to those that woud result into a run on banks. From 
2010 which is the year when recovery from the crisis had started to set-in, to 2012 there 
have been increased deposits. This may imply that the fears that would have caused a 
run on banks had been wiped out by the recovery.  
The exact reason for change in deposits (decline in 2009) and increase from 2010 to 
2012 woud be clear if the views of the depositors were captured. Howewer this was 
beyond the scope of this work and constitutes areas for further research. 
Table 6.4: Customers Deposits, 2006 to 2012 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Customers 
deposits 
198.9b 249.9b No 
data 
Decline 
by 99b 
Increase 
by 70b 
Increase 
by 38.6b 
Increase 
by 6.2b 
Source: Compiled by the author from Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements For the Years Ended 31st December 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
6.2.15 Impacts Through Reduction of Liquidity in the Banking System 
As a result of the 2008 economic crisis, Barclays bank experienced some reduced 
liquidity in the banking system in Tanzania. It experienced a reduction in inter-bank 
borrowing. These went down to some extent.  
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The bank would get about 40% to 60% only of its request for funds from other banks. 
However, these other banks did not officially and openly declare that they were 
reducing the amounts of their cash that could be made available to other banks such as 
Barclays. Reduction of the amounts of cash available to a bank implies reduced ability 
of the bank to undertake its various banking activities smoothly 
6.2.16 Impacts Through Job Losses  
To some extent, Barcalys bank was affected by the 2008 economic crisis through the 
conduit of job losses by its actual and potential individual clients. The exposure to 
personal loans happened due to some job losses of some of its individual customers 
who  
had accessed credit through its massive retail lending. Some of these borrowers might 
have lost jobs due to the crisis that resulted to increase in direct and indirect 
unemployment.  
As noted earlier in this report about 48,000 people lost jobs in Tanzania directly due to 
the crisis. Based on the rule of thumb that for every one direct job lost there are three 
jobs that are lost, the indirect jobs that were lost due to the crisis then were 144,000. 
This makes a total of direct and indirect jobs lost due to the crisis to be 192,000. It is 
obvious that not all these were potential or actual customers of Barclays Bank 
Tanzania. The bank could not give the exact number of its customers who lost jobs and 
therefore were unable to honour their loan obligations. This remains among the areas 
for further research.  
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For the actual customers who lost jobs, the implications include their inability to repay 
their loans that were mainly secured and guaranteed by their employers. For others that 
lost jobs, the implications include loss of potential borrowers in the bank’s credit 
products for employees. Therefore, unemployment in general and in the context of 
economic crisis in particular stands to affect banks in various ways including loss of 
actual and potential borrowers. 
6.3  Responses to the 2008 Economic Crisis by Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd 
Similar to the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis to Barclays Bank Tanzania, the 
research also aimed at identifying the way the bank responded to the crisis. Responses 
from the interviews with the bank officials are presented and discussed in this part of 
the report.  
6.3.1 Freezing of Lending 
As with other banks, the main business activities of Barclays Bank Tanzania include 
lending to various categories of borrowers, both individuals and corporate. Among the 
possible responses to economic crisis include banks freezing extending loans to various 
groups of clients. This would be among the strategies of reducing various kinds of risks 
including defaults. According to Barclays Bank Tanzania there was no freezing of 
lending to any of its customer groups. 
6.3.2 Reduced Lending 
Whereas Barclays Bank Tanzania did not freeze lending, it reduced some of its lending 
activities. Due to the uncertainties caused by the 2008 global economic crisis, the bank 
was obliged to reduce issuance of loans. This was done in two major ways. Firstly, 
headroom was cancelled by the bank in order to limit exposures to some sectors. 
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Secondly, the bank evaluated high risk sectors like tourism, whole sale and trade 
(buying commodities abroad).  
Loans in these sectors were reduced considerably. This was especially so for new 
businesses than known ones. The bank also reduced personal lending as a cautious 
strategy to reduce possible losses. This affected the bank negatively because it reduced 
some of its customers who might have gone less risk-avers lenders. From the table 
below it can be seen that there has been a decline in loans and advances at Barclays 
Bank Tanzania. This can be among the evidence that the bank responded to the 2008 
crisis by reducing lending. 
Table 6.5: Loans and Advances to Customers, 2006 to 2012 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Loans 
and 
advances 
192.2b 221.2b No data Decline 
by 62b 
Decline 
by 11b 
Decline 
by 25b 
Decline 
40.4b 
Source: Compiled by the author from Barclays Bank Tanzania Ltd, Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements For the Years Ended 31st December 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
6.3.3  Injecting Equity in Some Businesses 
Among the responses of Barclays Bank Tanzania to the 2008 economic crisis include 
injecting equity in some businesses it had extended credit to. This was done in order to 
promote the businesses that were still promising but were struggling due to the 
economic crisis. These promising busineses, if left without the injected equity, would  
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most likely collapse. If they collapse the implications include the fact that there would 
be more defaults and more NPL. These in turn would negatively affect the bank’s sales 
volume, revenues and profits. The bank could not give figures on the amount of equity 
it injected into various businesses. 
6.3.4  Debt Re-negotiation and Re-scheduling 
Given the situation that some of its borrowers were put in by the 2008 economic crisis, 
the bank was obliged to reschedule some debts of its troubled and struggling customers.  
In some cases, payment time, frequencies and amounts to be paid had to be re-
negotiated and re-cheduled. This was done on case by case basis depending on the 
position of each client. This was done by the bank’s Non Performing Loans (NPLs) 
unit. For example, some five-year loans had to be extended to six years and re-
amortized. The bank had to renegotiate loan portifolio in the tourism sector that were 
worth about 10 million Sterling Pounds. This is about 10% of the bank’s corporate 
book. As part of the bank’s response, customers in this category had to be put in special 
care unit of the bank. 
6.3.5 Increased Risk Assessment 
Whereas the bank is very keen in risk assessments, this was increased as a result of the 
2008 economic crisis. As a result of increased risk assessment, the bank became more 
risk-averse to such risky sectors as tourism and trade. It also became more risk-averse 
to new and unknown businesses and clients that wanted to borrow for first time as well 
as for long maturing obligations. The aim was to reduce risks in all aspects of the 
bank’s undertakings. 
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6.3.6  Stress-testing 
Stress-testing is a kind of test that is performed to determine stability of a given system 
if a certain shock occurs. As a result of the 2008 economic crisis, Barclay Bank 
Tanzania conducted stress-testing to determine its stability amidst the crisis. It did 
stress-testing through simulations on some sectors. The bank used a number of 
variables to conduct the stress-test.  
These variables include profit margin for producers in the manufacturing sector, 
number of tourist arrivals for the tourism sector and foreign currency-inlows watch for 
clients exposed to foreign currencies. It also has close watch on cancellation of 
contracts for its customers exporting to the countries higly affected by the crisis. 
Among other things, the results of stress-testing led to the decision of reducing credit in 
the tourism sector. 
6.3.7 Adherance to Regulations  
Baclays Bank Tanzania has been adhering to banking regulations such as those 
provided by BoT and Basel Committee on Banks Supervision. Baclays bank had no 
problems in adherence to the BoT and Basel regulations. This is because, according to 
the respondents in the study informing this report, Barclays has a buffer of about 16% 
above its core capital requirement while the Basel requirement is 10%. Therefore the 
bank had 6% more of the needed buffer. See Bank for International Settlements (2013) 
and Bank for International Settlements (2011) for details in Basel regulations. 
6.3.8 Economic Stimulus and Financial Sector Rescue Packages  
Barclays Bank Tanzania did not benefit from the Tanzanian government’s response to 
the economic crisis by way of issuing a total of 1.7 trillion Tanzanian Shillings in its  
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2009/10 national budget. As documented in Ngowi (2013), the government sat aside 
the fund in the 2009/10 national budget for the purpose of rescuing banks that had 
extended credit to cash crops traders especially cotton. Since Barclays does not finance 
this specific activity, it was not a beneficiary of this government response to the 2008 
economic crisis. 
6.3.9  Increase in Number of Reports to BoT 
As a result of the crisis, BoT strengthened its monitoring role as the regulator in the 
banking sector. As a way of complying, Barclays had to increase the number of 
reports/returns submitted to BoT. The bank did not establish the number of reports it 
was submitting to BoT before the crisis and those submitted after the crisis, despite the 
researcher’s follow up question on this. Therefore the extra number and types of reports 
that had to be submitted to BoT could not be established. 
6.3.10  More Conservative Approach for Collateral Valuations  
The crisis made it necessary for Barclays Bank to improve its oversight of credit risk. 
Among other things, the bank responded to the increased risks by being more 
conservative in its approach in collateral valuations. This is an understood response 
when taking into account that according to Adei (2010) inter alia the 2008 economic 
crisis started partly due to laizefaire in the US banking system that led to, inter alia, 
sub-prime mortgage.  
6.3.11  Contingency Plans to Ensure Full Operations in Times of Stress 
Barclays Bank Tanzania did not respond to the 2008 global economic crisis by way of 
enhancement of contingency plans. This would be done in order to ensure full  
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operations of the bank in times of economic crisis. Barclays bank did not do this kind of 
response because it had enough buffer capital to operate even under stress. This is 
consistent to its responses that it remained sound despite the crisis. It is also consistent 
to the BoT’s various reports that banks in Tanzania continued operating during the 
crisis. 
6.3.12  Provision of Eemergency Liquidity 
Barclays bank responded to the 2008 economic crisis through provision of emergency 
liquidity. This was done because, according to the respondents, there is always liquidity 
crisis in the banking sector with BoT as the lender of last resort. Although Barclays has 
liquidity contingency plans as per statutory requirements, this was strengthened as a 
result of the 2008 crisis. 
The impacts of the 2008 economic crisis to Barclays Bank can be explained and 
understood in light of the monetarists school of thought theoretical underpinning. 
Recession in the real sectors of the economy in general and the bank clients in 
particular affected the liquidity situation in the bank. This is the case for impacts 
through defaults by borrowers, , debt re-schedulling, reduced isuance of loans, and 
increased credit risk. 
However, the bank was not affected through some mechanisms that could have affected 
some. For example it was not affected through the mechanisms of troubles experienced 
by its parent bank. This can be understood in the light of what Minja (2009) stated as 
the law requiring foreign banks in Tanzania to operate as independent entities and not 
as branches of their parent companies abroad. It was aslo not affected by mechanisms 
related to high intergration with the global financial system. This can be partly  
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understood in light of Tanzania’s rather low development and complexity of the 
financial system as pointed in BoT (2008), Minja (2009) and Ngowi (2013). Adie 
(2010) has similar views but in the context of the African continent as a whole with 
exceptions of South Africa and to some extent Nigeria. These two countries have 
relatively more advanced financial systems that are more integrated in the global 
system than the rest of Africa. 
The responses by Barclays can be understood and interpreted in the context of the 
theoretical underpinning of the Debt-deflation theory as partly stated by Fisher (1933). 
The bank avoided collapsing due to economic crisis. It therefore undertook the various 
response measures to avoid collapsing, as predicted in Fisher (ibid). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPACTS OF AND RESPONSES TO THE 2008 ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TIB 
7.1 Introduction 
Tanzanian Investment Bank (TIB) is among the banks that were studied with the aim of 
understanding the mechanisms through which it was affected by the 2008 economic 
crisis and the way it responded to the same. Findings from the bank are presented in 
this chapter. 
 7.2  Mechanisms Through Which TIB Was Affected by the 2008 Economic 
Crisis 
In what follows, the mechanisms through which TIB was affected by the 2008 global 
economic crisis are presented and discussed. Before the discussion of the specific 
mechanisms through which TIB could have been affected by the crisis, some signals 
indicating that the bank was affected the crisis are outlined. These signals are drawn 
from the bank’s annual reports for 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
TIB (2008:7) dedicates a special sub-section on the impacts of the 2008 global 
economic crisis. It is noted that the crisis affected several sectors of the economy in 
Tanzania including those that form the bank’s major borrowers. The bank noted also 
that the economic crisis caused reduction of business activities and the stability of the 
financial sector was shaken. TIB (ibid: 8) states that the bank was directly affected by 
the crisis through reduction in access to foreign lines of credit. The report also 
acknowledges that the year 2008 had a lot of challenges to the bank due to the crisis. 
See TIB (ibid: 9). 
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The TIB’s board chairman statement in the 2009 annual report started by noting that 
2009 was not an easy year for the bank due to the crisis. It notes that the crisis affected 
the business environment of the bank and posed very uncertain future for most 
businesses. As noted in TIB (2009: 7) the bank encountered some difficulties in the 
performance of some of its customers due to the impacts of the crisis on these 
customers including those in floriculture, tourism, transit trade, mining and cotton.  
In TIB (ibid: 9), the bank states that the 2008 crisis threatened not only its customers 
who were exposed to global markets but also the bank itself. Another signal that TIB 
was affected by the 2008 crisis is found in TIB (ibid: 1) where it is stated that the 
bank’s profit for 2009 was negatively affected by the crisis. According to TIB’s 2009 
annual report (pages 13 and 14) the Treasury and Funding Division of the bank faced a 
lot of challenges as a result of the 2008 crisis. The challenges include foreign exchange 
volatility. It is also stated that the bank expected better future performance when the 
global economy was expected to recover from the 2008 crisis although it was expected 
that the damages inflicted by the crisis would take longer to address. 
TIB’s 2010 annual report too presents some signals that the 2008 economic crisis 
affected the bank. In TIB (2010: 8), it is stated that in 2010 there was some recovery 
from the 2008 crisis that had affected business environment for the bank and its 
customers. In TIB (ibid: 10) it is stated that majority of the bank’s customers whe were 
badly affected by the crisis in 2008 had started to consolidate gains in 2010. All the 
above show clearly that TIB, like Barclays was affected negatively by 2008 economic 
crisis in various mechanisms as discussed in detail below. 
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7.2.1  Impacts Through Defaults by Borrowers 
As noted in the introduction about the bank, TIB finances among others, the 
agricultural sector. According to the bank, it was affected by the 2008 economic crisis 
through defaults by some of its borrowers who were affected by the crisis. Those who 
defaulted include borrowers in the cutflowers industry, in the cotton sub-sector and 
those dealing with exports. The default was due to reduced demand of the products 
abroad and the decline in the price of the same which made it difficulty for the 
borrowers to honour their obligations to the bank. 
Page seven (7) of TIB’s 2008 annual report is on the impacts of global economic crisis. 
It is stated that the 2008 crisis affected key sectors in Tanzania. These are sectors that 
have driven growth over years, especially those that are predominantly export oriented. 
This is the case for the agricultural, mining, tourism, horticultural and the 
manufacturing sector. TIB (2008:7) notes further that cotton, coffee and horticulture 
were among the sub-sectors that were most severely impacted by the crisis. For cotton 
for example, lint prices went down by about 50% in 2008 resulting in export orders 
cancellations and huge financial losses. On the part of coffee and flowers, TIB (ibid) 
informs that export prices went down by about one third.  
According to TIB (2008:8), the manufacturing sector was affected by the crisis by both 
declining global demand and increase in the cost of import of inputs due partly to 
currency depreciation. The bank informs that the Tanzanian shilling lost its value by 
about 13% against the US dollar between January and December 2008. Tourism sector, 
according to TIB (ibid) suffered substantially from the crisis through substantial decline 
in tourist arrivals and receipts, hotel bookings and air travel.  
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The general impacts of the crisis to TIB through the sectors affected by the crisis should 
be partly understood from the sectoral distribution of TIB’s actual lending portfolio as 
at 31st December 2008 which is highly skewed towards the agricultural, transport and 
communication, trade, hotels and tourism and electricity and gas sectors that have over 
10% of the loan portfolio as shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1. TIB’s Actual Lending Portfolio by Sector as at 31st December 2008 
S/n Sector Total amount in Tshs Percentage 
1 Agriculture and agro-processing 17,116,217,865 23 
2 Manufacturing  4,821,709,564 6 
3 Transport and communication 15,190,354,696 20 
4 Trade  10,931,146,917 15 
5 Hotels and tourism 8,090,976,419 11 
6 Electricity and gas 10,056,682,364 13 
7 Mining  2,578,389,971 3 
8 Small business 2,649,263,162 4 
9 Education 1,702,931,819 2 
10 Others (including fishing, 
building/construction, health, private 
and other services) 
1,537,357,221 2 
 Total 74,675,029,998 100 
Source: TIB Annual Report 2008 for the year ended 31st December 2008, page 7. 
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It can be seen from the table for example that TIB’s lending to agriculture is to the 
tunes of 23% of its loan portfolio. Given the impacts of the crisis in the demand for and 
prices of agricultural products, it is understood that the bank stood to be negatively 
affected by way of the borrowers in the sector being unable to pay. In its annual report 
2009, TIB (2009:7) informs that the year 2009 was not easy as it started with the global 
financial and economic crisis that affected the business environment of various sectors 
including the banking one.  
TIB (ibid) informs further that there were some difficulties in the performance of some 
of its customers especially those in the sectors that were hardest hit by the crisis. The 
bank names these sectors as including floriculture, tourism, transit trade, mining and 
cotton. There is no wonder therefore that TIB was affected by the crisis through, inter 
alia, defaults of some of its customers in the affected sectors.  
The defaults in the cotton sub-sector for example, can be partly understood in the light 
of what is documented in Velde and Lunogelo (2009), URT (2009) and Ngowi (2010). 
The authors have documented that there were both reduced demand and declining 
markets for traditional agricultural commodities such as cotton. About 124,344 bales of 
cotton remained unsold by April 2009. Cotton price declined from between 400 and 
540 Tshs per kilogram to 370 Tshs. This is a decline of about 100 Tshs per kilogram or 
21.3%.   
According to URT (2009), export of horticultural products including cutflowers and 
vegetable declined by about 25% due to the crisis. There was a drop in export revenue 
of about 50%, mostly due to cancelled apparel orders from the US. This does not mean  
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that all those affected were TIB customers. However, some customers of the banks too 
were most likely affected as well. 
The implications of defaults include increase in NPLs in the bank. Without reference to 
a particular bank, IMF (2010) informs that the crisis increased the rate of NPLs in 
Tanzanian banks. It informs that the rate peaked in mid-2009 due to the 2008 crisis. 
According to the Fund, NPLs exhibited large variation among banks, partly reflecting 
different exposures to distressed sectors. According to IMF (ibid), system-wide NPLs 
rose to 7.8% in June 2009 from 6.2%  in December 2008 due to the 2008 crisis. This is 
an increase of 1.6%.  
The Fund informs further that NPLs declined by 0.5% to reach the 6.7% mark partly as 
a result of the government rescue package for distressed borrowers. According to IMF 
(ibid), NPL rates varied not only across sectors but also across banks. It informed 
further that NPLs for systemically important banks at the end of June 2009, ranged 
from 1.8% to 14.2% which is an average of 8% and a range of 12.4%. Although these 
figures are not specifically for Barclays, they send some signals on the possible rate of 
NPL in the bank due to the crisis. 
7.2.2 Impacts Through Reduced Sale of Bank Products  
In its response, TIB indicated that as a result of the crisis, there was reduced demand 
for some of its products due to the crisis. This is partly a result of reduced willingness 
and  
 
 
 121 
ability of potential and actual TIB customers to demand for these products following 
the crisis. Therefore the bank experienced reduced sales volumes. By extension this 
implies reduced profit amidst some fixed costs such as wages and salaries of permanent 
staff, rent, interest rates and other fixed costs. 
Although establishing clear causal-effect relationship between the reduced sales of 
bank products on one hand and reduced profit on the other is tricky, TIB (2009: 10) 
states that the 2009 profit before tax (Tshs 3.3 billion) were lower than that of 2008 as a 
result of effects of the 2008 financial and economic crisis. 
7.2.3  Reduced Profits 
Historical data show that generally, TIB has been posting profits since 1998 to 2012. 
The pofit has generally shown an increasing trend over time although there have been 
some decline in profit for some years. In the context of this study, there was a sharp 
decline in profits in 2009, which is just one year after the 2008 global economic crisis. 
The profit trend in general and the sharp decline of the same in 2009 in particular is 
shown in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1. 
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Table 7.2. TIB Profit Trend, 1998 – 2012 
S/n Year Profit in 000,000 
Tshs 
Annual change Change as % of 
previous year profit  
1 1998 517   
2 1999 637 120 23.2% 
3 2000 224 -413 -64.8% 
4 2001 114 -110 -49.1% 
5 2002 110 -4 -3.5% 
6 2003 252 142 129.1% 
7 2004 914 662 262.7% 
8 2005 2,960 2046 223.9% 
9 2006 2,712 -248 -8.4% 
10 2007 3,839 1127 41.6% 
11 2008 4,599 760 2% 
12 2009 3,286 -1313 -28.5% 
13 2010 3,608 322 9.8% 
13 2011 5,788 2180 60.4% 
15 2012 7,100 1312 22.7% 
Source: Computed by the author from TIB historical data provided during field study. 
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Figure 7.1: TIB’s Profit and Asset Trends, 1998 to 2012 
 
 
Source: TIB historical data provided during field data collection. 
It is seen from the table and figure that from 1998 to 2012 ( a total of 14 years) TIB 
made profits in all of the 14 years reported above. The profit increased in total of nine 
(9) years and declined in a total of five (5) years. Among the years in which the bank 
posted reduced profit is 2009. This is just one year after the 2008 economic crisis and is 
the largest decline in absolute terms since 1998. TIB (2009:10) attributes the decline in 
profit in 2009 to the 2008 economic crisis. It is clear that profit is a function of many 
variables. This implies that attributing the 2009 decline in profit totally to the 2008 
economic crisis may be questioned and needs further interrogation.  
However, given the business environment that led to the reported decline in profit, it 
makes sense for the bank to attribute a large part of the decline in profit to the 2008 
crisis even though a clear causal-effect relationship was not established by the bank. 
This could have been established by, inter alia, giving a counter-factual situation that 
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would show what would have been the profit level in the same year had the 2008 crisis 
not existed.  
It was beyond the scope of this study to establish such causality. It remains to be among 
the areas for further research. Among other things, it would also be interesting to 
interrogate and establish in further research the causes of the decline in profit level 
posted by the bank in the year 2000 (413 million), 2001 (114 million), 2002 (4 million) 
and 2006 (248 million) when there was no economic crisis and see whether the same 
cannot explain the profit decline in 2009. 
It can be seen from the table that just after the profit decline in 2009, there was some 
modest increase in profit in 2010. This might have been caused by some recovery from 
the crisis albeit weak, fragile and unsustainable. The 2010 modest increase in profit was 
followed by a huge surge in profit in 2011 and 2012. These are the years in which the 
global economy in general and that of Tanzania in particular had arguably recovered 
from the 2008 global economic crisis. 
The reduced profit can also be a reflection of the sharply reduced loan portfolio of the 
bank as (reduced loan portfolio) shown in the figure below. Profit is a function of many 
variables including but not limited to the amount of loan issued. Ceteris paribus, the 
higher the loan portfolio, the higher the profit and vice versa. 
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Figure 7.2. TIB Loan Portfolio, 1998 to 2012 Showing a Sharp Decline in 2009  
 
Source: TIB historical data availed to the researcher during data collection 
7.2.4  Impacts on TIB’s Assets 
Based on the data presented in Figure 7.3 below, it can be seen that TIB’s assets have 
generally been increasing over years since 1998. The assets were below the 500 million 
Tshs mark in 1998 and had reached about 7000 million Tshs mark by 2012. However, a 
closer look at assets growth trend shows that there was a stagnation in assets growth in 
2008. 
TIB’s assets grew uninterruptedly from below 500 million Tshs in 1998 to about 3000 
million Tshs in 2007. Then it stagnated at about 3000 million Tshs in 2008 before 
growing again from about 3500 million Tshs in 2010 to 7000 million Tshs in 2012. As 
for profits, it may be challenging to give a clear causal-effect relationship between the 
stagnation of TIB’s assets in 2008 on one hand and the 2008 economic crisis on the 
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other. However, given the economic environment in 2008, it could be fair to attribute 
the stagnation to the crisis.  
Figure 7.3. TIB’s Assets, 1998 to 2012 
 
Source: TIB historical data provided to the researcher during data collection. 
When combined with the decline in profit in 2008, the asset stagnation in the same year 
could be reasonably attributed to the 2008 crisis. However, since the crisis started 
officially on 15th September 2008, its negative effects on stagnation and profits would 
start to be seen and felt in 2009. This is because normally there is a time-lag between 
such shock as the crisis on one hand and its effects on many variables such as assets 
and profits on the other. 
7.2.5  Impacts on the Bank’s Soundness 
Similar to Barclays Bank Tanzania, TIB remained sound despite the 2008 economic 
crisis. According to TIB (2008:5), there was a strong performance of the bank in 2008 
as evidenced by the bank’s financial results. TIB (ibid) states further that like in 2007, it  
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continued to register very good results in almost all the key performance areas. Similar 
statement was given by the bank for 2009 performance as stated in TIB (2009: 7). This 
implies that the bank’s soundness was not affected by the crisis compared to the way 
the crisis affected  
According to The Economist (May 11th – 17th 2013), such American banks as Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch collapsed into the arms of Bank of 
America while America International Group (AIG) and Citigroup had to be bailed out.  
TIB’s soundness can partly be seen from its profit and assets levels that did not go to 
the red territory. These can be seen in Figure 4.3 of this work and are in line with BoT’s 
various reports that banks in Tanzania largely remained sound during the crisis. As 
alluded to by Minja (2009) this partly is due to the low integration of the Tanzanian 
banks to the global financial system. This in turn is a result of relatively low 
development of the sector in Tanzania. 
The reported soundness of the bank conforms to the BoT (2008, 2009) reports that 
generally Tanzanian banks remained sound despite the crisis. As mentioned in Minja  
(2009) the soundness of the banks in Tanzania during the crisis can be partly attributed 
to the low level of integration of the Tanzanian banking system to the global one due to 
the former’s relative underdevelopment. It can also be attributed to TIB’s strict 
adherence to BoT and Basel requirements. 
7.2.6 Impacts Through Exposure to Complex Financial Products  
TIB reported that it was affected by the 2008 economic crisis through its exposure to 
complex financial products. This can be partly understood when considering that, as 
stated in the introduction to TIB in general and under trade financing and export  
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finance in particular, the bank also engages in complex trade finance arrangements. It 
does this in conjunction with its correspondent banks. This poses potential exposure to 
complex financial products like derivatives that were affected by the economic crisis in 
general and through troubled correspondent banks in particular. 
7.2.7 Impacts Through Credit Risks 
TIB noted in its response that it was affected by the 2008 global economic crisis 
through the mechanism of credit risk. As documented in the introductory part on the 
bank, TIB issues credit to a number of sectors. Among these include generally risky 
sectors such as agriculture and tourism whose credit risk increases in time of economic 
crisis such as the 2008 one. It also issues credit to import and export trade that is also 
exposed to credit risk especially in times of crisis such as that on 2008.  
The implications of increased credit risk include greater possibilities of the bank to 
loose money through defaults and rescheduled debt repayment. These in turn may be 
reflected in reduced profit in 2009 and 2010 which are just a year and two after the 
crisis respeftively, as shown in figure 7.4 below. 
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Figure 7.4. TIB profit before tax, 1998 to 2012, showing decline in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Source: Developed by the researcher from TIB historical data availed during data 
collection. 
7.2.8  Losses of Deposits With Troubled Correspondent and Other Banks 
TIB has trade relations with a number of international corresponding banks. These 
include the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd of Japan, Standard Chartered Bank of  
London, Standard Chartered Bank of New York and Standard Bank of South Africa. 
According to TIB (2009: 6) the bank’s bankers include Stanbic Bank (T) Ltd, National 
Bank of Commerce (NBC), Svenska Handelsbank AB of Sweden, Bank of Tanzania 
(BoT).  
These, apart from Stanbic Bank (T) Ltd, NBC and BoT are banks located in more 
developed parts of the world and most likely were affected by the crisis. This is because 
similar banks and banks in similar countries were affected by the 2008 crisis due to  
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their huge integration in the global financial markets. Besides the trade relations with 
corresponding banks, TIB has deposits with other banks too. 
According to TIB, the bank did not incur any loss of deposits with its correspondent or 
other banks. According to TIB (2008:12), the bank deposits in other banks were of the 
tunes of 3,086,434,000 Ths. According to TIB (2009:19) such deposits in 2009 were to 
the tunes of 5,500,032,000 Tshs. This is an increase by 2,413,598,000 Tshs or 78.2%. 
There is no clear evidence that TIB did not loose money through deposits with other 
banks due to the crisis.  
However, the increase in such deposits by a whole 78.2% just a year after the crisis is 
an indicator that there were no losses that is why TIB increased, as a rational actor in 
the market, increased the deposit. This implies that either TIB did not have deposits 
with these banks or if it did, the correspondent banks were not troubled by the crisis. If 
troubled by the crisis, then the troubles were not contagious to TIB. It was beyond the 
scope of this study to find out whether TIB had deposits with these correspondent 
banks and whether these correspondent banks were affected by the 2008 economic 
crisis and if so why TIB was not affected through loss of deposits if it had them in these 
banks. Therefore further interrogations on these issues are needed in future research. 
7.2.9 Impacts Through Exposure to Crops and Other Commodities Financing 
Surprisingly, TIB responded that it was not affected by the 2008 economic crisis 
through the mechanism of exposure to crops and other commodities financing. This is 
inconsistent with its response that it suffered from defaults from cutflower and cotton 
exporters through its agricultural sector financing. It is also inconsistent to the fact that 
in 2008, according to TIB (2008:7) a total of 23% of its loans went to agriculture and 
agro-processing as did 25% of the same in 2009 according to TIB (2009:11).  
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To the extent that TIB suffered from defaults in cutflower and cotton sub-sectors but 
reported not to suffer from exposure to crops and commodities finance, the 
implications, inter alia can be that TIB does not classify crops and commodities finance 
under the agricultural sector.  
7.2.10 Impacts Through Change in Demand for Government Securities/treasury 
Bills 
According to TIB, the issue of the bank being affected by the crisis through the 
mechanism of change in demand for government securities/treasury bills is not 
applicable to it. However, this is inconsistent with the fact that TIB’s 100% owned 
subsidiary, Rasilimali Ltd deals with, inter alia, trading in government 
securities/treasury bills. In TIB (2008: 12) it is reported that the bank’s balance sheet 
was composed of,  
inter alia treasury bills and bonds worth 44,505,526,000 Tshs. The figure for 2009, 
according to TIB (2009: 19) was 59,551,160,000 Tshs. Therefore, the issue of 
government securities/treasury bills is of relevancy to TIB, contrary to its response. 
Generally, during economic crisis, investors’ appetite for government 
securities/treasury bills is lower than in a situation without crisis. Partly this is 
explained by the fact that potential investors in these securities are negatively affected 
by the crisis and therefore short of cash to buy government securities. Secondly, they 
are likely to perceive investing in such ventures as a risky undertaking because 
governments too may not be in a position to pay when the securities mature. This is 
because economic crisis affects negatively governments’ fiscal space resulting into 
inability to honour some financial obligations.  
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Therefore it is most likely that Rasilimali Ltd did not perform well during the crisis. 
Being a 100% subsidiary of TIB, it is fair to argue that TIB was most likely negatively 
affected by the 2008 crisis through the negative impacts of the same at Rasilimali Ltd.  
7.2.11  Impacts Through Foreign Parent Banks  
From the introduction to TIB above, it is clear that the bank is a 100% Tanzanian local 
company. According to TIB (2008: 11), the share of the bank are held by the Treasury 
Registrar on behalf of the Government (of United Republic of Tanzania) to the tunes of 
99.83%; Consolidated Holding Corporation (of Tanzania) to the tunes of 0.13% and 
National Insurance Corporation of Tanzania Limited (0.04%). The share composition in 
2009, according to TIB (2009: 17) had changes although the same shareholders 
remained with shares of 99.91%, 0.07% and 0.02% respectively. Corresponsing figures 
for 2010, according to TIB (2010: 23) were 99.96%, 0.03% and 0.01%.  
Being totally 100% local Tanzanian bank therefore the possibilities of TIB being 
affected by the 2008 crisis through various mechanisms involving foreign parent 
company are ruled out. Such possible mechanisms would include impacts through such  
would be foreign parent banks withdrawing funds from the would be local subsidiaries, 
parent banking companies stopping re-investing profits locally, parent banking 
companies repatriating funds from subsidiaries and parent banking companies 
curtailing local operations by selling their assets. 
Even if TIB was a foreign bank registered in Tanzania – similar to Barclays Bank 
Tanzania - it would most likely not be affected through the mechanisms of the impacts 
on the would-be parent company. This is because foreign banks in Tanzania are 
registered as independent banks and not subsidiaries of their parent companies. 
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7.2.12 Impacts Through Run on the Bank 
Similar to Barclays, TIB did not experience a run on the bank by way of extra high and 
abnormally rapid withdrawal of deposits by its customers. The bank’s customers 
maintained a normal level of withdrawals of their deposits. This may imply that the 
depositors were not worried about the security of their deposits which in turn would 
indicate their trust on the bank’s soundness. By extension, this could be a result of the  
BoT’ 2008 reassuring statement that banks in Tanzania remained stable despite the 
crisis and that customers did not need to worry by, inter alia running on the banks in 
general and TIB in this context in particular.  
However, it may also imply that there were risks of loosing deposits but the depositors 
did not see those risks. Reasons of TIB’s none-experience of run on the bank were 
behind the scope of this study and constitute areas for further research in the future. 
Figures on daily, weekly and monthly withdraws before, during and after the crisis 
could not be available. If they were available it would be possible to give some 
empirical evidence of existence or none existence of run on the bank in TIB.  
However, a proxy can be used instead. Figures in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.5 below show 
that there were sharp drop in deposits in TIB in in 2008 and 2009. In the context of run 
on bank this may indicate customers’ fear to deposit with the bank. This is similar to 
the fear that would lead to a run on the bank by way of extraordinary high and frequent 
withdraws. 
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Table 7.3: Deposits in TIB, 2007 to 2010 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Deposits 17,045,207,314 10,607,085,775 4,418,969,042 50,973,574 
Source: Extracted by the researcher from TIB historical data availed during data 
collection 
Figure 7.5: TIB total deposits, 1998 to 2012 
 
Source: TIB historical data availed during data collection 
7. 2.13  Impacts Through Reduction of Liquidity in the Banking System 
According to TIB, the bank experienced some reduction of liquidity in the Tanzanian 
banking system. This claim could not be substantiated in the responses by the bank.. 
Similar response was made by Barclays Bank Tanzania. According to TIB (2008: 19),  
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the bank experienced a decline in deposits from other banks in 2008 compared to 2007. 
In 2007 the deposits were to the tunes of 13,200,069,000 Tshs while in 2008 it went to 
the negative territory (-15,917,745,000 Tshs).  
In 2009, according to TIB (2009:27), the deposits from other banks were back to the 
positive territory (3,874,396,000 Tshs). This shows some increased liquidity although 
short of the 2007 levels by 9,325,673,000 Tshs. Etablishing a clear causal-effect 
relationship between the decrease in deposits from other banks on one hand and the 
2008 crisis on the other is difficulty. However, the bank’s attribution of the reduced 
liquidity to the crisis is justifiable given the economic environment of the time. 
7.2.14  Impacts Through Curtailed Access to Credit Abroad 
The 2008 economic crisis arguably had some benefits to TIB, albeit minimal. Without 
supporting data, the bank claimed that as a result of curtailed access to credit abroad, 
there was increased demand for the same at TIB. This is similar to the findings of 
Tumusiime (2010) in the case of some banks in Uganda. 
7.2.15 Impacts Through Increase in Non-performing Loans (NPLs) 
TIB responded that it experienced an increase in non-performing loans (NPL) due to 
the 2008 economic crisis. According to TIB (2008: 16) the bank’s impaired losses on 
loans and advances in 2007 were 963,267,000 Tshs. In 2008 however, it had increased 
to 2,196,310,000 Tshs. This is an increase by 1,233,043,000 Tshs or a whole 128.0% in 
just a year. According to TIB (2010: 26), the ratio of NPL to total advances in 2009 was 
25% while in 2010 it was 15%.  
The 10% variance can be partly explained by some recovery from the crisis that started 
setting-in in 2010. Establishing clear causality between the increased NPL on one hand  
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and the 2008 crisis on the other can be tricky. However, the bank’s business 
environment for 2008 when its customers were severely affected by the crisis can 
justify the causal-effect relationship. 
A proxy of the sharp reduction in profit in 2009 which is just a year after the crisis may 
be used to indicate possible impacts of NPL. However, it is understood that reduced 
profit, as shown in Figure 4.6 below is a function of many variable in which NPL is just 
one.  
Figure 7.6;TIB’s Profit Before Tax, 1998 to 2012 Showing a Sharp Decline in 2009 
 
Source: TIB historical data availed to the researcher during data collection. 
7. 2.16 Impacts Through Exposure to Personal Loans 
Banks can have been affected by the 2008 economic crisis through the mechanism of  
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exposure to personal loans. This would happen due to jobs losses of borrowers from 
banks. Job losses would imply inability of the borrowers to honour their debt 
obligations that were being met through their salaries. This in turn would affect the 
involved banks in various ways including but not limited to increase in doubtfull, bad 
and NPL. 
7.3  Responses to the 2008 Economic Crisis by TIB 
Similar to the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis to TIB, the research also aimed at 
identifying the way the bank responded to the crisis. Responses from the interviews 
with the bank officials are presented and discussed in this part of the report.  
7.3.1  Freezing of Lending 
According to the respondents, TIB did not respond to the 2008 economic crisis by the 
way of freezing of lending. It continued to issue credit to its various clients. Due to 
risks embedded in some sectors, businesses and individuals in times of economic crisis 
such as that of 2008, one would expect that banks would freeze some lending. By not 
freezing any lending amidst increased risks, implications may be that TIB is a risk-
taking bank. 
7.3.2 Reduced Lending 
Similar to the findings on freezing lending, TIB response was that it did not respond to 
the crisis by reducing lending. The bank kept on issuing loans to its clients. This is not 
consistent to historial data from TIB which show that there was a stagnation of lending 
between 2007 and 2008 and sharp decline of the same in 2009 before peaking up 
slightly in 2010 and 2011 as shown in the graph below.  
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Figure 7.7. TIB Loan Portfolio, 1998 to 2012 
 
Source: TIB historical data, 1998 – 2012 
The methodological triangulation in which the response from TIB and actual figures 
from historical data have been compared indicates the importance of using various 
sources of data in research. 
7.3.3  Increased Risk Assessment 
TIB indicated that it responded to the 2008 economic crisis by increasing its risk 
assessment of borrowers. This was partly done through improvement of oversight of 
credit risk and more conservative approach for collateral valuations. According to TIB 
(2008: 25), the bank carries risk management through its Risk Department under 
policies approved by the Board of Directors. It manages foreign exchange risk, interest 
rate risk, credit risk (loans and advances, investments,), market risk, liquidity risk and 
other operational risks.  
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It is stated in TIB (2009: 11) that the bank’s credit risk management system was to be 
operational in 2010. This implies that the bank was not very well equipped in 2008 and 
2009 to respond to the crisis by way of having a credit risk management system. This is 
not good in an operating environment with high credit risk as was the case in 2008 and 
2009 when the crisis heightened the level of such risk. 
7.3.4 Stress-testing 
Similar to Barclays Bank Tanzania but without giving details, TIB informed that it 
responded to the 2008 economic crisis by conducting stress-testing. This is consistent to 
the requirements by BoT for all banks to conduct stress-testing as among the strategies 
to respond to the 2008 economic crisis. 
A bank stress test is an analysis conducted under unfavorable economic scenarios such 
as the 2008 economic crisis. The aim is to determine whether a bank such as TIB has 
enough capital to withstand the impact of adverse developments in the market. Stress-
tests are meant to detect weak spots in the concerned bank such as TIB or the banking 
system at large at an early stage, so that preventive action can be taken by the bank 
such as TIB and regulator such as BoT.  
Conceptually, bank stress tests focus on a few key risks – such as credit risk, market 
risk, and liquidity risk. Bank stress tests attracted a great deal of attention in 2009, 
following the 2008 global economic crisis that left many banks and financial 
institutions across the world severely under-capitalized. 
7.3.5 Financial Stability Measures 
According to Gadanecz and Jayaram (undated), a financial system can be characterised 
as stable in the absence of excessive volatility, stress or crises like the 2008 economic 
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crisis. TIB responded to the crisis by adopting some financial stability measures as 
recommended by the BoT. 
7.3.6 More Adherance to Regulations 
Similar to Barclays, TIB responded to the crisis by adhering more to the BoT 
regulations such as those on capital requirement and maintaining the needed ratios. 
According to TIB (2008: 33), BoT requires each bank to hold a minimum level of the 
regulatory capital of Tshs 5 billion and maintain a ratio of total regulatory capital to the 
ris-weighted asses (the Basel ratio) at or above the internationally agreed minimum of 
10%. In 2008, TIB’s total capital was 36,678,470,000 Tsh which is much above the 
BoT requirement. TIB (ibid: 15) explains that there was no specific regulatory 
requirements related to Basel II implementation. However, the bank was undertaking to 
strengthen its risk management and governance structure. 
7.3.7 Enhancing Contingency Plans to Ensure Full Operations in Times of Stress 
Similar to Barclays bank and without elaboration even after follow up questions, TIB 
argued that it responded to the 2008 global economic crisis by enhancing contingency 
plans to ensure full operations despite the crisis. 
7.3.8  Provision of Emergency Liquidity 
TIB argued in its response that, it had adequate liquidity. Therefore it did not provide 
for emergence liquidity as a strategy to respond to the 2008 global economic crisis. The 
response that TIB had adequate liquidity is in line with BoT’s responses that generally 
banks in Tanzania had adequate liquidity over and above the regulatory minimum. 
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7.3.9 Discussing With Affected Customers 
According to TIB (2008: 7), the bank partly responded to the 2008 economic crisis by 
discussing with its customers who were affected by the crisis. The aim of the 
discussions included to find ways of mitigating the impacts of the crisis. The bank did 
this in its role as a development bank. The response by way of discussion with 
customers is part of participatory and collaborative efforts between various 
stakeholders in addressing the crisis.  
7.3.10 Long Term and Developmental View 
Among the strategic approaches taken by TIB to respond to the 2008 economic crisis, 
according to TIB (2008: 9) was taking long term and development view of the 
enterprises and sectors that were affected by the crisis. This was in response to the 
challenges facing the borrowers as a result of the crisis. This is in contrast to Barclays 
bank that reported to have responded to the crisis by, inter alia, stopping extending 
loans to long-term investments beyond two years.  
This shows the difference between commercial banks like Barclays bank and 
development ones like TIB. (when this report was writte, TIB was in a transformation 
process from investment bank to a Development Financial Institution (DFI). This 
implies further that compared to purely commercial banks, development banks are 
likely to be better in serving enterprises in times of economic crisis. Similar to the 
findings on the impacts mechanisms and responses in Barclays Bank, there are various 
theoretical underpinnings that can be used to interpret and understand the findings in 
TIB. 
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The impacts of the 2008 economic crisis to TIB can be interpreted and understood in 
context of the monetarists school of thought theoretical underpinning. Recession in the 
real sectors of the economy in general and on part of the TIB clients in particular 
affected the liquidity situation in the bank. This is the case for impacts through the 
mechanisms of defaults by borrowers, reduced demand for its products, increased credit 
risks, reduced liquidity in the banking system as well as increase in NPLs.. 
Similar to Barclays bank, TIB was not affected through some mechanisms that could 
have affected some banks elsewhere in the world especially in developed countries. For 
example, it was not affected by mechanisms related to high intergration with the global 
financial system. This can be partly understood in light of Tanzania’s rather low and 
limited development and complexity of the financial system. These facts have been 
pointed out in BoT (2008), Minja (2009) and Ngowi (2013) in Tanzanian context and in 
Adie (2010) in the context of the African continent. 
Similar to the reresponses by Barclays Bank to the 2008 economic crisis, the responses 
by TIB can also be interpreted and understood in the context of the Debt-deflation  
 
theoretical underpinning as partly stated by Fisher (1933). TIB undertook the various 
response to the 2008 economic crisis in order to avoid collapsing, as predicted in Fisher 
(ibid). These responses include but are not limited to increasing risk assessment for its 
borrowers, stre-testing, more adherence to regulations, discussing with affected 
customers as well as taking a long term and developmental view of its promising 
clients.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8. 1  Introduction 
In this chapter, a summary, conclusions and recommendations emanating from the 
study are presented. The summary briefly captures the main issues in the study. The 
section on conclusions dwells on the main issues that can be concluded on the impacts 
of and responses to the 2008 economic crisis in the banking sector in Tanzania. The 
recommendation sub-section covers policy recommendations and recommendations for 
future research based on this study. 
8.2  Summary 
This study aimed at identifying the mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were 
affected by the 2008 economic crisis and the way they responded to the same. Findings 
from BoT revealed some nine (9) possible mechanisms through which banks in 
Tanzania in general could have been affected by the 2008 economic crisis. These 
mechanisms include increase in NPLs, decline in personal loans, banking sector 
soundness, banks’ assets quality, resilience of banks, banks’ liquidity, banks’ 
profitability, financial soundness and accumulation of excess reserves.  
When it comes to responses to the 2008 economic crisis, findings from BoT show that 
the Central Banks responded to the crisis in about twelve (12) major ways. These are 
responses through stress-testing, increase of reserve requirements on government 
deposits held in commercial banks, enhanced monitoring of the banking sector, easy  
monetary policy, increase in banks’ capital requirements by 200%, establishment of  
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Financial Sector Stability Department at BoT, enhancement of financial system stability 
and efficiency, prudential oversight, establishment of Financial Regulators Forum, 
strengthening crisis preparedness, liquidity management and review of lending rates. 
The responses to the 2008 crisis by individual banks that were identified by BoT are 
only three (3). These are more cautious lending, preference for safer money market 
instruments and resumed lending following signs of recovery. 
 
From the detailed field study of Barclays and TIB, it was found that there are about 
twenty two (22) mechanisms through which banks could have been affected by the 
2008 global economic crisis. These include impacts through the mechanisms of defaults 
by borrowers, debt re-scheduling, reduced issuance of loans, reduced sale of bank 
products, bank’s soundness, exposure to complex financial products, credit risks and 
losses of deposits with troubled correspondent and other banks. 
Other mechanisms include exposure to crops and other commodities financing, parent 
banks withdrawing funds, parent company stopping re-investing profits locally, parent 
company repatriating funds, parent company curtailing local operations, run on bank, 
reduction of liquidity in the banking system and through job losses of salaried bank 
borrowers. 
Banks could also be affected by the 2008 global economic crisis through other types of 
mechanisms. These include reduced sale of bank products, reduced profits, reduced 
banks’ assets, banks’ soundness, exposure to complex financial products, increased 
credit risks, losses of deposits with troubled correspondent and other banks, exposure to 
crops and other commodities financing, change in demand for government 
securities/treasury bills, impacts through foreign parent banks, reduction of liquidity in 
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the banking system, curtailed access to credit abroad, increase in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and exposure to personal loans. 
These potential and actual impacts identified from the studied banks confirm as well as 
oppose some impacts outlined in the literature. They generally show that whereas banks 
in the more developed world like the United States of America and Europe were 
affected by the 2008 economic crisis in a direct way, banks in Tanzania were affected 
indirectly through the impacts of second-round effects (bounce-on effects) of the crisis.  
They were affected because the real sectors of the economy they financed were 
troubled by the crisis. Partly this confirms intersectoral linkages in general and between 
the real sectors of the economy on one hand and the financial sector on the other. It is 
also seen from the findings that the mechanisms through which banks were affected by 
the crisis partly depended on the sectors they fund in general and the proportion of their 
loans portfolio in these sectors in particular.  
The mechanisms through which banks were potentially and actually impacted also 
show that even when a bank has a foreign parent company, it is not a reason for that 
bank to be affected by the impacts of the crisis in that parent company.  
This is because of the domestic banking regulation that requires foreign banks in the 
country to be registered and licensed as independent banks with own capital and not  
branches of foreign banks. However, the contrary is also the case where even a bank 
which is 100% locally owned can be affected by economic crisis due to impacts of the 
crisis in some foreign banks. These include correspondent banks and other banks where 
local banks hold some of their deposits. 
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The results also indicate that there is a co-movement of sectors in which case when the 
real sectors of the economy perform badly the financial one too is in a danger to 
perform bad and vice versa, ceteris paribus. Therefore the study has tremendously 
increased the understanding of possible impacts of economic crisis in banks.    
The study has also identified about ten (10) ways in which the studied banks responded 
to the 2008 global economic crisis. These responses include freezing of lending, 
reduced lending, increased risk assessment, stress-testing, injection of capital in some 
businesses financial stability measures, more adherance to regulations, enhancing 
contingency plans to ensure full operations in times of stress, provision of emergency 
liquidity, discussing with affected customers and long term and developmental view. 
The studied banks responded to the 2008 global economic crisis in various ways. Some 
of the responses were triggered by the requirements of the authorities like the BoT 
while others were initiatives of the banks themselves. Most of the responses arguably 
aimed at protecting the banks from severe impacts of the crisis. Some responses 
however, aimed at protecting the enterprises that they have been financing. Such 
responses include capital injection in struggling but promising businesses by Barclays 
and discussion with clients in the case of TIB.  
There have also been some sharp differences on some kinds of responses that arguably 
show the difference between commercial and investment bank. Barclays for example 
stopped financing long-maturing businesses while TIB took some long term view for 
some businesses. The former seems to be typical for commercial banks which are by 
and large short-term oriented in terms of offering credit. The latter is typical for 
development banks that mainly finance long term ventures. 
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Although it cannot be generalized from these two observasions, there are signals that 
investment banks are better in funding businesses in times of economic crisis. This is 
partly because some repayments are long term in nature in which time economies might 
have recovered from the crisis. 
Findings from the two banks that were covered in the study show some differences and 
similarities in the mechanisms of impacts through which they were affected. They also 
show some similarities and differences in the way they responded to the 2008 global 
economic crisis. These similarities and differences are captured in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1:Similarities and Differences in Mechanisms of Impacts of and Responses 
to the 2008 Economic Crisis Between Barclays and TIB 
S/n Impacts Responses 
  Barclays TIB  Barclays TIB 
1 Impacts through 
defaults by borrowers 
V V Freezing of lending v X 
2 Impacts through debt 
re-scheduling  
V V Reduced lending v v 
3 Impacts through 
reduced issuance of 
loans 
V V Increased risk assessment 
 
v v 
4 Impacts through 
reduced sale of bank 
products  
V V Stress-testing 
 
V V 
5 Impacts on the bank’s 
soundness 
X X Financial stability measures  
 
X v 
6 Impacts through 
exposure to complex 
financial products  
X X More adherance to 
regulations 
V V 
7 Impacts through 
credit risks 
V V Enhancing contingency plans 
to ensure full operations in 
times of stress 
X v 
8 Impacts through 
losses of deposits 
with troubled 
correspondent and 
other banks 
X X Provision of emergency 
liquidity 
 
x X 
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9 Impacts through 
exposure to crops and 
other commodities 
financing 
X V Discussing with affected 
customers 
 
X V 
10 Impacts through 
parent bank 
withdrawing funds  
X N.A Long term and 
developmental view 
 
X V 
11 Impacts through 
parent company 
stopping re-investing 
profits locally 
X N.A Stopping long-maturing loans 
 
V X 
12 Impacts through 
parent company 
repatriating funds  
X N.A Financial stability measures  
 
 
X  V 
13 Impacts through 
parent company 
curtailing local 
operations  
X  N.A    
14 Impacts through run 
on the bank 
X X    
15 Impacts through 
reduction of liquidity 
in the banking system 
V V    
16 Impacts through job 
losses of bank clients  
V X    
17 Reduced profits V V    
18 Impacts on bank 
assets 
V V    
19 Impacts through 
agriculture finance 
X V    
20 Impacts through 
change in demand for 
government 
securities/treasury 
bills 
X X    
21 Impacts through 
curtailed access to 
credit abroad 
V X    
22 Impacts through 
increase in non-
performing loans 
(NPLs) 
V V    
Source: Developed by the researcher 
Key: 
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V = impacted by the mechanism/responded in that way 
X = not impacted through the mechanism/responded in that way 
N.A = Not Applicable 
 
It can be seen from Table 8.1 that the banks have been affected by the 2008 economic 
crisis in many similar ways. Out of the 22 different mechanisms, there are a total of 
eleven (11) or 50% similar mechanisms through which the banks have been affected. 
There have been five (5) or 22.7% different possible mechanisms that have not affected 
the banks. There are four (4) or 18.2% types of mechanisms in which one bank was 
affected while the other was not affected. It is also seen that there have been four (4) or 
18.2% types of mechanisms that have affected one bank but were not applicable (N.A) 
in the other bank. 
It is therefore seen that there is no particular mechanism through which the studied 
banks were affected by the crisis. The general mechanisms through which the banks 
have been affected may not be generalized to all other banks. However, they indicate 
the main mechanisms through which similar banks in similar environment can be 
affected by similar economic crisis. 
Regarding responses to the crisis, there are equal number of ways in which the banks 
have responded to the crisis. Out of a total of ten (10) ways in which the banks 
responded to the crisis, there are a total of five (5) or 50% of common responses by the 
banks. In the remaining five (5) or 50% ways, each bank responded in its own 
particular way. This can partly show that there are no particular ways in which the  
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banks responded to the 2008 global economic crisis. Although this cannot be 
generalized to be the way banks should respond to economic crisis similar to the 2008 
one, it provides signals of what similar banks in similar environment can do in response 
to similar economic crisis. 
8.2.1  Analysis of the Impacts 
From the findings on the mechanisms through which the banks were potentially and 
actually affected by the 2008 economic crisis, several issues do emerge. Findings on the 
mechanisms through which banks in Tanzania were impacted by the 2008 global 
economic crisis are analyzed here.  
Findings from BoT revealed some nine (9) possible mechanisms through which banks 
in Tanzania could have been affected by the 2008 economic crisis. These mechanisms 
include increase in NPLs, decline in personal loans, banking sector soundness, banks’ 
assets quality, resilience of banks, banks’ liquidity, banks’ profitability, financial 
soundness and accumulation of excess reserves. These mechanisms are very few 
compared to the 22 mechanisms identified by Barclays and TIB. Therefore the detailed 
study of Barclays and TIB has added much value by identifying thirteen (13) new extra 
mechanisms through which banks in can be affected by economic crisis similar to the 
2008 one.  
The mechanisms of impacts that have been identified by BoT however are largely a sub 
set of those identified by Barclays and TIB. Looking at the 22 mechanisms identified 
by Barclays and TIB, one sees some impacts that have to do with the situation within 
Tanzania. Some impacts however are mainly related to the global environment. These 
are summarized in the figure below. 
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Figure: 8.1. Local and Global Nature of Impacts of the Crisis to Banks in 
Tanzania 
S/n Impacts of local nature Impacts of global nature 
1 Defaults by borrowers Exposure to complex financial products 
2 Debt re-scheduling  Losses of deposits with troubled 
correspondent banks 
3 Reduced issuance of loans; Parent banks withdrawing funds 
4 Reduced sale of bank products;  Parent companies stopping re-investing 
profits locally 
5 Bank’s soundness; credit risks;  Parent companies repatriating funds 
6 Exposure to crops and other commodities 
financing;  
Parent companies curtailing local 
operations 
7 Run on the bank;   
8 Reduction of liquidity in the banking 
system 
 
9 Job losses  
Source: Developed by the author from field findings 
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The impacts of local nature indicate that the banks were mainly affected by the 2008 
economic crisis indirectly through the impacts of the crisis in the real sectors of the 
economy. This shows, inter alia, the very direct linkages that exist between the banking 
sector on one hand and the real sectors of the economy on the other. It shows close 
interdependence of these sectors. When the real sectors of the economy that are funded 
by banks experience shocks, these shocks will be transmitted to the banks involved in 
particular and possibly to the whole banking system if not checked early enough.  
Given the inter-sectoral linkages that exist within the real sectors of the economy and 
between these sectors and the banking sector, when the banking sector is affected by 
such shocks as economic crisis, the real sectors of the economy whose main axis is the 
banking sector will also be affected. It remains as among the possible areas of further 
research to find out how shocks in the banking sector impact on the real sectors of the 
economy as this was out of scope of this study. 
The impacts of global nature that have been outlined in the figure above have many 
implications. Inter alia, they show that the studied banks in Tanzania were not very 
much affected by the 2008 global economic crisis. As noted in BoT (2008) and Minja 
(2009), this is mainly due to the limited interconnectedness of the banks in Tanzania 
with the global financial system.  
This in turn reflects the relatively low level of international intergration and 
globalization of the Tanzanian banking system to the international one. It also implies 
that the Tanzanian Shilling is not widely traded globally. Therefore, the relatively low 
development of the banking sector in Africa in general (with exception to South Africa) 
and Tanzania in particular has been a blessing in disguise as it helped to shield and  
 
 153 
cushion the banking sector from from severely suffering from the 2008 global 
economic crisis. 
It is the researcher’s views that if the Tanzanian banks studied were highly globalized 
and internationnaly integrated, including operations in the geographical areas that were 
severely affected by the crisis, such as United States of America (USA) and Europe,  
they would suffer more from the crisis. This is because the mechanisms listed as being 
of local nature would also apply to their global operations. This in turn would put them 
in greater exposed positions thereby increasing the actual and potential impacts. 
8.2.2  Analysis of the Responses 
The findings on the various mechanisms through which banks responded to the 2008 
economic crisis in Tanzania are analyzed in this sub-section. Some of the responses by 
BoT can be seen to be reactive. They aimed at reducing impacts of the crisis and spread 
of the same. These include such responses as stress-testing, increase of reserve 
requirements on government deposits held in commercial banks, enhanced monitoring 
of the banking sector, easy monetary policy, prudential oversight, liquidity management 
and review of lending rates. 
Other responses however are proactive as they aimed at reducing impacts of a possible 
future crisis in the banking sector. These incluse such responses as enhanced 
monitoring of the banking sector, increase in banks’ capital requirements by 200%, 
establishment of Financial Sector Stability Department at BoT, establishment of 
Financial Regulators Forum and strengthening crisis preparedness. 
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The responses to the 2008 crisis by individual banks that were identified by BoT are 
only three (3) compared to about ten (10) responses identified by Barclays and TIB. 
The detailed study of the two banks therefore has added much value by showing many 
more ways in which banks responded to the crisis compared to the list of responses 
from BoT. The responses by individual banks that were identified by BoT are more 
cautious lending which is also reflected in the responses by Barclays and TIB, 
preference for safer money market instruments and resumed lending following signs of 
recovery. The last two were not identified by Barclays and TIB. 
 
From the findings on the responses to the 2008 economic crisis by Barclays and TIB, 
several observations can be made. Among these observations include the fact that 
whereas some of the responses were basically initiated by individual banks, others were 
initiated by various authorities. These authorities include but are not limited to the 
Government of Tanzania, Basel Committee on Banks Regulations and the BoT. These 
categories of responses are summarized in Figure 8.3.  
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Figure 8.3. Categories of Responses to the Crisis 
S/n Responses initiated by authorities Responses initiated by banks 
1 Stress-testing Provision of emergency liquidity 
2 Increase in number of reports to BoT Contingency plans to ensure full operations in 
times of stress 
3 Economic stimulus and financial sector 
rescue packages 
More conservative approach for collateral 
valuations 
4 Adherance to regulations Stress-testing 
5  Increased risk assessment 
6  Debt re-negotiation and re-scheduling  
7  Injecting equity in some businesses 
8  Reduced lending 
9  Freezing of lending 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
 
8.3  Conclusions 
The study on which this report is based aimed at identifying the mechanisms through 
which banks in Tanzania could be and were affected by the 2008 global economic crisis 
and the way the banks and authorities responded to the crisis. From the findings of the 
study, a number of conclusions are made in this section. 
It has been found that banks in Tanzania were potentially and actually affected by the 
2008 global economic crisis. There are about twenty two (22) different mechanisms 
through which the 2008 global economic crisis could have affected banks in Tanzania  
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and arguably other banks in similar environment elsewhere. The extent to which the 
studied banks could be actually affected depend on a number of issues. These include 
issues that are internal to Tanzania as well as issues that are external to Tanzania. Issues 
that are internal to Tanzania include the relatively low development level of the 
banking industry in the country as well as little integration of the banks in the global 
financial system. 
The little integration of Tanzanian banks in the global financial system in turn has 
reduced potential and actual exposure of the banks to complex financial products. It has 
also reduced potential and actual exposures to toxic assets that could have negatively 
affected the banks. Another factor that is specific to Tanzania that has reduced the 
impacts of the crisis to the banking sector in Tanzania is the legal framework in which 
foreign banks operate in Tanzania. Such banks are registered as independent banks with 
own capital base and not as subsidiaries of their foreign parent banks. This is in 
accordance to the Banking And Financial Institutions Act 2006.  
Only two banks out of the 32 that were licensed by BoT when the study began were 
studied deeply. This is just 6.25% of the banks. This is not a representative sample of 
all the banks. Therefore they may not give a full picture of the impacts of and responses 
to the crisis in all banks in Tanzania. However, the results indicate that other similar 
banks in similar environment as the ones covered in the case study might have been 
affected by the crisis and responded to it in similar mechanisms and ways. Findings 
from the BoT arguably give a full picture of impacts and responses across the banking 
sector in Tanzania. This is because as the regulator of the industry, BoT has an over 
view of the impacts of and responses to the crisis in all the banks.  
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It is concluded also that some mechanisms through which banks could be impacted by 
the crisis and respond to the same are as stated in the literature.. Others however, are 
not. This implies that some impacts and responses in the literature have been confirmed 
while others have not. There are also some mechanisms of impacts and ways of 
responses to the 2008 economic crisis that were not in the literature but emerged from 
the field case studies.  
This implies that the study has improved the understanding of the way economic crisis 
can affect banks and the way banks can respond to the same. This implies additional 
knowledge in the body of literature. It is also seen that for some findings from the 
banks, especially those on the impacts of the crisis there are missing clear causality. 
Banks have reported some mechanisms through which they were affected by the crisis 
but have not established clear causal-effect relationship. Therefore, some of the impacts 
stated by banks may not be conclusive until very clear causal-effect relationships are 
established. Since this was beyond the scope of this study, there is a need for further 
study in the future. 
8.4  Recommendations 
There are a number of recommendations that can be made based on the findings of this 
study. In this sub-section, some policy implications as well as implications for further 
research are identified. It is expected that the policy recommendations will help policy 
and decision makers to formulate and implement policies that will help in avoiding or 
reducing impacts of economic crisis in banking sector should a similar crisis occur. The 
recommendations are also important for policy and decision makers in knowing the 
course of actions to take to respond to eventual similar crisis. 
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There is no research that can address and answer all issues in a single volume. The 
study on which this thesis is based is not an exception. It has covered some research 
issues as stated in the objectives. However it has also raised a number of issues that can 
be researched on further in the future either by the researcher himself or by other 
researchers. The recommendations for further research therefore are important in 
addressing the issues that could not be addressed in this study for various reasons. They 
are important in taking the issues raised in this work into higher levels and stimulating 
more bedates thereby adding value to the body of knowledge. 
8.4.1  Policy Recommendations  
Among the policy recommendations based on the findings of the study include the need 
for policy and decision makers to ensure that there in place policies that will contribute 
in preventing and in some cases reducing impacts of economic crisis in the banking 
sector. From the findings, it is clear that the banking sector in Tanzania was negatively 
impacted by the 2008 global economic crisis in an indirect way. It was mainly impacted 
through the negative impacts of the crisis in the real sectors of the economy. It is in 
these sectors that clients of the banks operate.  
The impacts of the crisis to the these clients were contagious. They were partly 
transmitted into the banks that finance their operations. There is therefore a need of 
getting correct policy mixture that will prevent the real sectors of the economy from 
being negatively affected by the crisis. The real sectors of the Tanzanian economy were 
affected by the 2008 through the bounce-on or second-round effects of the crisis. Part 
of appropriate policies to prevent or reduce such impacts includes policy measures that 
reduce dependency on export market.  
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Such policy measures include having in place fiscal and monetary policy measures and 
instruments that are conducive for building huge, strong and dynamic domestic market 
through inter alia value addition to intermediate goods and processing to final products 
of a number of products that are exported without value addition. These are mainly 
products from such extractive sectors as agriculture and mining. These would reduce 
the negative impacts of economic crisis to the dealers in various nodes of various value 
chains who suffered from reduced demand in export market as a result of the crisis that 
hit more the developed world than countries like Tanzania.  
Other policy measures to reduce the impacts of economic crisis in the banking sctor 
include fiscal and monetary policy measures and instruments that would stimulate and 
bail out the real sectors of the economy. These measures would reduce and even 
remove the possibility of the reals sectors of the economy to collapse thereby dragging 
the banking sector behind them. 
When impacts of the crisis to the potential and actual bank clients are reduced through 
such policy measures inter alia, the contagious impacts on banks would also be 
reduced. Therefore, the first area of focus in preventing the impacts of the crisis in the 
banking sector is first and foremost to prevent the same from the real sectors of the 
economy.  
Among the policy implications in as far as responses to the crisis are concened include 
the need for policy and decision makers to ensure that there are smart regulations in the 
banking sector and that these are implemented. The regulators in the banking sector 
need to continuousy be alert and awake to avoid being taken by surprise in case of 
another economic crisis.  
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It has been seen in the research that the 2008 economic cris affected banks across the 
world, Tanzania included. It is fortunate that the crisis did not lead to collapse of banks 
in Tanzania. However, it should not be taken for granted that economic crises will not 
led to collapse of banks in the country always. Policy and decision makers should be 
proactive and formulate policies that will guide among other things, how depositors’ 
cash will be protected in eventual bank collapse as a result of a future economic crisis.  
There also should be policies on how strategically important and too large to collapse 
banks should be bailed out in eventual future crisis leading to collapse of such banks. 
Policy options include bailing them out through tax payers’ money. Another alternative 
is to require these banks to write a living will that should show how the banks will 
rescue themselves from their own fall and collapse. This is important in order to 
increase confidence on customers and avoid run on banks should another crisis emerge. 
8.4. 2 Recommendations for Further Research 
As noted above, this study has not been able to cover all the research issues pertaining 
to the 2008 global economic crisis in general and its impacts to and responses in the 
banking sector in Tanzania in particular. This was not the objective of the study either. 
Therefore, there are many issues that have been raised in this study that constitute areas 
for further research. This is because this study is a pioneering one in this area and level. 
Many other studies can be generated based on the issues covered as well as those not 
covered in this work. Some of these areas for further research are outlined below. 
This study has identified the way the BoT responded to the 2008 economic crisis in the 
banking sector in Tanzania. For comparison purposes, future studies can identify the 
way central banks in other countries responded to the crisis. 
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 The study has also identified about twenty two (22) mechanisms through which banks 
can have been affected by the 2008 global economic crisis in Tanzania. Each of these 
mechanisms can form an area for further in-depth study. Among the areas that call for 
further research in some of the mechanisms is establishment of clear causality between 
the impacts stated by the banks on one hand and the 2008 global economic crisis on the 
other. This is so because it is understood that there are possibly many other factors that 
led to the observed changes than the 2008 economic crisis. 
Another area for further research is to replicate and extend the research to many more 
banks. Due to reason explained in detail in the methodology chapter of this study 
especially on the type of research design, the field research covered only two (2) out of 
32 banks that were licensed by BoT when the study began. This implies that the same 
study can be replicated in many other banks. The best would be to conduct a census that 
would give a true picture of the mechanisms through which all the banks were affected 
by the 2008 global economic crisis and the way they responded to the same.  
The next best alternative would be to conduct a survey in which the study would be 
conducted in a representative sample of banks. This would also give the general 
situation on the mechanisms through which banks were affected and their resposes to 
the crisis. Also future researches can be conducted using case studies from other banks 
that were not covered in this study. 
Another area for further research is in distinguishing the impacts of the 2008 global 
economic crisis from those of the 2012 Euro zone sovereign debt crisis. This is because 
the 2008 economic crisis started seeing some recovery in 2010. However, its impacts 
and their results arguably continued beyond 2010. However, the Euro zone crisis  
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started in 2010. It is possible therefore that, banks suffered from the 2010 Euro zone 
sovereign debt crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis at the same time from 2010 
and beyond. Future studies therefore should attempt to separate the impacts of the 2008 
global economic crisis from those of 2010 Euro zone sovereign debt crisis.  
Apart from the general possible areas for further research above, there are some 
specific areas from this study that need to be investigated and interrogated more in the 
future. These are mainly areas that were out of scope of this study and where no data 
could be immediately obtained partly because the studied banks themselves had not 
established such data. Based on the findings from this study for example, it is important 
in the future to establish the number of actual and potential customers that banks lost 
due to increased credit risk and therefore increase in interest rate that made some clients 
to move away from a specific bank. 
Also the actual and potential revenues and profits lost due to customer loss for the 
above reason was beyond the scope of this study and the banks did not have data on the 
same. All these form part of areas for further research. Establishing such lost 
customers, revenues and profits would require establishing a clear causality between 
the crisis on one hand and the lost customers, revenues and profits on the other. It 
would also imply filtering out other possible contributory factors than the 2008 
economic crisis to loss of customers, revenues and profits by the bank. 
This study could not establish with direct empirical evidence whether there was a run 
on banks due to the 2008 crisis or not. A proper measure of run on banks would be 
figures on daily, weekly or monthly withdrawals before, during and after the crisis. 
This would help in assessing whether during the crisis there was extraordinary 
withdraws that can be translated as a run on banks. In immediate absence of such 
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figures, figures on customers’ deposits were used in this study as a proxy to discuss the 
response that Barclays Bank Tanzania did not experience a run on banks.  
Another area for further research is establishing the exact number of banks customers 
who lost jobs and for that reason were unable to service their loans and lead to loss to 
the banks. Based on the rule of thumb that for every one direct job lost there are three 
jobs that are lost, the indirect jobs that were lost due to the crisis then were 144,000. 
This makes a total of direct and indirect jobs lost due to the crisis to be 192,000. It is 
obvious that not all these were potential or actual customers of Barclays Bank Tanzania 
that indicated that it was affected by the crisis through job losses of some of its 
customers. The bank could not give the exact number of its customers who lost jobs 
and therefore were unable to honour their loan obligations. This remains among the 
areas for further research. 
Banks have reported decline in profit due to the 2008 economic crisis. Given the 
business environment that led to the reported decline in profit, it makes sense for the 
banks to attribute a large part of the decline in profit to the 2008 crisis. However, future 
studies can establish a clear causal-effect relationship between the decline in profit on 
one hand and the 2008 economic crisis on the other. This can be established by, inter 
alia, giving a counter-factual situation that shows what would have been the profit level 
had the 2008 crisis not existed. Since it was beyond the scope of this study to establish 
such causality, it remains to be among the areas for further research. 
Findings indicate that the studied banks did not incur any loss of deposits with their 
correspondent banks. This may imply that the correspondent banks were not troubled 
by the crisis. If troubled by the crisis, then the troubles were not contagious to these  
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banks. It was beyond the scope of this study to find out whether  these correspondent 
banks were affected by the 2008 economic crisis and if so why the studied banks were 
not affected through loss of deposits. Therefore further interrogations on these issues 
are needed in future research. Since the correspondent banks are outside Tanzania (in 
USA, UK, South Africa, Sweden, Japan etc), such eventual study has to be conducted 
outside Tanzania. 
It was beyond the scope of this study to identify how the TIB subsidiary (Rasilimali 
Ltd) was affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how this affected TIB in turn. The 
exact impacts of the crisis on Rasilimal Ltd and through it on TIB could not be 
established as it was out of the scope of this study. It therefore constitutes an area for 
further research based on this one. 
The areas for further research that have been identified above are by no means 
exhaustive. Readers can identify many more areas that need further research based on 
this work. Such futher research can be of various types and levels. They can be simple 
small research in form of class assignments for students, bachelors, degree reports as 
well as masters and doctoral theses and dissertations. Other possibilities of forms of 
future researches include but are not limited to post-doctoral researches as well as 
researches for conference papers, among others.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Introduction Letter to Respondents 
                            Honest Prosper Ngowi 
                Mzumbe University 
            P. O. Box 20266  
    Dar Es Salaam 
                          Pngowi2002@yahoo.com,  
                       +255 754 653740 
Dear Sir/Madam , 
REF: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION  
I am a senior lecturer, researcher and consultant in economics and business at Mzumbe 
University Dar Es Salaam College Campus. I am undertaking a Doctoral research at the 
Open University of Tanzania (OUT) on the Impacts of and Responses to the 2008 
Global Financial and Economic Crisis in Tanzanian Banking Sub-sector. Given its 
relevance, your organization has been selected as among respondents for this study.  
It is understood that the world economy went through hard times of economic crisis 
from around September 2008. The crisis had many impacts to various sectors including 
the banking sector. There have been many responses to address the impacts of the crisis 
in various sector including the banking sector. Some of the responses have been  
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successful while others have not. I would like to know specifically what has been the 
mechanisms through which your bank has been impacted by and responded to the 2008 
global economic crisis. This is important for advising on the stability of this and related 
sectors in Tanzania especially in times of economic crisis as the one 2010 Euro Zone 
crisis and other possible economic crises in the future. 
I therefore have the greatest honour to humbly request you to respond to the research 
questions below. The information will be used for the purpose of the said study only. 
Should you prefer a face to face discussion of the questions it is also very much 
appreciated. Otherwise, may you send back your responses to me via 
pngowi2002@yahoo.com or posted to Honest Prosper Ngowi, Box 20266 Dar Es 
Salaam. I can also collect the responses from your office. In case of need, my mobile 
number is +255 754 653 740.  
Sincerely 
Honest Prosper Ngowi 
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Appendix II: Interview Guide and Responses From TIB 
Background Information 
1. Name of the bank ……TIB………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Position of the respondent…Senior Economic Researcher…………………………  
 
Questions 
i) What have been the impacts of the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis in your bank? 
S/n  Possible impacts  Tick 
appropriate 
impacts to 
your bank in 
this column 
Explain the impacts with 
detailed evidence/data and 
how it was dealt with by 
your bank 
1 Defaults by borrowers  Cutflowers, cotton and other 
exportables defaulted 
2 Debt re-scheduling (pay 
time, frequencies and 
amounts) 
  
3 Reduced issuance of loans   
4 Reduced sale of bank 
products (specify the 
products) 
  
5 Reduced profits   
6 Reduced bank soundness X  
7 Exposure to complex 
financial products (name 
them) 
  
8 Credit risks    
9 Losses of deposits with 
troubled correspondent 
X  
 188 
banks 
10 Exposure to crops and 
other commodities 
financing (name them)  
X  
11 Drop in demand for 
government 
securities/Treasury bills 
NA  
12 Parent banking companies 
abroad withdrawing funds 
to support operations at 
home 
NA  
13 Parent banking companies 
stopping re-investing 
profits locally 
NA  
14 Parent banking companies 
repatriating funds from 
subsidiaries 
NA  
15 Parent banking companies 
curtailing local operations 
by selling their assets 
NA  
16 Rapid withdrawal of 
deposits 
X  
17 Reduction of liquidity in 
the banking system  
  
18 Increase in domestic 
demand for credit due to 
curtailed access to credit 
abroad 
  
19 Increase in non-performing 
loans 
  
20 Exposure to personal loans 
due to jobs losses 
X  
21 Exposure to crop financing  X  
22 Others: Describe please   
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ii) What have been the responses to the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis in your bank? 
 
S/n  Possible responses Tick appropriate 
responses taken by your 
bank  
Explain the responses 
in detail with evidence 
1 Freezing of lending X  
2 Reduced lending X  
3 Increased risk assessment   
4 Stress-testing   
5 Financial stability measures 
(explain) 
  
6 More adherence to 
regulations (Central bank 
and Basel regulations) 
  
7 Economic stimulus and/or 
financial sector rescue 
packages 
  
8 Changes in the financial 
system  
X  
9 More strict regulations: 
legislative, oversight, and 
domestic regulatory 
functions for:  
Systemic risks 
Capital standards 
  
10 Central bank strengthening 
of monitoring role 
  
11 Improvement of oversight of 
credit risk  
  
12 More conservative approach 
for collateral valuations 
  
13 Enhancing contingency 
plans to ensure full 
operations in times of stress 
  
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14 Provision of emergency 
liquidity 
X  
15 Improving financial sector 
supervision/stability 
assessment 
NA  
16 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
NA  
17 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
NA  
18 Others: Describe   
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iii) What have been the results of the responses to the crisis in your 
bank
1
? 
S/n  Response taken by your 
bank 
Impacts (results) of 
the response 
Explain the results of 
each response in 
detail with evidence 
1 Freezing of lending X  
2 Reduced lending X  
3 Increased risk assessment   
4 Stress-testing   
5 Financial stability measures 
(explain) 
  
6 More adherence to 
regulations (Central bank 
and Basel regulations) 
  
7 Economic stimulus and/or 
financial sector rescue 
packages 
  
8 Changes in the financial 
system  
NA  
9 More strict regulations: 
legislative, oversight, and 
domestic regulatory 
functions for:  
Systemic risks 
Capital standards 
  
10 Central bank strengthening 
of monitoring role 
  
11 Improvement of oversight of 
credit risk  
  
12 More conservative approach 
for collateral valuations 
  
13 Enhancing contingency 
plans to ensure full 
operations in times of stress 
  
                                                          
1
 What happened to the bank when you responded to the crisis? 
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14 Provision of emergency 
liquidity 
X  
15 Improving financial sector 
supervision/stability 
assessment 
NA  
16 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
NA  
17 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
NA  
18 Others: Describe   
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Appendix III: Documents Availed by TIB to Supplement Primary Data 
1. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
1998 
2. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
1999 
3. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2000 
4. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2001 
5. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2002 
6. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2003 
7. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2004 
8. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2005 
9. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2006 
10. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2007 
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11. Tanzania Investment Bank Annual Report For the Year Ended 31st December 
2008 
12. Tanzania Investment Bank, Annual Report for the Period January – December 
2009 
13. Tanzania Investment Report 2010 
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Appendix IV: Interview Guide and Responses From Barclyas Bank 
Background Information 
1. Name of the bank …………Barclay Bank…………………………………2 
 
2. Positions of the respondents: Senior Treasury Staffs 
Background 
Barclays Tz is more in manufacturing, tourism, construction and real estate. Not much 
on agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 If you do not want the name of the bank to be specifically mentioned in the research report, please 
indicate so 
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QUESTIONS 
a. What have been the impacts of the 2008 global financial and economic 
crisis in your bank? 
S/n  Possible impacts  Tick 
appropriate 
impacts to 
your bank in 
this column 
Explain the impacts with detailed 
evidence/data and how it was dealt with 
by your bank 
1 Defaults by borrowers X For those in tourisis. So repayment has to 
be rescheduled. Bank had to negotiate 
with them (NPL unit). These customers 
were put in special unit care. Hotels had 
cancelled bookings. Some 5 years loans 
had to be 6 years and re-amortized 
 
Manufacturing did not face similar 
challenges – their markets were internal 
were affected though raw materials price 
hike.  
 
Main worry was on tourism and these 
customers were put on watch list. Matured 
business could survive, new ones had to 
negotiate renogiated  about 10m punds of 
loan portifolio (10% of Barckays 
corporatebook 
2 Debt re-scheduling (pay 
time, frequencies and 
amounts) 
yes On case by case depending on their 
position, eg some with some customers 
still had hopes for more business. 
Equity injection was another strategy by 
the bank – required promoters to inject 
funds 
3 Reduced issuance of 
loans 
x Two ways: headroom was cancelled – to 
limit exposures to some sectors 
2) Evaluated high risk sectors like 
tourism; whole sale and trade (buying 
commodities abroad were frozen 
considerably – especially for new 
businesses, than known ones also froze 
personal lending – this affects the bank 
because it is reduced customers who went 
to more risk avers 
4 Reduced sale of bank 
products (specify the 
products) 
X Longer-maturing obligations were stoped 
5 Reduced profits X Profits come from interest. If you do not 
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led you reduce profit.  
For controlled profits the bank focued 
more to mass clients (individuals/retal – 
this was not done well/controlled so it lead 
to loss) rather than corporate 
6 Reduced bank soundness  Did not collapse, buffer capital was still 
good, ability to do business is still there 
but not very well with stakeholders 
7 Exposure to complex 
financial products (name 
them) 
no Only loans especially long term maturing 
obligations. Term loans above two years is 
a problem 
8 Credit risks  X Increase almost 100%. Interest went up 
substantially by 5%.  This is disincemtive 
to customers…. Corporate world shy 
away from borronwing this time but 
personal borrowing increase. Risk 
averseness inc reased – shy away from 
new business 
9 Losses of deposits with 
troubled correspondent 
banks 
no Mainbank is Barclay so no exposures. 
Were vetting across the world with 
financial institutions which which it has 
correspondent 
10 Exposure to crops and 
other commodities 
financing (name them)  
NB  
11 Drop in demand for 
government 
securities/Treasury bills 
no No issues. Market not disturbed 
12 Parent banking 
companies abroad 
withdrawing funds to 
support operations at 
home 
no Nothing was taken from Barclay Tz 
because Barclay UK (parent bank) Qatari 
Group (shareholders) bought preferential 
shares instead of taking UK Govt capital 
…. Buffer was enough but even so  
13 Parent banking 
companies stopping re-
investing profits locally 
no Has bigger buffer of capital so did not 
need to take money from Barclay 
Tanzania – the buffer was enough and was 
not desperate 
14 Parent banking 
companies repatriating 
funds from subsidiaries 
no As abpve 
15 Parent banking 
companies curtailing 
local operations by 
selling their assets 
no Liquid 
16 Rapid withdrawal of 
deposits 
no Market run of this ind did not haopen 
here. But generally financial institutions 
trading with each other stopped quickly to 
reduce exposure; Banks reduced selling to 
each other but did not tell so offcia  
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17 Reduction of liquidity in 
the banking system  
Yes Liquidity 
18 Increase in domestic 
demand for credit due to 
curtailed access to credit 
abroad 
NA  
19 Increase in non-
performing loans 
Yes Increased – 60% as watch list : some NPL 
20 Exposure to personal 
loans due to jobs losses 
N Massive in retail lending. Some smaller 
establishment c;osed 
21 Exposure to crop 
financing  
 NA 
22 Others: Describe please   
 
 
b. What have been the responses to the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis in your bank? 
S/n  Possible responses Tick 
appropriate 
responses 
taken by your 
bank  
Explain the responses in detail with evidence 
1 Freezing of lending   
2 Reduced lending   
3 Increased risk assessment   
4 Stress-testing No It did stress testing by doing simulations/scenarios eg 
tourism – resulted in decision to reduce loans to 
tourism – used profit margin for producers; number 
of tourist arrivals; foreign currency watch (inflows of 
forex is thru exports/tourism/remittances – for clients 
depending on forex, they were changed to Tz; export 
customers (to watch cancellation of contracts) 
5 Financial stability measures 
(explain) 
  
6 More adherence to regulations 
(Central bank and Basel 
regulations) 
x BoT provided information to see how much capital 
banks in Tanzania had – Tz banks have about 16% 
buffer whole Basel requirement is 10% 
7 Economic stimulus and/or 
financial sector rescue 
packages 
No  
8 Changes in the financial system    
9 More strict regulations: 
legislative, oversight, and 
domestic regulatory functions 
for:  
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Systemic risks 
Capital standards 
10 Central bank strengthening of 
monitoring role 
Yes Number of returns/reports to BoT increased this town 
around to monitor bank operation 
11 Improvement of oversight of 
credit risk  
  
12 More conservative approach for 
collateral valuations 
Yes Relation of collateral value: 25% for up for upcountry 
clients  
13 Enhancing contingency plans 
to ensure full operations in 
times of stress 
No Had enough buffer 
14 Provision of emergency 
liquidity 
Yes There is always liquidity crisis in baning sector with 
BoT as lender of last resort. Bank has contingency 
plans as per statutory requirements  to deposit 
pension funds 
15 Improving financial sector 
supervision/stability 
assessment 
  
16 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and early 
warning system to spot signs of 
weakness 
  
17 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and early 
warning system to spot signs of 
weakness 
  
18 Others: Describe  A number of actions like strengthening capital ratio 
(buffer); capital requirement is 10% by Basel, but 
ours is 16% 
NPL ratio to gross loans and adnaced should not be 
over 5% 
,any other measures to buffer the banks 
Barclays barel touched by the crisis – don’t have 
complex products like derivatives 
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c. What have been the results of the responses to the crisis in your 
bank
3
? 
S/n  Response taken by 
your bank 
Impacts 
(results) of 
the response 
Explain the results of each 
response in detail with evidence 
1 Freezing of lending   
2 Reduced lending   
3 Increased risk 
assessment 
  
4 Stress-testing   
5 Financial stability 
measures (explain) 
  
6 More adherence to 
regulations (Central 
bank and Basel 
regulations) 
  
7 Economic stimulus 
and/or financial sector 
rescue packages 
  
8 Changes in the financial 
system  
  
9 More strict regulations: 
legislative, oversight, and 
domestic regulatory 
functions for:  
Systemic risks 
Capital standards 
  
10 Central bank strengthening 
of monitoring role 
  
11 Improvement of oversight of 
credit risk  
  
12 More conservative approach 
for collateral valuations 
  
13 Enhancing contingency 
plans to ensure full 
operations in times of stress 
  
14 Provision of emergency   
                                                          
3
 What happened to the bank when you responded to the crisis? 
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liquidity 
15 Improving financial sector 
supervision/stability 
assessment 
  
16 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
  
17 Risk-based assessments of 
financial institutions and 
early warning system to spot 
signs of weakness 
  
18 Others: Describe   
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Appendix V: Follow Up Questions For Barclays Bank 
SOME FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS TO BARCLAYS BANK FOR 
ELABORATION  
1. In one of your response I noted that Barclays reduced loans inssuance through 
“headroom?” I am not sure whether I got this well, what does it mean? 
2. May you give figures for defaults, associated reduced revenues, profits and loss 
incured as a result of the 2008 economic crisis please? 
3. May you  give figures for reduced issuance of loans and associated reduced 
revenues, profits and loss incured as a result of the 2008 economic crisis please? 
4. Due to the 2008 economic crisis, the bank was obliged to stop longer-maturing 
obligations: May I get some elaboration/examples of these “longer-maturing 
obligations” please 
5. May we have figures on reduction of customers and related revenues and profits 
due to increased credit risk that made it necessary to increase interest rate 
please? Interest rate was increased fro xxxxx to xxxxxxxxx 
6. Which are Barclays correspondent banks? 
7. How many of your borrowers are sallaried employees with employers’ 
guarantees on their loans? How many of these lost jobs due to the economic 
crisis and therefore were unable to pay their loans as agreed? 
8. How many of your customers are based in (i) Tanzania (ii) Europe (iii) USA 
9. Among Barclays responses to the 2008 economic crisis include injecting equity 
in some businesses. May I know how this was done including figures (number 
of busineses/amount of money involved etc..) 
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10. How much did the bank reduce lending due to the 2008 economic crisis?: 
Lending before the crisis was xxxxxxxxxxxx, Lending after the crisis was 
xxxxxxxxx 
11. Barclays increased the number of reports/returns to BoT: How many were 
submitted before? How many were submitted after BoT’s requirements for 
more reports/returns? 
12. Among the responses to the crisis at Barclays, include More conservative 
approach for collateral valuations: How was it done before? How is it done after 
the crisis? 
13. Is it possible to get your annual reports for the period 2006/07 – 2011/2012 
please 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 204 
Appendix VI: Documents Availed by Barclays Bank to Complement Primary Data  
1. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2006 
2. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2007 
3. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2008 
4. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2009 
5. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2010 
6. Barclays Annual Report and Financial Statement For Year Ended December 
31st  2011 
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Appendix VII: Responses From the Bank of Tanzania 
Background Information 
1. Name of the bank …………Bank of Tanzania 
2. Positions of the respondents: Senior Researchers …… ……………………  
NB: Dear Ngowi, on top of the written responses, please see the documents listed 
below for your further review 
The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Banks 
The financial sector in Tanzania was not affected directly by first round of the impact 
of the global financial crisis as was, in the case of advanced economies, partly due to 
the fact that banks in Tanzania were not holding the ‘toxic’ securities and debt 
instruments that had spread the crisis across the international financial system. The 
second round impact though, was felt in Tanzania as demand for exports collapsed, 
affecting the cash flows of export based activities. This caused banks to be more 
cautious to lending to the establishments involved in such activities, leading to a 
substantial slow down in credit growth from 44.6 percent in 2008 to 9.6 percent in 
2009. Banks seemed to substitute credit growth with accumulation of foreign assets.  
Second, the overall quality of the financial sector’s loan portfolio deteriorated. The 
non-performing loans increased during the height of the crisis (mid 2009) and return on 
assets declined as interest rates fell. 
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Measures taken by the Bank of Tanzania 
The Bank of Tanzania took a number of measures to mitigate the impact of global 
financial crisis.  
First, the Bank enhanced monitoring of the activities of the financial sector through 
introduction of daily surveillance of selected performance indicators of banks. These 
indicators have ever since been presented and discussed in the surveillance meeting on 
daily basis.  
Second, the Bank of Tanzania adopted a relatively easy monetary policy stance in 
2009/10 as a countercyclical measure to mitigate the impact of the crisis. It revised the 
money supply growth upwards 2009/10, and lowered the Lombard and the discount 
rates to allow greater flexibility in the provision of liquidity to the economy.  
Third, to improve the resilience of the financial sector to shocks in the medium to long-
term, the Bank raised the minimum capital requirements of commercial banks from 
TZS 5.0 billion to TZS 15.0 billion in 2010, (to be attained within three years by the 
existing banks). It also established a dedicated Financial Stability Unit which, among 
others, will produce routine financial stability reports and help to coordinate financial 
sector regulatory activities in the country.  
More details can be found in the following references (including their statistical annexes) 
Bank of Tanzania Annual Report 2010/11 page 66, paragraph 4;  
Bank of Tanzania Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement June 2010 Section 3.1; 
Section 6.4 
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Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement February 2010 page 7, 8 and 13; page 10;  
Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement February 2011 Section 4.10;  
Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review January 2010 
IMF Country Report No. 10/351 December 2010 paragraphs 17 to 19, page 38 and 39;  
IMF Country Report No: 09/336 December 2009 paragraph 11 to 14 page 29 and 30; 
paragraph 14 page 13;  paragraph 26 page 32 
 IMF Country Report No: 10/173 June 2010 paragraph 9 page 10; paragraph 27 page 23  
Tanzania Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies Attachment to IMF Country 
Report No: 10/173 June 2010 paragraph 12-14 on page 39, and paragraph 8 page 81; 
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Appendix VIII: Documents Availed by BoT to Complement Primary Data 
Bank of Tanzania Annual Report 2010/11  
Bank of Tanzania Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement June 2010 
Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement February 2010 
Bank of Tanzania Monetary Policy Statement February 2011 
Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review January 2010 
Bank of Tanzania Financial Stability Report September 2010 
Bank of Tanzania Financial Stability Report September 2011 
IMF Country Report No. 10/351 December 2010 
IMF Country Report No: 09/336 December 2009 
IMF Country Report No: 10/173 June 2010 
 
 
 
 
